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G E N E R A L  E D I T O R ’ S  I N T R O D U C T I O N
Visit almost any military or regimental museum and you will find mementos
of individual lives. These take many forms: medals, uniforms, bibles, letters,
diaries, paintings, photographs; or sometimes collected ‘ethnic’ materials,
both the weaponry of opponents and the artefacts of their peaceful activities.
The relatives of soldiers, NCOs and officers usually find solace in donating
such materials to the museums where they feel they will be cherished, will be
useful to those wishing to study military history, or will be displayed for
public view. Sometimes, the donations happen after their owner’s death in
action; sometimes at the end of a full life of survival and return to ‘civvy
street’. Naturally, much of this material relates to the two World Wars of the
twentieth century, but, given Britain’s imperial past, it is striking that a high
proportion of these donations relate to the imperial campaigns of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. This is also true of so many of the
colours and battle honours that hang in churches, testimony to a communal
pride, or to the large numbers of memorials, brass plaques and gravestones to
be found around the country. For the observant visitor, colonial campaigns
have a habit of turning up almost anywhere, not only in the museums,
churches and graveyards of the imperial power, but also in the landscape,
memories and preserved artefacts among the peoples against whom these
campaigns were fought. 
Although there has been a plethora of many different types of military his-
tory, this book is one of the first to consider the lives and attitudes of individ-
uals both in the officer corps and in the ranks, in this case exclusively on the
British side. Each war also stimulates a small wave of publications, something
apparent again in the Falklands, Gulf and Iraq wars of the last quarter century.
Soldiers still write letters, keep diaries (now sometimes audio diaries) and
occasionally write books, all with an eye both to their relatives and to a wider
public. Each war throws up its criticisms and its controversies and after each
there is a sort of ‘appeal to the ancestors’ as a means of modifying policy,
improving conditions or equipment, and as testimony to bravery and incom-
petence, political strategy and military tactics. 
This book takes a sequence of colonial campaigns in Africa and sets out to
illuminate them from the materials left by British combatants. These men
were taken from familiar surroundings to highly unfamiliar ones, to ‘small
wars’ that Sir Charles Callwell described as ‘campaigns against nature’.
‘Nature’ in this instance was not just the environment, but the nature of con-
ventional warfare, the nature of opponents who often turned out to be more
competent than any over-confident imperialist expected, and indeed the
nature of the British soldiery who had to cope with climatic conditions, dis-
ease, and indigenous tactics such as they had never imagined. Inevitably, the
soldiers reflected on all of these in their letters and diaries, in their judgments
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of the situations in which they found themselves, and in their attitudes to
superiors and the ‘enemy’ which were often severely tested and modified in
the course of campaigns.
In doing so, they invariably kept people at home informed in ways that were
not always possible in the press. For, after all, the writings and materials that
went home were all part of the manner in which an imperial society tried to
make sense of the warfare into which its elite led it. The materials that are
revealed and analysed in this book were part of the reciprocal character of the
imperial experience: warfare was not just some ‘distant noise’. Through its
combatants’ connections with families and friends, it was, in some senses, a
set of surprising, often disorientating, and sometimes tragic events, which
were also experienced by those at home.
John M. MacKenzie
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Since the 1970s our understanding of the late Victorian army has ben-
efited from a diverse and burgeoning array of scholarship. There have
been major works on civil–military relations, the army and society,
army reform, and imperial defence, buttressed by biographies of senior
commanders, studies of war correspondents and the role of the army in
imperial propaganda.1 Yet the human experience of Victorian warfare
has been less well documented – an oversight that contrasts sharply
with a profusion of recent studies on human experience in twentieth-
century warfare. Quite reasonably the authors of twentieth-century
studies claim that their works shed light on the demands and burdens
of campaigning, especially the ordeal of battle, perceptions of enemies,
allies and warfare itself, relations between officers and men (and
between various units fighting along side each other) as well as insights
on tactics, morale, discipline, weaponry, and combat motivation.2
These historical inquiries have benefited from the extent of twentieth-
century warfare – total wars in two cases, involving millions of pro-
tagonists, many of whom were literate and left testimony about their
experiences (not merely letters, poems and diaries but also oral testi-
mony on tape and in film). There is obviously less scope for examining
the military experience of the British soldier in the late nineteenth cen-
tury when the numbers involved, the degree of literacy and the facili-
ties for recording opinions were less extensive. Nevertheless, Victorian
soldiers wrote letters to family and friends at home, kept diaries, com-
posed poems, and occasionally gave interviews in far greater numbers
than is often realised. This was particularly true of the soldiers who left
bases in Britain and the Mediterranean to serve in the relatively short
campaigns in Africa before returning (or expecting to return) home.
From their writings retained in national and regimental archives, with
even more recorded in the metropolitan and provincial press and some
in articles and memoirs, insights can be gleaned about campaigning in
Africa as well as about the values, priorities and perceptions of the sol-
diers themselves.
In his study of the South African War (1899–1902), Thomas Paken-
ham argues that ‘the ordinary soldiers took time off to write letters
back to England in reply to those thousands of letters from home that
littered the veld at every camp site. It was the first dramatic test of the
new mass literacy, this orgy of letter writing by the working class.’3
Tabitha Jackson concurs; she claims that Forster’s Education Act of
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1870 had provided a framework for compulsory elementary education,
and that the literacy rate had grown from 63.3 per cent in 1841 to 92.2
per cent in 1900. The war, she asserts, had produced a ‘new outpouring
of writing’ and ‘an equal appetite for reading’ about it, hence the dis-
patch of 58 newspaper correspondents with the main British army to
South Africa.4 Yet in The Red Soldier (1977), and in Marching Over
Africa (1986), the late Frank Emery revealed that Victorian soldiers had
written numerous letters from earlier campaigns. He confirmed that
letter-writing was not an exclusive preserve of regimental officers,5 and
that many shrewd and observant commentaries were written by non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) and private soldiers. Emery, though,
spread his work over much of the Victorian period, including odd let-
ters from the Crimea, India and Afghanistan, and so covered several
campaigns in a perfunctory manner – one letter from the Asante War
(1873–74), six from the reconquest of the Sudan (1896–98) and a mere
three from the South African War. More recent writing indicates that
there is an abundance of material to sustain more focused research and
writing on particular campaigns.6 Utilising such evidence should not
only add to our understanding of these operations but may also provide
corroborating testimony for critical or contentious issues, supply a
greater range of perspectives from soldiers in different regiments or
corps, and yield insights from soldiers engaged in different aspects of
the same campaigns (particularly those in front-line, reserve or sup-
porting roles). In seeking to test these assumptions, this work will con-
centrate on the later African campaigns from the Asante War (1873–74)
to the South African War, and, in the last campaign, review the experi-
ence of regular soldiers from two distinctive parts of the United King-
dom – Scotland and the west country.
Emery rightly argued that the Victorian soldiery, despite being
recruited primarily from the labouring classes in town and country,
was more literate than often imagined.7 If educational improvements
flowed from Forster’s Education Act and the 1872 Scottish Education
Act, they varied from locality to locality, hardly applied to the poverty-
stricken masses in Ireland, and required the addition of free and com-
pulsory elementary education in the early 1890s.8 Meanwhile the army
developed its own educational requirements. In 1861 the possession of
an army certificate of education was made a condition of promotion –
a third-class certificate for promotion to corporal, a second-class cer-
tificate for promotion to sergeant, and a first-class certificate for a com-
mission from the ranks. From 1871 compulsory attendance of five
hours per week was required for new recruits and a new fourth-class
certificate of education – a minimum intended for all soldiers – was
introduced. Superficially the growth in educational attainment levels,
I N T R O D U C T I O N
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as monitored by the director-general of military education, appeared
meteoric, with 48.8 per cent of the rank-and-file described as ‘possess-
ing a superior level of education’ by 1878, 85.4 per cent by 1889.9
These claims, like all educational statistics, have to be interpreted
with care. By 1888, over 60 per cent of the other ranks were unable or
unwilling to pass the examination for a fourth-class certificate of edu-
cation (that is, simple reading and an ability to complete a few easy
sums – a level purportedly attainable by an 8-year old child). So limited
were these achievements that the army abolished the fourth-class cer-
tificate in 1888 and terminated compulsory schooling. Henceforth it
relied upon persuasion and inducement to raise educational standards.
It made the possession of a first-class certificate one of the conditions
for promotion to sergeant and the possession a second-class certificate
a condition for promotion to corporal. It also expected that the regi-
ments would make provision for voluntary schooling. Nevertheless,
genuine improvements in educational standards occurred: the propor-
tion of the rank-and-file in possession of third-class certificates of edu-
cation rose by nearly 30 per cent from 1870 to 1896, and illiteracy –
defined as an inability to read or write one’s own name – diminished
sharply (from an affliction of 90 per cent of rankers in 1860 to virtual
elimination by the end of the century). By the 1890s, fewer than 40 per
cent of men had achieved more than the barest levels of literacy, and
the proportion attaining first-class certificates of education remained
persistently small. In short, the improvements were genuine but lim-
ited; as Alan Skelley perceptively observes, neither the national
system of education nor the provisions made by the army were partic-
ularly effective by the late 1890s, and ‘the standard reached by the
majority of those in the ranks was elementary at best’.10
A literary aptitude, therefore, was perhaps not as common in the
late Victorian army as some have supposed, but it was far from rare.
However, an aptitude to write and the inclination and/or opportunity
to do so did not always coincide. When a campaign was underway
some found all too little time to write or too little inclination to do so.
An engineer serving with Colonel Henry Evelyn Wood’s column in
Zululand apologised to friends in Sheffield: ‘I have very little time for
writing. We are working all day, and have not time for anything, we are
so pushed’, while an officer writing from Suakin in March 1885 was
equally apologetic: ‘You must not expect many letters, as unless I get a
spare day like this I have no time or place to write.’11 This may have
been special pleading, at least as regards the lengthy Anglo-Zulu War
where, as Archibald Forbes (the veteran reporter of the Daily News)
recalled, letter-writing appeared to be the chief relaxation of the men
in their encampments.12 When Sergeant Josh S. Hooper (2/Buffs) was
I N T R O D U C T I O N
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appointed as his regiment’s letter carrier, crossing the Tugela River
with mail in the morning and later re-crossing with stamps from the
post office on the Natal side, he found himself ‘in great demand from
Colonel to Private’ as ‘they all want to receive letters or send some
off’.13
During the Egyptian campaign of 1882, Lieutenant Charles B. Bal-
four (1/Scots Guards) was extremely fortunate inasmuch as he pos-
sessed ample supplies of paper and had the use of a table that his
servants built for him.14 Many others shared the anxieties of Lieu-
tenant H. W. Seton-Karr (1/Gordon Highlanders): ‘I have not been able
to write for some time as materials are short and there is nothing to
write on.’15 Yet officers and men struggled to overcome these difficul-
ties: Seton-Karr kept an extensive diary of his experiences in Egypt, and
many soldiers borrowed paper and pencils or paid exorbitant amounts
for materials (6d a sheet for ruled paper in some instances). Some
pleaded for paper to be sent from home, while others scribbled letters
on the back of knapsacks, leaving the lines of cloth visible in one or
two erasures, or liberated supplies from enemy quarters. A Bishopshire
youth found paper in a sheikh’s tent after the battle of Ginnis (30
December 1885) that was described ‘as coarse in texture and crossed by
dark and thick horizontal lines’.16 Even so, writing as a sedentary exer-
cise could be a daunting experience. Colonel H. S. Jones, in command
of the Royal Marine battalion in Egypt, complained that ‘the flies must
be seen to be realised. They literally make everything black. I am writ-
ing under great difficulties, lying on the ground, and tormented beyond
belief by these pests.’17 In writing from Ambigol Wells during the
Gordon relief expedition, a Cornish officer serving in the West Kent
Regiment apologised for his ‘penmanship, but the flies are doing their
best to carry my nose and mouth by assault; they are simply awful’.18
Some soldiers had additional incentives to persevere with their lit-
erary activities. Quite apart from an understandable desire to reassure
family and friends that the writer had survived the campaign or a par-
ticular battle, several staff and regimental officers wrote for leading
newspapers and journals during the Asante War and in many, if not all,
of the subsequent campaigns. By its sheer prevalence, military jour-
nalism set a context for letter-writing from the front and provided a
further impulse, if only in the desire to get personal versions of events
to an audience at home (or sometimes to one in the colonies). Major-
General Sir Garnet (later Field Marshal Viscount) Wolseley had already
written extensively in Blackwood’s Magazine about his exploits in the
Red River expedition of 1870. He regarded the Magazine’s payments, in
excess of ‘£25 a month’, as ‘a nice addition to one’s half pay’.19 Two of
his staff officers in the Asante campaign, Captain (later General Sir)
I N T R O D U C T I O N
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Henry Brackenbury and Lieutenant (later Major-General Sir) John F.
Maurice also wrote for newspapers and journals. Brackenbury, the
author of a two-volume history of the campaign, readily accepted £300
from Blackwood for the work as he was a ‘poor man’ who needed rec-
ompense for ‘the loss of my appointment which I gave up when I went
with Sir Garnet, and the heavy expense of the campaign, and other
matters . . .’.20 Financial gain remained a powerful incentive: when
Brackenbury wrote for the Illustrated London News in the summer of
1877, he was allowed 25 columns at four guineas per column of 1,100
words; when he wrote for the Daily Telegraph, he received £5 per
column of 1,500 words.21 Twenty years later the Morning Post paid
Winston Churchill £10 per column for the 15 articles that he wrote
from the Sudan – articles that spanned some 140 manuscript pages.22
In spite of the increasing presence of ‘special’ correspondents and
war artists in these campaigns – some 30-odd in the Sudan (1896–98)
and at least 70 accredited journalists with the British army in South
Africa by early 1900 23 – the serving officer remained much in demand.
When Charles Fripp, the Graphic’s correspondent, fell ill and had to
leave Zululand, he persuaded Lieutenant Edward Hutton (60th Rifles)
to make sketches for him and send them to his newspaper for publica-
tion.24 Journalists sometimes missed key episodes in battles, such as
the charge of the 21st Lancers at Omdurman (2 September 1898), and
so required soldiers to provide the crucial insights. Just as Captains
Edward Stanton and Sir Henry Rawlinson, as well as Corporal John Far-
quharson (1/Seaforth Highlanders), provided sketches from the earlier
battle of Atbara (8 April 1898), Lieutenant John Brinton (2/Life
Guards), who was attached to the 21st Lancers and was wounded in the
charge, may have supplied details for René Bull’s sketch of the charge.
Brinton, according to his friend Churchill, served as a correspondent
for Bull’s paper Black and White.25
Neither the Horse Guards nor the War Office welcomed this profu-
sion of writing for the press. In November 1872 Edward Cardwell, the
secretary of state for war, ruefully quoted the adjutant general, General
Sir Richard Airey, as stating: ‘Three years ago no one was allowed to
talk shop: now every one wants to write a Book.’26 Similarly, in the fes-
tering relations between Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge, who
was the officer commanding-in-chief, the duke claimed that he
dreaded Wolseley’s ‘connection with the Press’.27 Even if the War Office
came to appreciate that military correspondents were likely to be less
critical than their civilian counterparts, some senior officers, including
Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener, remained profoundly suspicious of sol-
diers (such as Winston Churchill) who used their reporting to prepare
for a political or another career once they left the service.28
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Letter-writing from the front, which was mainly passed on by the
recipient to metropolitan or local newspapers, with or without the
agreement (or the name, rank and military affiliation) of the writer con-
cerned, came into a different category. The army appreciated that sol-
diers wanted to receive correspondence from family and friends, and
that a two-way flow of correspondence could sustain morale during an
overseas campaign. Concessionary rates for postage persisted since the
late eighteenth century (1d for soldiers’ letters and 6d each for offi-
cers’), and elaborate arrangements were made with colonial postal ser-
vices to support the flow of mail to and from the soldiers in Zululand
and later the Transvaal. When the army was sent to Egypt in 1882 an
Army Post Office Corps (APOC) was formed of volunteers from the
24th Middlesex (Post Office) Rifle Volunteers, and during the campaign
six army post offices were opened (two in Alexandria, one in Port Said,
one in Ismailia, and two accompanying the march of the 1st and 2nd
Divisions), with another 15 staff manning five field post offices to ser-
vice the needs of the 7,000 men sent from India to Egypt. There were
similar arrangements in support of the Suakin expedition of 1885, and
during the South African War, a vastly expanded APOC (396 all ranks
by May 1901) sustained the massive war effort. If troops on the march
could not obtain stamps, the letters were charged to the addressees at
the rate which would have been prepaid. By the end of September 1902,
APOC had delivered 68.9 million letters and newspapers and 1.4 mil-
lion parcels to the troops.29
Nevertheless, the War Office remained anxious about information
from a campaign finding its way into the public domain. On 7 March
1881 Ralph Thompson, the permanent under-secretary at the War
Office, warned newspaper editors not to reveal information, particu-
larly if sent by telegraph, that could assist the enemy. He evinced con-
cern about revealing the dates when reinforcements were due to arrive,
all movements of troops, the numbers of guns and garrisons, details of
transport and where collected, and information about temporary
bridges and posts.30 Understandable as these anxieties were, what was
published in Britain was probably of less importance than what was
written in Africa and either published locally (a section of the Egyptian
press remained hostile to the British policy in Egypt and the Sudan)31 or
went astray. The Daily Chronicle’s extensive reports of the battle of
Abu Klea (17 January 1885) went missing for several weeks, and other
reports and sketches from the same battle never reached their destina-
tion. Some 2,000 bags of mail were also seized, ransacked and burnt by
the Boers when they captured the Roodewal Railway Station on 7 June
1900.32 Beleaguered British forces went to extraordinary lengths to pro-
tect their correspondence: in the Transvaal, in 1881, dispatches were
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written on tissue paper, folded small and hard, and then placed in quills
which native runners concealed in their hair. All too often, though, the
runners discarded their messages lest the Boer patrols discover them.
During the Sudan campaign of 1898 when the expedition moved
beyond the railway terminus, correspondents sent their letters,
sketches, and telegrams down river by native swimmers.33
From the Egyptian campaign onwards, the military authorities
moved beyond exhortation and censored telegrams from the front. On
the subsequent Nile expedition Bennet Burleigh, the correspondent of
the Daily Telegraph, complained that the excised copy concerned both
well-understood military details and the feelings of officers and men
about the news of Khartoum’s capture and the death of Gordon. ‘For
that black day’, he wrote, ‘very few of those who formed part of the
Nile Valley expeditionary force will ever forgive the officials responsi-
ble.’34 While information on the troops’ morale might have been of
interest to the Mahdi, its suppression served political purposes. ‘Spe-
cial’ correspondents faced even more difficulties when the obsessively
secretive Kitchener was in charge of the Sudan campaign of 1896–98.
He treated most of the press with contempt, rarely gave interviews,
limited their telegraphic allowance to 200 words a day, and required
Major (later Major-General Sir) F. Reginald Wingate to act as censor. As
Wingate, assisted by Brevet-Colonel (later Major-General) Leslie
Rundle and Major (later Major-General) Hector Macdonald, had to read
thousands of words daily, this meant delays and cuts, often without
telling the writers.35 Apart from irritating the ‘special’ correspondents,
this censorship enhanced the value of uncensored communications
from the front, namely the letters of officers and men.
Generally letters from soldiers (and sometimes from civilians accom-
panying the expeditionary forces) leant colour, corroboration at times,
and often particular insights to the reports from ‘special’ correspon-
dents. Their style varied enormously, ranging from highly personalised,
graphic and blood-curdling descriptions to more detached, detailed and
factual accounts. Even if the letters were perforce limited in perspec-
tive, often blinkered by regimental loyalty, and frequently inaccurate in
assessing distance, casualties and numbers of the enemy, they had a
lasting value. They described the hardships, dangers, fears and exhilara-
tion of active service in a way rarely conveyed in the official dispatches.
Sometimes they constituted the only first-hand record of particular
engagements, that is, if the vast majority of officers were killed, as in
the ambush at Bronkhorst Spruit (20 December 1880) or if journalists
were not present, as in the siege of Wakkerstroom (1880–81).36
Their value was further enhanced by the ability of editors to identify
the authors, exploit their local appeal, and highlight the element of
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human interest. Letters passed on by recipients to the metropolitan or,
more commonly, local newspapers might or might not carry the
author’s name, rank, and regimental affiliation. Traditionally, serving
officers who wrote directly for newspapers or journals had to be dis-
creet. Sir John Adye feared that any revelation of his name ‘would
injure me professionally’, while Brackenbury insisted: ‘The authorship
[of an article on the Royal Artillery] must be kept secret . . . They may
guess as much as they like, but they must not be able to assert who is
the writer.’37 A fortnight later he urged that Blackwood should ‘not
send me a cheque for RA article, lest it should be traced, – unless it is
without my name, payable to bearer, and not crossed’.38 Similarly,
during the South African War, when writing for the newspapers had
become so prevalent that officers and men sent letters directly for pub-
lication in the ‘Letters from the Front’ columns of many newspapers,
these letters were often anonymous,39 unlike those passed on by friends
and family to the press.
Provincial newspapers, especially those who could not afford to send
their own ‘specials’ or employ officers to cover a campaign, reproduced
reports from the central press agencies or from those in the major
London newspapers. Like the London press, they also printed letters
passed on from the family and friends of serving soldiers, especially as
these were a cheap and distinctive form of news. When the South
Wales Daily News received its first letter describing the battlefield at
Isandlwana, it stated that ‘We shall be glad to publish any letters from
soldiers at the seat of war, which may be received by their friends in
South Wales and Monmouthshire.’40 It was inundated with letters
thereafter. Provincial weeklies (and evening dailies) exploited the
potential of this correspondence by emphasising the local provenance
of the writer, or by highlighting the regional or county connections of
certain regiments, or by publishing material that was new and differ-
ent from the reports already published in the metropolitan press. For
most of the South African War, the Somerset County Gazette ran a
weekly column entitled ‘Our Country’s Share in the War’ in which it
published letters from the front and commented on the activities of the
Somerset Light Infantry. If local newspapers could hardly claim that
soldiers’ letters were ‘scoops’, they welcomed the correspondence as a
means of enhancing their coverage of contemporary campaigns and of
sustaining their readers’ interest in the fate of soldiers overseas. Their
headlines capitalised on the local dimension, with phrases such as ‘A
Barnstaple Man at Ulundi’, ‘A Wiganer in South Africa’, ‘Letters from
Bury Lads’, ‘A Pitlochry Soldier’s Baptism of Fire’, or ‘Letter from a
Leeds Man’ – even in the last instance, where the correspondent was
later described as ‘formerly of Leeds, but now of central Africa’!41
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If editors knew the writer personally, they could vouch for his
integrity, especially if he commented upon contentious issues (such as
the killing of retreating Zulus after the battle of Ulundi).42 They printed
letters recounting the bravery of local soldiers, notably the death of 
Private Donald Cameron, 79th (Cameron Highlanders), who was report-
edly the first man to enter the enemy trenches at Tel-el-Kebir (13 Sep-
tember 1882) and was immediately dubbed a ‘Perthshire Hero’.43 They
also printed letters which informed family and friends about the survival
and good health of local soldiers: after Tel-el-Kebir, a Royal Marine sent
a letter to his parents in Stirling in which he mentioned meeting another
nine men from his home town, (naming three rankers from the 42nd
(1/Black Watch), another three from the 72nd (1/Seaforth Highlanders),
two from the 74th (2/Highland Light Infantry) and one from the 79th
(Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders).44 Editors relished the opportunity
of exposing errors in official reports that listed certain soldiers as missing
or dead. The Wigan Observer printed a letter from Private John Stevens,
a ranker in the ill-fated 1/24th that was annihilated at Isandlwana (22 Jan-
uary 1879), explaining that he had been posted elsewhere before the
battle. While recounting his own survival, Private Stevens reported that
his friend and fellow Wiganer Private Dyer was among the slain.45 The
Dover Express was even more caustic over a perfunctory letter sent by
the War Office to a 60-year old widow, stating that her youngest son had
perished in the same battle. When Private James Holland wrote to her
subsequently, the paper asserted: ‘One may imagine the joy of the mother
on the receipt of the letter, but one may also imagine from this what the
life of a British soldier is thought of at headquarters.’46
Human interest aside, editors and sometimes journalists (where the
letters or interviews were incorporated as part of longer reports) com-
mended the letters to their readers. The South Wales Weekly and
Daily Telegram praised the correspondence of private soldiers from
Monmouthshire in Zululand and en route to Afghanistan as ‘replete
with interest and are creditable specimens of the progress of education
in the army’.47 The Midland Counties Express lauded an ‘interesting
letter’ from Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Reginald Talbot (1/Life
Guards) in Egypt as ‘Its style contrasts very favourably with the high-
flown descriptions of certain special correspondents.’48 The Natal Wit-
ness reproduced a lengthy report from a journalist of the Free State
Express, who had interviewed two soldiers – Sergeant Jeremiah
Madden (King’s Dragoon Guards) and Private Joseph Venables (58th
Regiment) – captured by the Boers after the battle of Laing’s Nek (28
January 1881). The journalist reported their stories verbatim, including
accounts of how they had been well-treated by their captors, and
claimed that they were ‘told in good faith’.49
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More substantively editors drew their readers’ attention to letters
that contained vivid or ‘graphic’ accounts, sometimes of fierce hand-
to-hand fighting or the formidable effects of British fire-power or
simply the immense and varied hardships of campaigning in African
conditions.50 In these respects, editors were not only selecting letters of
particular interest but were also extracting passages that might appeal
to their readership. The editorial role, therefore, went beyond Emery’s
claim that newspaper editors simply ‘tidied up spelling, improved
grammar and punctuation, and possibly corrected the proper names
appearing in their raw copy. . . [even if] their substance and content
would appear unchanged’.51Although many editors published letters in
their entirety, especially when they were short but even on occasion
when they spanned a couple of columns of newsprint, they also
selected key passages for publication and excised others. Oliver Borth-
wick, son of the owner of the Morning Post, and its editor J. N. Dunn
excised and amended the lengthy correspondence of Winston
Churchill from the Sudan, which certainly contained superfluous
material.52
Editors were not always scrupulous in their printing of soldiers’ let-
ters. They sometimes misspelt surnames (during the Anglo-Zulu War,
the 2/24th had neither a Corporal Samuel Miles nor a Sergeant W.
Maule, as the Bristol Observer and the Brecon County Times alleged,
but it did have a Corporal Samuel Wiles and a Sergeant W. Morley).53
They occasionally reported an involvement in battles where none had
occurred; indeed, they had little opportunity to corroborate the verac-
ity of authors who stated or implied that they had been present at
famous battles, notably Isandlwana and the defence of Rorke’s Drift.54
The late Norman Holme, in his substantive study The Noble 24th, cor-
rectly observed that ‘spurious claims’ were made by several soldiers,
‘possibly to increase their standing within the community, or with
members of their family’ and that these are now ‘firmly embedded in
family folklore’.55 Soldiers sometimes retracted comments made in
correspondence sent immediately after a battle. Lieutenant Henry
Curling, RA, psychologically shaken after escaping from Isandlwana,
later conceded: ‘When I was ill, I wrote such a stupid letter: I think I
must have been off my nut when I wrote it.’56 Accordingly any usage of
soldiers’ letters as historical sources has to be corroborated, wherever
possible.
Nevertheless, editors correctly described the content of most letters
as intrinsically ‘interesting’ or of ‘great interest’ inasmuch as they pro-
vided timely commentary on matters that would catch the attention of
their readers. If pride of place went to detailed descriptions of major
battles and vivid accounts of hand-to-hand fighting,57 there were plenty
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of reports on the hardships of campaigning, descriptions of native allies
and adversaries, comments on other fighting units, newspaper report-
ing, and, in some letters, even critical remarks about commanding offi-
cers. Whether these letters were intended for publication (and some
were),58 they were often frank and forthright in their mode of expres-
sion and sometimes raised issues of controversy at home. In doing so,
they contributed to debates about the terms and conditions of military
service, the effectiveness of weapons, support services and military
leadership, and the strategy and tactics employed in African cam-
paigns. 
The letters have a longer term value as eyewitness accounts of the
British Army on active service, and as testimony to the values,
motives, concerns and aspirations of Victorian soldiers. As sources,
these letters have their limitations; only a small proportion remain in
their original form, often deposited in national or regimental muse-
ums, and most survive as printed material in nineteenth-century
newspapers. Although editors reproduced some letters fully and accu-
rately, their intervention, as already described, devalued many of the
originals. Where comparisons with original letters can be made, as in
the correspondence of Churchill and a few others, the excisions appear
to be mainly personal and family asides, lengthy narratives, some
florid writing and occasionally assertions too sweeping to print.59 So
material has been lost but even the original letters did not always
reveal the innermost thoughts of the authors. Like the sepoy letters of
the Great War, selected for publication by David Omissi, the corre-
spondence evolved through ‘layers of filtration’.60 Soldiers exercised a
degree of self-censorship as they were writing to friends and family at
home, and so tended to express themselves correctly (avoiding swear-
words) and to dwell upon socially acceptable matters (rarely referring
to any sexual liaisons). As with the sepoy letters, there was ‘scribal
intervention’ if authors, like Private James Price (2/24th), required a
literate ‘chum’ to write their letters for them.61 Where scribes were
involved, this could produce a somewhat stilted and conformist prose,
reflecting either standard phrases suggested by the scribes or the inhi-
bitions of the author as he expressed himself in a semi-public arena.62
Yet the proportion of Victorian soldiers who relied upon scribes was
probably far smaller than in the overwhelmingly illiterate sepoy army,
and, unlike the sepoys, the Victorian soldiers could express opinions
without fear of censorship at regimental or more senior levels.
As a consequence, their views remain unique as a commentary upon
the course and conduct of particular campaigns. While general points
can be drawn from this correspondence and are summarised in the Epi-
logue, the letters are used, first and foremost, within the context and
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chronology of specific campaigns. Each chapter of the book focuses
upon a different campaign, using the letters to indicate how feelings
evolved from the hopes and optimism at the outset, through periods of
acclimatisation and adjustment to the rigours and pace of campaign-
ing, to the sensations of excitement and relief (or sometimes shock and
horror) at surviving major battles, and ultimately to moments of reflec-
tion as the hostilities drew to a close. They provide breadth of cover-
age from all arms and services,63 comment on all the major events and
battles, and address the principal issues of each campaign. They prof-
fer important insights from the regimental level, from officers and
other ranks, on the course and conduct of colonial warfare.
During the campaigns, soldiers wrote letters from troop-ships,
camps, bivouacs, and occasionally from forts or barracks (as in Egypt),
but generally in surroundings quite different from the confines of
British barracks where noise, profanity and bustling camaraderie were
commonplace. Soldiers found themselves frequently in open, thinly
populated country, sometimes quite isolated from the nearest town-
ship, and periodically under threat from a hostile foe. During moments
of repose they reflected upon the strains of campaigning and the reali-
ties of war, composing and writing their letters in privacy (or in confi-
dence with a literate friend). Letter-writing flourished, argued
Alexander Forbes, because life in camp enabled the best qualities of the
soldier to emerge: they used ‘less foul speech, . . . were more kindly to
one another, and more Godly than in garrison’.64 Although these obser-
vations were purely impressionistic, active service probably had some
effect inasmuch as rankers (unlike the officers) had less access to drink
(other than the occasional rum issued at night) and the risks of battle
placed a premium on comradeship and fatalism about the future.
Yet the sheer quantity of the correspondence indicates that the Vic-
torian army was possibly not as remote from the rest of society as is
sometimes supposed. Although the army attracted the bulk of its
recruits from casual labourers and the urban poor – young men seeking
a refuge from hunger and unemployment or an escape from their
domestic circumstances, especially from amatory mistakes – it had a
broader appeal. It attracted those who were impressed by military
bands and uniform as recruiting parties marched through their locality,
or were ready on a whim or fancy to travel abroad, join friends in the
ranks, and seek a life of adventure instead of a tedious menial occupa-
tion. Admittedly many of these recruits, unless they came from mili-
tary families, probably enlisted without the blessing and support of
their families. Few families had a positive image of the army as a
career, that is, living in barracks and serving under military discipline,
tales of drunken and licentious soldiery, lengthy periods of overseas
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service, and limited prospects on returning to civilian life. As Lord
Wavell recollected, ‘There was in the minds of the ordinary God-fear-
ing citizen no such thing as a good soldier; to have a member who had
gone for a soldier was for many families a crowning disgrace.’65 This
correspondence indicates, nonetheless, that many soldiers kept in
touch with families and friends. They either reconciled with relatives
after the trauma of enlistment or kept in touch with them or, in some
cases, forged new relationships through marriage.66 In letters from
Africa they expressed concerns about the health and welfare of family,
asked to be remembered to old friends, and passed on messages about
comrades from the same locality.67
The authors may have taken the Queen’s shilling, and left their
domestic surroundings, but they knew that there would be interest at
home in how they fulfilled their military commitments. In this respect
the letters testify to the motivations of the authors, as well as to their
morale, attitudes to death in battle, and their warrior ethos – values
that distinguished them from many of their civilian readers (other than
those with a service background). Campaigning in Africa, as the writ-
ers indicated, afforded an opportunity to serve ‘Queen and country’, to
do their duty, and to earn honours for their regiment (or their company,
frequently described as ‘the pride of the regiment’), promotions in the
field, and medals for themselves.68 Highly motivated, these soldiers
usually exuded confidence in their leaders (at least initially, and often
throughout their campaigns); recorded few instances of ill-discipline
on active service (other than in the protracted South African War); and
appreciated the efforts expended on their logistic support, including
the postal services and the supply of food and provisions (which rarely
broke down). If these feelings were expressed in a somewhat formulaic
language, the letters indicate that most soldiers began (and sometimes
ended) these campaigns positively motivated, with a strong sense of
comradeship and robust morale. Nor does it seem that they were
simply writing in this vein to impress their readers. They could be
frank, and the letters are particularly revealing when they describe the
flagging of morale after serious defeats, or when units found them-
selves besieged and the toll of sick and wounded began to mount. As a
Gordon Highlander reflected on the siege of Ladysmith: ‘The authori-
ties may keep much in the dark, but the fearful truths connected with
this part of the misery of the siege remain all the same . . . I know what
the pinch of hunger is.’69 Many soldiers, nonetheless, remained fatalis-
tic about the risks of battle and, whether actively religious or not, fre-
quently claimed that survival was a matter of God’s will. If they were
to die, they expected to do so by fighting ‘bravely’ at their ‘post’ or by
fighting and dying ‘like a faithful English soldier’. Such sentiments car-
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ried credibility when the authors had just observed the sacrifice 
of comrades at Isandlwana and the sight of corpses strewn over the 
battlefield.70 They chimed with fervent desires to engage their foes, to
gain revenge for fallen comrades and to close with the enemy. As sol-
diers they were imbued with a warrior ethos, a code by which they
would assess adversaries and allies alike.
The attractions of active service, though, ranged beyond military
matters. Campaigning in Africa fulfilled desires for adventure and for-
eign travel that were among the more positive attractions of military
service. These young soldiers saw sights in an exotic continent that
many of their families and friends would never do; they visited places
in Egypt that they had only learned about from sermons and Biblical
readings. Their writings, if not remotely on a par with those of con-
temporary missionaries and explorers,71 sustained the growing popular
interest in Africa generally, and in Egypt in particular. For Drummer
George Paterson (1/Black, Watch), Cairo was as ‘pretty a city as ever I
saw. The streets are lined with tall, shady trees on each side, while the
houses (in the principal part of the city) are magnificent. No wonder
then Cairo is called the mother of the world.’ Tel-el-Kebir, he informed
his friend, was ‘situated in the Land of Goshen, a land, I am sure, you
have often read about as well as myself’.72
The letters reveal, too, that Egypt (and to a lesser extent the other
campaigns in Africa) had more prosaic attractions. Egyptian service
offered the prospect of earning khedival medals and a khedival
allowance which, if added to the field allowance, almost doubled the
daily pay of regimental officers.73 Given the relatively low rates of pay
endured by officers and other ranks, another facet of army life that
hardly enhanced its image at home, active service had its compensa-
tions. This was especially true for the rank-and-file, some of whom
earned gratuities for distinguished service in the field. Although sol-
diers regularly grumbled about the charges for sea-kit and the cost of
goods supplied by local traders, they no longer suffered many of the
stoppages that could reduce their pay to as little as a penny a day in
Britain; and, if serving on ‘dry’ campaigns, soldiers had little incentive
to spend money anyway. As Sergeant J. F. Bolshaw (17th Lancers) wrote
from Zululand: ‘If I ever do return again I shall be quite a rich man, as
we cannot spend any money here. All our pay is saved.’74
The linkage between the attractions and opportunities of active ser-
vice and the image or reputation of the army at home underpins much
of the correspondence from the African campaigns. Soldiers, if
despatched from Britain on expeditionary forces, anticipated that they
would return home relatively quickly. They reckoned that the cam-
paigns would be short and decisive affairs, and, in writing about their
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exploits, were either preparing for their homecoming or at least leav-
ing a record in case they failed to do so. This context had less signifi-
cance for soldiers drawn from garrisons in the Mediterranean, Natal
and Cape Colony, or from the army of occupation when it was formed
in Egypt, or from India, but the turnover of men in a short-service army
always ensured that many were anticipating a return to Britain (not
least the reservists who rejoined the colours for a specific conflict, like
the 80,000 who served in the South African War). Facing the prospect
(or possibility) of an early return to Britain, soldiers had every incen-
tive to write about their own experiences, as well as the achievements
of their unit, the mission as a whole, and any likely rewards. Lance
Corporal J. A. Cosser wanted not merely to earn a medal but to ‘come
into the street and show off a medal’.75 If positive accounts of service 
in Africa could enhance the status of individual soldiers in their 
own communities, they could also boost the reputation of the army
generally.
Where matters went awry in African campaigns, soldiers were even
more anxious about the manner in which they were reported at home.
In extreme calamities their letters might provide crucial evidence, but
normally they anticipated that official despatches and the reports of
‘special’ correspondents were likely to precede the receipt of corre-
spondence from themselves. Explaining any reverses and apportioning
blame seemed crucial requirements, and some soldiers were quick to
explain events from their own point of view. In these circumstances
the writing was often forthright, whether occasioned by apparent para-
noia – as in the case of Lance-Corporal Cosser: ‘They do not let the
people of England know half of what goes on here’76 – or worried by
press censorship in later campaigns, or incensed by the perceived fail-
ings of command or of the government. Although many soldiers
remained deferential, defending embattled commanders from outside
critics, some broke ranks to criticise commanders, and others readily
denounced their respective governments. Those who expressed politi-
cal opinions may or may not have been representative of fellow sol-
diers, but they were often blunt in their assertions – as Sergeant
Bolshaw wrote from Zululand: ‘There is no mistake about the English
Government’s fault in sending so few men as they did.’77
In short, the letter-writing of Victorian soldiers remains valuable
because of its range and scope. Despite the factual errors, limited per-
spectives, and editorial intrusion, these letters contain a wealth of
detail, some unique insights and highly revealing commentary about
the army on active service. If the chronology and events of specific
campaigns establish a context for each group of letters, the relationship
between soldiers and their local communities, the image of the army
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at home and the process of conveying news from Africa provide a
broader framework for the correspondence as a whole. The letters may
contain few literary flourishes, but they are written with vigour and
clarity, are often conversational in character and are sometimes pas-
sionate in expression. They reflect all too well the feelings and ten-
sions of soldiers operating in an alien environment, with their values,
discipline and training periodically stretched to the limits.
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‘Wolseley’s march to Kumasi’ has been described as ‘one of the military
dramas of the Victorian age’.1 Britain exercised an informal protec-
torate over parts of the Gold Coast from the early 1830s, the fever-
ridden region traditionally known as ‘a white man’s grave’. As two
previous British expeditions in 1823 and 1863–64 had suffered serious
losses, the Colonial Office resolved not to send another British force to
the Gold Coast, even after the Asante (pronounced Ashanti) invaded
the protectorate in 1873. Although a composite force headed by a
detachment of Marines under Colonel Festing thwarted the invasion at
Elmina (13 June 1873), panic gripped the authorities at Cape Coast
Castle.2 On 13 August the British Government appointed Sir Garnet
Wolseley as administrator and commander-in-chief on the Gold Coast
and despatched him, with twenty-seven special-service officers, to
work with the local Fante tribesmen to resist the Asante. Following his
arrival in September, Wolseley promptly requested British reinforce-
ments, planned a short campaign over the less hazardous months of
December, January and February, and then decisively defeated the
Asante in battle before sacking their capital, Kumase (6 February 1874).
He earned enormous plaudits for this campaign, which cost under
£800,000 and involved minimal casualties.3 Yet the campaign aroused
its share of controversy, both at the time and subsequently. While spe-
cial correspondents, such as Henry M. Stanley and Winwoode Reade,
berated the failure of his transport arrangements and the risks involved
in a prompt evacuation of Kumase,4 some modern commentators argue
that Wolseley discounted the military worth of the Fante precipi-
tately.5 Few deny that Wolseley and his forces conducted a remarkable
campaign, overcoming formidable natural obstacles while incurring
relatively few casualties, and several commentators, taking their cue
from Cardwell, regard this campaign as a vindication of his reforms.6 In
reviewing the experiences of some thirty-five officers and men from all
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the British infantry units and support arms, it will be possible to gauge
whether they had any insights on these and other aspects of the cam-
paign.
Wolseley’s scepticism about the resolve, reliability and martial
prowess of the coastal tribes, particularly if required to fight in the
bush, was widely shared by British officers and men. Prior to Wolse-
ley’s arrival in September, Colonel Festing (Royal Marine Artillery) had
already engaged the Asante near the town of Elmina. With only 300
men, including light infantry, artillery, sailors and some soldiers from
the 2nd West India Regiment, he had first suppressed local disaffection
in the town and then repulsed an attack by some 3,000 Asantes.
Having routed the Asante in about two hours, killing King Kofi
Karikari’s nephew and four of his six chiefs, Festing lacked the men to
mount a counter-offensive. As he said after the battle, ‘get me 5,000
native allies at Abbaye, I will undertake to engage the enemy. The
native allies were promised me, but they were never forthcoming.’7
Like Festing, Wolseley quickly concluded that the Fante tribes could
not protect themselves: they had become preoccupied with trading,
‘grown less warlike and more peaceful than formerly’, and their kings
could not raise the men required.8 Hausas were employed in the puni-
tive raids upon the disaffected villages of Essaman, Amquana and
Ampenee, but in the raid on Essaman (14 October 1873) they were crit-
icised for a lack of discipline and reckless firing. ‘They are plucky fel-
lows’, wrote Lieutenant Edward Woodgate, ‘probably the best native
Auxiliaries we shall get, and it is a pity there are so few of them, their
great fault seems to be shyness of bush fighting, and in the difficulty of
restraining them in the open when their blood is up.’9
Even when the Asantes, suffering losses from smallpox and dysen-
tery, began their retreat to the River Pra, native forces under British
command struggled to harass them effectively. Whenever the Fantes
gained sight of the enemy or heard their war-drums or even a rumour
of their presence, they either broke ranks and ran or cowered at the
rear. Officers lamented the fate of ‘poor’ Lieutenant Eardley Wilmot,
RA, who was left at the head of his column when the vast majority of
native levies deserted during an action north of Dunkwa (3 November
1873). Severely wounded, he kept fighting with a small group of sol-
diers from the 2nd West India Regiment until shot through the heart.10
At least his courageous resistance prevented a rout, but one briefly
occurred at Fesu (27 November 1873) when an advance party of
Hausas, followed by the company of Kossus, broke under Asante fire
and stampeded to the rear for 200 yards, carrying a naval officer ‘along
in the crowd’ unable to feel his feet ‘for a long way’. ‘That affair’, he
reckoned, ‘will make the Ashantees [sic] very plucky . . . they are no
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mean enemies in the bush. Had we had English troops it would have
been different; we could have followed them into the bush, and bayo-
neted them, as it is not so thick here.’11 These preliminary engage-
ments, if not tactically decisive, gave an early insight into the fighting
methods of the Asante. The latter’s penchant for decapitating captured
enemies prompted one ‘bluejacket’ from HMS Decoy to describe them
as ‘barbarous wretches’, adding: ‘but we will give them a lesson they
will not forget in a hurry. They are afraid of a white man; one is equal
to four of these black fellows.’12
Although Wolseley continued to employ native auxiliaries (two
native regiments under Major Baker Russell and Colonel H. E. Wood,
VC, would accompany his expedition and several others were supposed
to be raised by Captains Dalrymple, Butler and Glover in diversionary
columns – only one of which materialised), he requested the dispatch
of British soldiers. In doing so, he accepted Cardwell’s instructions that
‘every preparation should be made in advance’, that these forces should
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not be disembarked until the decisive moment occurred, and that they
should operate only in the most favourable climatic conditions,
namely the four months from December to March.13 Originally Wolse-
ley hoped to land these forces by mid-December, but delays created by
the dilatory retreat of the Asantes, and the problems of securing and
retaining the services of native labourers, delayed his plans. As the
troop-ships arrived in mid-December, he sent the Himalaya carrying
the 2nd Battalion, Rifle Brigade, the Tamar with the 23rd Fusiliers
(Royal Welch Fusiliers) and the Sarmatian with the 42nd Highlanders
(The Black Watch) back to sea until the end of the year.14
Soldiers were bitterly frustrated by the delay in disembarkation irre-
spective of whether they had endured a miserable journey, like Rifle-
man George H. Gilham, confined to his bunk for seven days, or had
experienced, as Private Robert Ferguson (Black Watch) recalled, ‘a
grand voyage to the Gold Coast’. Many officers and non-commissioned
officers of the Black Watch were so eager to land that they offered to
undertake any kind of duties ashore, but in each case they were
refused.15 As in all expeditionary campaigns, the journeys from home
had done much more than transport men and equipment. In the case of
the Black Watch, soldiers fondly recalled the enthusiastic scenes when
the Sarmatian left Portsmouth, with Prince Arthur gracing the occa-
sion, and another salute from the Channel Squadron off Gibraltar.
They forged cordial relations with the 135 volunteers from the 79th
(Cameron) Highlanders, who had brought the battalion up to strength.
The Camerons, who served as a distinct company, were regarded as a
‘very nice body of men . . . anxious to fall into our way of doing things’.
During the voyage all soldiers were vaccinated, and they were able to
prepare their equipment, attend lectures on the Gold Coast and try out
their ‘drab’ Gold Coast clothing. The men were ‘rather proud’ that they
were allowed to wear ‘a small red buckle fixed on their helmet’ in place
of the regiment’s traditional red hackel. Although discipline had to be
enforced at times (Private E. Black received twenty-five lashes for
threatening to throw a sergeant overboard16),the men were in good
heart when they arrived off Cape Coast, and so spending another fort-
night aboard ship was remembered by Ferguson as ‘the weariest and
dullest days of it’.17
Meanwhile the Royal Engineers pressed on with their labours, con-
structing a path along the 74 miles from Cape Coast to Prahsu, with
eight camp sites, two hospitals and 237 bridges. Major Robert Home,
RE, who was in charge of the task, recalled that it had to be undertaken
despite recurrent tropical thunderstorms. Every day he was wet to the
skin and he was eventually hospitalised with ‘a frightful attack of
fever’.18 On 12 December another officer evaluated these efforts:
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The engineers have pioneered the road to the Prah, hacking and hewing it
through forests of teak and mahogany and across streams and swamps and
over hills and valleys. Their advance will get to the Prah the day after to-
morrow . . . The permanent stations for the European troops – nine [sic] in
number – are nearly completed, with huts for from 400 to 2,000 men each,
with officers’ quarters, hospitals, stores, magazines, and defence works.
The work has never stopped, and gang after gang of labourers have been
worked off their legs. This is a most exhausting service – everything to be
done on foot, and I have been moving sometimes twenty to thirty miles
in a day, feeling utterly done up at night, not to mention two attacks of
fever, during one of which I was delirious for two days.19
The Naval Brigade, marching ahead of the main body of infantry, pro-
vided invaluable assistance. They helped to build a bridge across the
Pra in 3 days and spent 17 days, working 4 hours per day, felling trees,
clearing a camp site and building huts. A ‘bluejacket’ recalled that ‘it
was blazing hot work . . . felling trees in that latitude’.20
When allowed to disembark, British units did so in order and moved
immediately into the interior. The Naval Brigade, requiring the least
transport, had landed on 27 December, the Rifle Brigade and more engi-
neers on New Year’s Day, the Black Watch on the 3 and 4 January, and
the 23rd Fusiliers on the following day. Soldiers, armed with their short
Snider rifles and sword–bayonets, marched in the early mornings, cov-
ering some 7–10 miles per day, before resting during the heat of the day
and the close, sultry evenings. They found the smell appalling: Lieu-
tenant Ernest N. Rolfe, RN, greatly appreciated a bottle of eau de
Cologne, ‘which, with a bit of camphor in the corner of my handker-
chief, I find most useful, as the stench along the road of the newly
turned soil and dead Ashantees [sic] beats Paris’. 21 Nevertheless, many
marvelled at their first sight of a tropical rain forest. As an officer wrote:
The vegetation is more glorious than anything I have ever seen. As
underwood there are groves of plantains with huge green leaves and flow-
ers of the most brilliant scarlet, masses of convolvuli of all colours, and
palm trees with their trunks covered with exquisite ferns. Shooting up
here and there are bamboo plants looking like bunches of huge green
ostrich feathers. Above all this tower the gigantic trees, their stems bare
for the first 100 or 150 feet, then leaves spreading out above like clouds
of bright emerald green.22
Sapper Arthur Richards wondered how this ‘beautiful green bush’ with
its ‘magnificently coloured birds and butterflies’ and an abundance of
cocoa nuts, oranges, figs and other fruits could be so unhealthy.23
Soldiers and sailors were mightily impressed by the organisation on
their behalf, particularly the regular supplies of food (1lb of preserved
beef, 1lb of biscuit, tea, sugar and rice each day, with grog at night) and
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medical support (both preventive measures, such as the periodic issue
of quinine and lime juice and the rapid removal of fever-ridden
cases24).Yet the entire support network depended upon native bearers,
whose incapacity continued to bedevil the operation. Lieutenant H.
Jekyll, RE, who was in charge of erecting the telegraph, struggled to
find labourers despite being ‘authorised to spend unlimited money’.
‘One difficulty’, he wrote, ‘is the stupidity and laziness of the natives,
who require a great amount of supervision. I thought of giving them
piece work, but that won’t do, for the nigger doesn’t care for money, he
only cares for idleness.’25 Sergeant-Major Benjamin Bennett (23rd
Fusiliers) regarded the Fantes as ‘the most debased wretches I have ever
seen’,26 while another officer feared for the supply system itself ‘as the
Fantees, who are our carriers, are frightened to death of the Ashantees
[sic]’, and so had to be placed under ‘a very strong guard’.27 Although the
Fante women were much admired for their stoicism, carrying 60lb
loads on their heads in addition to children on their hips,28 the laziness
of their menfolk and the recurrent desertions along the line of march
gave rise to profound concerns. As the transport system became
increasingly problematical, Wolseley had to seek carriers from the 2nd
West India Regiment and required most of the Fusilier Battalion and
the Royal Artillery still at Cape Coast to re-embark on their ship. Cap-
tain A. J. Rait would have to rely on the 60 Hausa gunners that he had
trained so well, and only Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Savage Mostyn,
his adjutant, Lieutenant W. Phibbs, 7 officers and 100 volunteers from
the 23rd were retained initially, although another 200 were brought
forward later to replace the sick. At the central depot of Mansu 135
Black Watch under Captain Moore volunteered to carry stores, mainly
50lb boxes on their heads and shoulders, over the next 11 miles to
Suta.29
What really alarmed the soldiers and sailors, however, was the pos-
sibility of a premature peace. At Prahsu the sailors were perturbed
when ‘eleven niggers came down with a message from King Coffee
[sic], begging us to stop and palaver a bit’.30 Once Wolseley had dis-
missed these emissaries, insisting that he would sign a peace treaty
only in Kumase and that King Kofi must release all his prisoners and
pay an indemnity of 50,000 ounces of gold, he played a ruse on them by
sending the Naval Brigade ahead, so that they would pass the sailors
supposedly marching en route north of the Pra. ‘Bluejacket’ recalled:
We had a little Gatling gun with us, which, just as the ambassadors hove
in sight, we managed to fire off at nothing particular. Either the noise of
the gun or the sight of us was too much for one of the ambassadors, for
that same night he shot himself dead in his tent, and left the others to
carry to the King the news that the Naval Brigade was coming along.31
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As the news of the meeting filtered back, many soldiers were delighted.
Sapper Richards, manning his telegraph office at Dunkwa, relished the
prospect of the Union Jack flying ‘on the highest house or hovel that
Coomassie holds’.32 When the Black Watch reached Prahsu on 21 Janu-
ary 1874, one of its non-commissioned officers recorded in his diary:
Met a good number of sick coming down country – mostly seamen and
riflemen; many of them look very bad. Our men hanging out very well,
but about 40 complaining. They are afraid of being left behind, and say
they are better than they really are.33
The main body of Wolseley’s expedition began its crossing of the Pra
on 20 January and proceeded towards the town of Fomena, north of the
Adansi Hills, where it planned to create a forward supply depot. Lord
Gifford’s Assin scouts, followed by the engineers, their labourers and
Major Baker Russell’s Hausa auxiliaries, had crossed the Pra some fif-
teen days earlier to cut a path through the undergrowth and establish
some camping sites. Captain J. Nicol, one of Russell’s officers, recalled:
‘our duties are various – road-making, bush clearing, throwing up
earthworks, carrying provisions and ammunition, surveying, fighting,
making camp, etc’. He found clearing villages particularly time-con-
suming: in one case, ‘I had 150 men with me, and it took us three hours
to clean out enough to house the Naval Brigade. One house was a
Fetish house; the state of affairs there was remarkably nasty.’34
Although the following soldiers had to struggle along a rudimentary
path, make their own huts and cope with further desertions from their
Fante bearers, they found consolations on the line of march. A com-
missariat officer described the climate as ‘much less enervating than
on the southern side of the Prah’;35 indeed Captain Nicol found a cool-
ing breeze when he reached the summit of the Adansi Hills, some
1,500 feet above sea level, although there was little to see but a mist-
lined canopy of the tropical rain forest.36 Sergeant Charles Lewis (Rifle
Brigade) described the wood as ‘not so thick as on the other side of the
Prah, but, of course, it is nothing but wood everywhere’. Lewis, like
others, was impressed by the signs of civilisation in Asante territory,
especially by comparison with the villages south of the Pra: ‘the
houses’, he noted, ‘are built in a kind of square, with a court in the
centre and open – I mean with no covering – the walls are built and
thatched, having the front or side facing the court open . . . the floors
are about 3ft. from the ground, and made of red clay’.37 On the other
hand, meeting the prisoners released by the Asantehene (King Kofi),
including a German missionary, his wife and child, gave a powerful
insight into Asante practices. They had been held prisoner for five
years, and ‘the poor woman’, wrote Nicol, ‘had been subject to some
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horrible indignities’, while the missionary, as the commissariat officer
learned, ‘had got little to eat but snails, and was in constant danger of
losing his head’. They were delighted to be free.38
More Asante envoys, suing for peace, accompanied the released pris-
oners; they informed Wolseley that the king would agree to all his
terms if only he would halt his advance. Entering Kumase, though, had
become a sine qua non for Wolseley. His reply that he was determined
to do so, whether as friend or foe, delighted Captain Nicol, as ‘we
expect all to be settled in a fortnight’.39 Sergeant Lewis yearned to
engage the enemy and ‘soon let King Coffee know what we came here
for’, and there was apparently ‘great glee’ among the Black Watch as it
became clear that the king was going ‘to dispute our entry into
Coomassie’.40 Once Wolseley had accumulated his reserve supplies, he
resumed his advance towards Kumase, but had to remove initially a
threat to his flank from at least 1,000 Asantes moving towards the vil-
lage of Boborasi. Colonel John McLeod (Black Watch) led a mixed Euro-
pean and native force against the village, and a sailor from the Active
described the ensuing engagement. ‘As we took them by surprise, and
were not aware of their position being so close’, he recalled, ‘it was a
regular set out for a few minutes. Then we went to work in earnest, and
after about an hour, we cleared the village’. On the return march the
Asantes counter-attacked:
their dreadful war yells and drums sounded right and left of us, and they
made a desperate attack on our rear. But they reckoned rather too soon;
and as the Active’s company was rear guard, we gave them a warm recep-
tion, and their war cry turned to wailing, for they retired cut to pieces.
. . . That was the first battle since we landed; and the Naval Brigade 
consequently had the first rub, as we were first into the village and last
out of it.41
For the loss of only three men (including Captain Nicol), Mcleod’s
detachment had routed at least twice its number of Asantes. They had
taken fourteen prisoners and captured muskets, powder and the state
umbrella of General Asamoa Kwanta. More importantly they had
gained valuable experience in bush-fighting and a morale-boosting vic-
tory. ‘Bluejacket’ recollected:
The Ashantees [sic] stuck to their ground like bricks . . . before we moved
them. I don’t know in what order we were formed. I only know there was
a man of ours on my left and another on my right, and I had orders to keep
in line with them, and so I did. As for the Ashantees, you precious
seldom got a sight of them, for you couldn’t make anything out ahead of
you more than a dozen feet. Our orders from the General were to ‘fire low
– fire slow, and charge home’.42
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Similar tactics would be employed by the main body of the expedi-
tion when it moved on to the village of Insafu (30 January). Acting on
information that the enemy were deployed in their thousands nearby
(actually in a horseshoe formation along a strong defensive position –
a ridge near the village of Amoafo – overlooking a mud-filled swampy
ravine into which the only path descended and then ascended on the
slope beyond), Wolseley decided on a frontal assault with some 2,200
soldiers while guarding against the enemy’s tactic of attacking the
flanks and of trying to surround the opposing army. ‘The plan of oper-
ations’, wrote Rolfe, 
was to advance in a hollow square, the 42d Highlanders forming the front
face extending 300 yards on either side of the road, where Rait’s guns
were to move, and the rear face being composed of the Rifles, while the
left was composed of 100 sailors and Russell’s Regiment, and the right
face of 100 sailors and Wood’s Regiment . . . In the centre the carriers for
hammocks and ammunition were to move. The plan looked excellent on
paper, but no one thought it would come off as wished in practice. The
Chief of Staff [Colonel John McNeill] added a final order, somewhat in
German style – ‘If you can’t carry out your orders, do the best you can.’43
At about 7.40 a.m. on 31 January, the Black Watch under the com-
mand of Brigadier Sir Archibald Alison, a one-armed veteran of the
Crimea, engaged the enemy. With their pipers playing, company after
company descended into the ravine, meeting with a ferocious fire from
the Asantes. Private Ferguson recalls:
This was a trying way for us, young soldiers, to get under fire. The
Ashantees [sic] were swarming in advance on our flanks in thousands,
and I almost felt my time was up, and that I was to be potted like a rabbit
in cover . . . We were fighting in sections, every man in his place, and
doing his best. Seldom we got a right shot at a black fellow, they kept so
well under cover, but they did keep popping at us! And so close it was
too! They were mostly armed with the old flintlocks, and loaded with
pieces of ragged lead, rusty iron and stones. Had they been better armed,
more of us would have fallen . . . In such circumstances, we kept on firing
and advancing as best we could . . . most of our men were getting
wounded, but only a few were going to the rear . . . When we had a
moment to speak and look at each other we would glance along the files
to see who were hit and if any were down. Such is the way we had to fight
in the bush; it was all against us, and if a couple of big guns had not been
brought to our assistance I doubt we would have fared worse.44 
Ferguson’s account of the battle is only one of several that have sur-
vived, and, like all such narratives, is limited in perspective. None of
the individual recollections compare with the tactical understanding
of Brackenbury’s authoritative work, based on all the reports sent to
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him as Wolseley’s assistant military secretary during the twelve-hour
engagement.45 Yet neither Brackenbury nor the unit commanders, nor
the special correspondents, who also wrote accounts of the battle, had
any overview of how the battle was fought. As Rolfe recalled, all infor-
mation was ‘secondhand, for nobody could see anyone at 50 yards’ dis-
tance from him’.46 So the insights of front-line soldiers and sailors have
some enduring value, not least when they all pay tribute to the resolute
courage and fighting attributes of the Asantes. It took over four hours
before the Highlanders broke through the enemy’s lines to enter their
base at Amoafo. The Asantes had defended all the intervening villages
and thereafter redoubled their flank attacks and later mounted several
assaults on the baggage train (prompting the Fantes to flee and requir-
ing a redeployment of Riflemen to secure the baggage and the depot at
Kwaman). ‘The Ashantis’, wrote one naval officer, ‘fought well, and
had to suffer severely before they gave in’; and among the wounded
afterwards, ‘many were the expressions of admiration of the undaunted
courage and good fighting properties of the Ashantees [sic]’.47
‘British pluck and the Snider’ had prevailed, asserted another
sailor.48 Pluck, in the sense of spirit, courage and commitment, was cer-
tainly evident on the British side. Many officers and men were
wounded but kept on firing as best they could. ‘Bluejacket’ was close
to Wood when he was ‘hit full in the chest’ but he kept ‘blazing away
for half an hour after’ until he could stand no more.49 The Highlanders
bore the brunt of the casualties, with two dead (one of whom, Private
Thomson, became separated from his unit and was decapitated by the
enemy) and 129 wounded (nine of whom later died of their wounds) –
or about one in four of those engaged. Their discipline, zeal and deter-
mination won praise from comrades in other units, even if one thought
that they had been too erect and conspicuous at first – ‘they got more
cautious afterwards, and got more undercover, which is the chief thing
in this warfare’.50 When interviewed after the war, one Black Watch
sergeant recalled:
I got hit twice – once in the neck here, and then in the breast, and thought
it was worse than it really was when I saw blood come streaming over
my grey coat. Did I fall out? No, sir, I didn’t. Lieutenant Mundy [sic, prob-
ably Mowbray] got a severe wound on the head close by, and as it didn’t
seem to occur to him that there was any need to fall out, I stuck by him
at the front.51
British fire-power was widely regarded as the other key ingredient in
the victory. The breech-loading Snider was a far superior weapon to the
flintlock muskets possessed by the Asantes, with one sailor even sug-
gesting that it was ‘murder, not a fair fight’.52 That on the following day
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the Royal Engineers claimed to have buried some 3,010 Asantes, and
that those were only the corpses in and around the road,53 testified to
the carnage inflicted. Inevitably in bush warfare, where the square for-
mation, as Rolfe had feared, split apart as it began to manoeuvre (with
gaps appearing between the front and both flanks), friendly fire will
have added to the confusion. Sailors found themselves ‘firing into the
42nd, and they were firing into us, we were in a fix, and had to cease
firing. But we soon found our mistake out, and we gave it to them [the
Asantes] again; and so we kept on all day.’54 Although the Gatling
machine-gun was not used, Rait’s field guns, which had to be manhan-
dled across the swamp and up the path, provided invaluable support for
Russell’s Hausas, the 42nd and the Rifles. Even a solitary field gun
could have a powerful effect on enemy morale; as Gilham observed: ‘A
small field gun which was got into position did good work among the
enemy, as did the rockets which were sent among them, and no doubt
astonished them’.55
Notwithstanding the victory at Amoafo, officers like Rolfe realised
that the Asante had mounted attacks ‘all down the line of communi-
cations’.56 With Fante bearers refusing to move from Fomena after the
attack on the depot, one officer asserted: ‘The chief source of anxiety is
now getting supplies along, the convoy which went this morning [2
February] having been stopped yesterday.’57 Once five companies of the
42nd and the Naval Brigade had cleared some Asantes from a nearby
village, the expedition, minus baggage, pressed forward. They swept
aside various ambushes and fought another pitched battle on the
northern bank of the Oda River. In this six-hour engagement, in which
the Asante again ‘stood well’,58 Wolseley’s forces seized the next vil-
lage, Odasu, and repulsed three counter-attacks upon it. Thereafter
Wolseley sent the Highlanders forward, and they advanced, as
described by Dr Troup, surgeon to the 42nd, ‘with pipes playing, the
men shooting everything before them, and cheering along the whole
line’.59 Having left the artillery and the Rifles trailing in their wake, the
Highlanders, after a brief halt, completed the last few miles, where-
upon, as Ferguson recalled, ‘we entered Coomassie in the grey darking
[sic], our pipes playing the ‘Highland Laddie’. We gave three cheers for
old Scotland after all was over.’60
If the soldiers’ descriptions of Kumase hardly compare with the
evocative accounts of the special correspondents, especially Melton
Prior’s remarkable drawing ‘Sketches From Coomassie: The King’s
Slaughtering Place’,61 they at least indicated their own priorities. For
soldiers, who had been caught in a tropical downpour on the eve of
entering the city and had to clamber through a swamp near Kumase,
shelter and drinking water were key requirements. In this respect the
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42nd were particularly fortunate as they met Asante women on enter-
ing the city, and the latter ‘could not have been kinder to us, if it had
been Edinburgh we were marching into’.62 They found water for the
conquering intruders before disappearing at nightfall. When the Naval
Brigade belatedly entered the largely deserted Kumase, they found
shelter, if not water, on their arrival.63 As Wolseley clung to the forlorn
hope that the Asantehene would return to sign a treaty, he banned loot-
ing, and so soldiers had to uphold this order, flogging their Fante bear-
ers whenever they were caught in the act. They also guarded the royal
palace, which was described as ‘really very fine, full of beautiful things
of marvellous sorts, untidy and dirty to a degree, but still fairly large
and full of valuable things’.64 As the Asante did not reappear after a
couple of days, and as the weather continued to deteriorate with
another thunderstorm, Wolseley chose to abandon the capital. Having
seized some royal treasures for auction, he left on 6 February, ordering
the engineers and native labourers to burn the city while the Black
Watch acted as rear guard.
Within two days the expedition had reached Amoafo, whereupon Dr
Troup reflected on the exploits of the Highlanders:
We have had over 100 wounded, and about 10 officers – the majority,
however, slight. We have had the brunt of the whole thing, and the regi-
ment has behaved splendidly. I am proud to have served in the field with
it, and to have earned my second medal in its company. I would not be
surprised if two or three officers got the Victoria Cross [Lance Sergeant S.
McGraw did receive the VC] . . . I have been six days lying in the open,
and two days drenched with rain; had to cross a river naked with my
clothes over my head, [the Oda had swollen above the bridge across it]
and to sleep without a change. It is all over now, and we can scarcely
avoid a laugh occasionally.65
During the swift return to Cape Coast (units re-embarked from 19 to
27 February), few paused to reflect upon Wolseley’s triumph. As several
of the letter writers, and those interviewed later by the press, suc-
cumbed to fever or dysentery on the return journey, they could hardly
comment on the terms accepted by the Asantehene’s messengers at
Fomena on 13 February.66 Many of the others, all too aware of the bur-
geoning number of sick, simply wished to reach the coast as quickly as
possible. They took credit for a successful campaign, fought on inhos-
pitable terrain against a much more numerous enemy, but did not
attribute their success (as some modern scholars have) to Cardwell’s
recent reforms of the army, notably the abolition of purchase and the
introduction of short-service enlistments.67 As the expedition con-
tained many purchase officers (all but one of the Royal Welch Fusilier
officers had purchased their commissions)68 and long-service soldiers,
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while many of the youngest, newly enlisted, soldiers remained at home
or had never disembarked, Rait challenged the significance of the Car-
wellian legacy. In accepting the freedom of Arbroath on 18 April 1874,
the indefatigable gunner declared:
With regard to the abolition of purchase, I hope that it will not deter the
same class of officers who have always joined the service from continu-
ing to do so . . . I do hope, gentlemen, that the same type of men will still
continue to serve Her Majesty for I am sure with such gentlemen in the
service the rank and file will always be keen to follow . . . I also think
that medical testimony will bear me out when I say that it is a mistake
in having soldiers too young. They will not stand the experience of hard-
ships of a campaign in the same way as older men would do.69
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Eyewitness accounts are among the many sources used in the volumi-
nous literature on the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, a major test of British
command, transport arrangements, and the fighting qualities of the
short-service soldier. Quite apart from the writings of the late Frank
Emery, who refers to eighty-five correspondents in The Red Soldier and
another twenty-four in his chapter on that campaign in Marching Over
Africa,1 there are invaluable edited collections of letters from individ-
ual officers by Sonia Clark2 and Daphne Child,3 and by Adrian Greaves
and Brian Best.4 While the papers and journals of the British command-
ing officers have been splendidly edited,5 some perspectives of officers
and other ranks appear in testimony before official inquiries (into the
disasters at Isandlwana and Ntombe, and the death of the Prince Impe-
rial)6 and among the sources used by F. W. D. Jackson and Ian Knight,
and by Donald Morris in his classic volume The Washing of the Spears.7
Yet the letters found by Emery – the core of the material used for the
views of regimental officers and other ranks8 – represent only a fraction
of the material written during the Anglo-Zulu War. Many more officers
and men kept diaries or wrote to friends and family, chronicling their
exploits in that war and its immediate predecessors, the Ninth Cape
Frontier War (1877–78) and the campaign against the Pedi chief,
Sekhukhune (1878). While several soldiers complained about the postal
arrangements or the scarcity of stamps and paper, they still wrote let-
ters, even improvising, as Corporal Thomas Davies (2/24th) did, by
using gunpowder as ink.9 Their correspondence forms the core of this
Chapter’s review of campaigning in southern Africa. 
Several of the regiments who fought the Zulus had already served in
southern Africa. The 1/24th (of the 2nd Warwickshires, later South
Wales Borderers) and the 1/13th (Somerset Light Infantry) had served in
southern Africa since 1875; the 2/Buffs, the 80th (2/South Stafford-
shires) and the 88th (1/Connaught Rangers) had joined them in 1877,
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and the 2/24th, largely composed of short-service soldiers, had arrived
in March 1878. These forces, coupled with the 90th Light Infantry
(Perthshire Volunteers), two batteries of field artillery (N/5 and II/7)
and the 7th Company, Royal Engineers, undertook a daunting array of
garrison and other duties in Cape Colony, Natal, along the Zululand
border, and in the Transvaal. Sir Arthur Cunynghame, the general offi-
cer commanding (GOC) South Africa, compensated for his lack of cav-
alry by forming mounted infantry from the 1/24th in 1875, and raising
additional bodies of mounted riflemen, volunteers and mounted police
from the colonial communities, as well as native auxiliaries, both
before and during the Ninth Cape Frontier War.10 The Mfengu were
willing to fight the Ngqika and the Gcaleka in the Transkei, while the
Swazis readily joined in attacking the mountainous strongholds of the
Pedi in eastern Transvaal.
The Ninth Cape Frontier War and 
campaign against Sekhukhune
The campaigns of 1877–78 were a series of largely desultory engage-
ments, often involving small bodies of imperial troops (sometimes
half-companies or less) and/or mounted police and their auxiliaries.
These bodies repelled raids on police posts and convoys, skirmished in
thick bush and periodically mounted reprisal raids – burning villages
and seizing cattle. When the Xhosa massed in their thousands and
engaged in set-piece battles – at Nyamaga (13 January 1878) and Cen-
tane (7 February 1878) – they suffered heavy defeats, breaking before
the disciplined fire-power of a few hundred infantry, mounted police, a
rocket battery and a few guns. At Nyamaga, recalled Lieutenant
Thomas R. Main, (RE), ‘our Martini Henrys produced terrible havoc
amongst the enemy who, having no opportunity to reload, bolted
across the open plain’, pursued by the police and Mfengu auxiliaries.
Thereafter campaigning over the rolling hills, high plateaus, and bush-
covered ravines and valleys became wearisome and tedious: ‘We
trekked up & down the Transkei’, wrote Main, ‘but rarely brought the
Kafirs [sic] to book’.11
Volley-firing was also to the fore when the small force under
Colonel H. Rowlands, VC, tried to storm the rocky fastnesses of the
Pedi. One soldier of the 1/13th described how the assault was launched
on 27 October 1878, with companies deployed in skirmishing forma-
tion, supported by artillery, Swazis and the Carrington Horse. ‘In a
short time’, he wrote, ‘one thought the gates of hell were let loose 
and that demons were fighting’. Under continuous fire and periodic
counter-attacks, the 1/13th had to charge up a mountain, support the
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Carrington Horse who ‘were too weak to keep their position’, and,
despite driving the enemy up the mountain, had to retire ‘after six or
seven hours hard fighting . . . exhausted from thirst’. Having failed to
capture the stronghold of Chief Sekhukhune, Rowlands prudently
withdrew as his expedition was crippled by heat, lack of water and
horse-sickness. The march back to the camp at Spekboom Drift, as a
1/13th Light Infantryman observed, was a debilitating experience:
‘When we got to the river I do not think there was one man but drank
four canteens full of water as fast as one could drink, we were so
exhausted and thirsty.’12
Understandably the abortive campaign against Sekhukhune, under-
taken over peculiarly difficult terrain by an under-strength force,13 had
less impact upon British military thinking than did the bush fighting
in the Transkei. Many of the commanding officers and regular forces,
who would serve in the Anglo-Zulu War, fought in the Ninth Cape
Frontier War. In March 1878 Lieutenant-General the Hon. Frederic A.
Thesiger, later the second Baron Chelmsford, superseded Cunyng-
hame. He utilised the estimable services of Colonel Evelyn Wood, VC,
with the 90th Foot, and Major Redvers Buller in command of the Fron-
tier Light Horse (FLH), to mount systematic drives through the bush to
overcome the elusive Ngqikas by the end of May. The campaign repeat-
edly demonstrated that concentrated fire-power from small bodies of
regulars, or sometimes colonials, could disperse much larger bodies of
Xhosa, even without the aid of prepared defences. A Tauntonian
described such an action when sixty police, supported by four 7-
pounder muzzle-loading guns, sent ‘between 4,000 and 6,000 niggers
running for dear life’, but when the trail of one of their guns broke
down later they had to withdraw, whereupon the accompanying 400
Mfengus panicked and fled.14
When another patrol of forty Connaught Rangers, twenty police and
three volunteers was ambushed by about 1,000 Gcaleka (30 December
1877), several police, noted one of the volunteers, jumped ‘on their
horses and (five or six) galloped through and away’.15 Major Moore, who
earned a VC for leading the patrol, reported more positively: ‘The Con-
naught Rangers, boys though they are – not one of them had ever seen
an enemy before – and some of the Frontier Armed Police, behaved
admirably.’ He criticised only their ‘very mild’ shooting that accounted
for a ‘small number of the enemy’.16 Local volunteers and the native
levies had provided invaluable support, especially in pursuit of the
enemy and their cattle, but their periodic displays of ill-discipline and
unreliability evoked profound misgivings among the regulars.17
Although the resistance of the Ngqika and Gcaleka proved unex-
pectedly stubborn, many soldiers realised that a more challenging war
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with the Zulus was imminent. While based in King William’s Town in
the summer of 1878, Lieutenant Main heard ‘rumours of unrest among
the Zulus with their powerful army of 30,000 trained warriors, a very
different foe to the undisciplined Kafirs’.18 British units were ordered
into Natal as war appeared imminent (it was eventually provoked by
Cetshwayo’s rejection of an ultimatum from Sir Bartle Frere, the high
commissioner for South Africa, requiring acceptance of a British resi-
dent and the disbandment of the Zulu army). Private George Morris
(1/24th) anticipated ‘hard fighting’ ahead, while his comrade Private
John Thomas approved of the strict discipline in Pietermaritzburg: ‘I
saw six soldiers flogged on Saturday morning, and two this morning,
for being drunk on the line of march. They will have to remember that
the Zulus have got Martini-Henry rifles as well as we . . .’.19
The Anglo-Zulu War: first invasion of Zululand
Chelmsford duly assembled his army of 17,929 officers and men,
including over 1,000 mounted colonial volunteers and some 9,000
natives, and amassed a mighty array of transport – 977 wagons, 56
carts, 10,023 oxen, 803 horses and 398 mules.20 He planned to deploy
five columns, two of which (No. 2 under Lieutenant-Colonel A. W.
Durnford and No. 5 under Rowlands) were to defend the borders of
Natal and the Transvaal, respectively, while the other three were to
cross into Zululand on 11 January 1879. Wood’s No. 4 Column was to
cross the Blood River and subdue the northern areas of the Zulu king-
dom; Colonel C. K. Pearson’s No. 1 Column was to cross the Lower
Drift of the Tugela (Thukela) River and establish a base for future oper-
ations at the abandoned mission of Eshowe; and No 3, or Centre,
Column, nominally under Colonel Richard T. Glyn, but effectively
under Chelmsford’s command, would cross into Zululand at Rorke’s
Drift, where a supply depot was established on 11 January 1879. Sol-
diers found the country rugged and progress slow: companies of the
2/24th had to make roads for several days before advancing to the tem-
porary camp site at Isandlwana. Even those serving in the lines of com-
munication, like Private M. Gerrotty (2/4th), reported: ‘This is bad
country to travel in. We marched 150 miles up country, hardly any
water, and some of it of the worst description, all climbing up hills.’21
Within a day of crossing into Zululand, Chelmsford launched an
attack on Chief Sihayo’s mountainous kraal above the Batshe River. A
corporal of the 24th wrote: ‘We were at great disadvantage owing to the
rocks and bush, but we managed to rout them out in the long run after
about eight hours’ fighting.’ He admitted that ‘it is very hard work trav-
elling after these Zulus. They can run like horses.’22 This early display
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of Zulu mobility exposed the shortage of mounted men with the
Centre Column, and a week later Chelmsford ordered Durnford, with
the Natal Native Horse, a battalion of infantry and a rocket battery, to
support his column.23
By the time Durnford, with his 250 mounted men, reached Isandl-
wana (about 10.30 a.m. on 22 January 1879), Chelmsford had already
departed with six companies of the 2/24th, four guns of Harness’s 
battery, a detachment of mounted infantry, and the Natal Native 
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Pioneers. He had done so at first light after a reconnaissance party under
Major John Dartnell reported 1,000 Zulus some 12 miles eastwards.
Fearing lest Dartnell or another reconnaissance party under Comman-
dant Rupert Lonsdale had encountered the main Zulu impi, Chelmsford
planned to reinforce them but left a substantial force (five companies of
the 1/24th, one company of the 2/24th, the two remaining 7-pounder
guns, over 100 mounted infantry and four companies of the Natal
Native Contingent) under Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine, 1/24th,
to guard the camp. He also required Pulleine to keep his cavalry
vedettes advanced, draw in his line of infantry outposts and defend the
camp, if attacked. Once Durnford’s force arrived, including the rocket
battery, there were nearly 1,800 men at Isandlwana; by the early
evening, only some 55 Europeans and less than 400 natives survived.
Of the European survivors, most of the British soldiers testified
before official inquiries or wrote letters that have been used in
accounts of the battle.24 Captain W. Penn Symons (2/24th) reviewed
some of this evidence in a regimental inquiry, including the testi-
monies of the six survivors of the 1/24th (Privates Grant, Johnson,
Trainer, Williams, Bickley and Wilson) and observed: ‘It was very
remarkable how their accounts afterwards varied. Men forgot what
they saw and did amidst great excitement, and mixed up what others
told them with their own experiences and reminiscences.’25
Some survivors, like Lieutenant Curling, were profoundly shocked
by the experience and were not always lucid in their recollections;
others embellished their accounts, even in the case of H. C. Young pos-
sibly claiming to have escaped from Isandlwana when, according to
Lieutenant Higginson, he was in Sandspruit on the day of the battle.26
Moreover these accounts, as F. W. D. Jackson has observed, ‘do little
more than hint at the final stages of the battle’, where they gave the
impression of organised resistance collapsing – an impression contra-
dicted by Zulu testimony and the location of the dead.27
Despite these shortcomings, the correspondents corroborated
aspects of the battle, not least Colonel Durnford’s behaviour on reach-
ing the camp, where he outranked Pulleine. Durnford had already
learned from Lieutenant John Chard, RE, whom he had met while the
latter was returning to Rorke’s Drift, that Zulus were moving on the
distant hills,28 but the reports from outposts and vedettes were of vary-
ing accuracy. When Durnford heard subsequently that the enemy were
retiring, he determined to pursue them and prevent any reinforcement
of the main impi that was supposed to be engaging Chelmsford. An
‘eyewitness’ confirmed Lieutenant W. F. D. Cochrane’s claim that
Durnford requested the assistance of two companies of the 24th, which
Pulleine refused, and Trooper Muirhead (Natal Carabineers) regarded
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Durnford as ‘the cause of all the disaster’ on account of his provocative
advance at a time when the camp was not even protected by a laager of
wagons.29 Pulleine had to defend the camp, which sprawled over half a
mile of ground, but had neither entrenched it (which would have been
difficult on the hard stony ground) nor organised a laager (a time-con-
suming and skilled task that may have seemed superfluous for a tem-
porary camp site, where wagons were still bringing forward supplies
from Rorke’s Drift). Although scouts were supposed to give adequate
notice of any impending attack, Lieutenant Teignmouth Melvill,
1/24th, and others had warned of the dangers of undefended camps in
Zulu territory, and when Captain Edward Essex led survivors back to
Helpmekaar, after the battle, he immediately ordered the construction
of a wagon laager to afford protection.30
As regards the battle itself, Private Edward Evans of the mounted
infantry was another survivor (and brought news of the disaster to
Rorke’s Drift).31 In a letter to his mother and brother, he hinted at the
problem of overextended lines but said nothing about the ammunition
supply:
On the 22nd January 1879, at 4 a.m., General Lord Chelmsford marched
out his main column, about 2,000 strong, intending to attack the main
body of Cetyawyo’s [sic] army. . . and when our column was about 13 miles
away from camp we (the men left in camp) could hear the roar of their can-
nons, and believed everything was going on successfully with them. Now
comes the sorrowful history of our camp! About 9 a.m.our company of the
2–24th Regiment was on vidette [sic], or outline picket, on the left flank of
ours, when the enemy made his appearance on the left front of our camp.
Our picket opened fire on the enemy. We got the order, ‘Every man stand
to his arms, and be ready for action at a moment’s notice.’ About 11 a.m.
the enemy made its appearance in four large columns, estimated at 15,000
strong. Colonel Durnford, R.E., gave orders for his mounted men to go and
flank them on the right, and the rocket party also went to meet them, but
had no time to fire more than one rocket when they were cut up. Only one
escaped. Then Colonel Pulleen [sic] took out about 500 of the 1-24th, and
threw out a line of skirmishers in front of the enemy, when the poor fel-
lows opened a most destructive fire on the enemy, knowing they had to
fight for their lives, and intending to sell their lives as dear as possible.
They were over numbered more than 20 to one. Two divisions of artillery
were also pouring down upon them as fast as shot and shell could be used,
but took no effect on the murderous savages. Where 100 would fall 300
would come up and fill up the gap. All the mounted men were guarding the
back of the camp, but to no good. Heedless of shot or shell, or bayonet
stabs, they kept coming in by thousands, and killed our men like dogs.32 
A 20-year-old Natal policeman served in support of Durnford’s flank-
ing movement and wrote of the Zulus:
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we saw the hill black with them, coming on in swarms, estimated at
20,000. We held a ditch as long as possible, but being outnumbered the
order was given to get into camp. Well we got there. I went all over the
place for a gun, but could not get one. My revolver was broken . . . The
Zulus were in the camp, ripping our men up, also the tents and every-
thing they came upon with their assegais.33
Only mounted men, like Evans and Muirhead, had any chance of
escape: Muirhead described how Surgeon-Major Shepherd was killed in
flight after briefly stopping to examine a fallen trooper.34 One of the
escaping Basuto horsemen claimed that their chief had made them
concentrate their fire on one spot in the Zulu ranks, mowing ‘a lane for
the moment through the Zulus’ and then dashing through it.35 ‘It was
a ride for life’, wrote Evans, ‘Many of our noble heroes that escaped
from the hands of the enemy lost their lives in crossing the Buffalo
River. Thank God for learning me to swim. My horse fell in the water,
and both of us went down together, and both swam out again – but a
very hard struggle.’36
The remainder of Chelmsford’s Column had apparently marched
out, ‘full of spirits at the thought of a brush with the enemy’, and heard
nothing from the camp until the sound of gun-fire about 12.30 a.m.
When a horseman brought news of the attack, the readiness of Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Arthur Harness, with his four guns and two companies
of 2/24th, to march back contrasted with the incredulity of Major
Gosset and other members of Chelmsford’s staff.37 As Harness’s sol-
diers first marched back some 5 miles, then were ordered to rejoin the
column before finally being ordered to return to the camp, a colour-
sergeant of the 2/24th recalled: ‘It was awfully annoying this marching
backwards and forwards; but a soldier’s first duty is obedience and
away we went, though awfully tired.’38 A few miles from the camp, the
general and advance escort returned to explain that the camp had
fallen. When Chelmsford, who seemed, according to Private P. Fitzger-
ald (2/24th), ‘very near crying’,39 ordered that the camp should be
retaken even at the point of the bayonet, the ranks responded with
three cheers.40 By nightfall (times vary, but probably about 8 p.m.), the
column stormed into the camp with fire from guns and volleys, and
bayonets fixed. Apart from a few drunken Zulus, who were quickly
bayoneted, the soldiers found the camp deserted.41 They spent a largely
sleepless night, punctuated by periodic alerts: as A. J. Secretan (Natal
Mounted Police) noted, ‘We were lying amongst thousands of dead,
both black and white . . . I myself was lying in a pool of blood and a
ghastly corpse was just beside me.’42
At sunrise the spectacle was even worse. Secretan observed that
some British soldiers had died ‘formed up in square, where they held
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their ground till all were slain where they stood’. Like many others, he
was appalled by the mutilated corpses and the ‘horses and oxen all
lying about, stabbed and ripped up’.43 Several soldiers (Charles Mason,
Daniel Sullivan, John James and R. Wilson) as well as Lieutenant
Hillier (Lonsdale Horse) claimed that disembowelled band boys hung
from butcher’s hooks.44 Whether these stories, like similar tales already
documented, were true or were the products of rumour, hearsay and
fevered imagination – as has been suggested 45 – they circulated widely,
feeding the hatred of the Zulu and the desire, as expressed by Private
G. Griffiths (2/24th), for ‘revenge on the black heathens’.46 Such feel-
ings, though, had to fester for some time, as the column had lost its
colours, stores, valises, blankets, coats, tents and ammunition. ‘The
Zulus’, wrote Private D. Buckley (2/24th), ‘took everything they could
carry and what they could not carry they burnt.’47 As Chelmsford
promptly ordered a withdrawal from Isandlwana, and retired on to the
defensive in Natal, his soldiers consoled themselves as they awaited
reinforcements. Many counted their blessings, as they too had been
vulnerable, possessing only seventy rounds of ammunition per man.48
They extolled the achievements of their fallen comrades: ‘The enemy’,
wrote Private P. Thomas (2/24th), ‘had to pay dearly for their day’s
work’, a view echoed by the many who greatly exaggerated the number
of Zulu dead.49 Similarly many were quick to blame Durnford for the
debacle – and to identify other scapegoats: ‘those d——d volunteers
and Native Contingent’, claimed Private Thomas Harding (2/24th),
‘ran away as soon as they saw the enemy coming’.50
British morale, nonetheless, revived after the heroic defence of
Rorke’s Drift (22–3 January 1879), when some 140 men – 35 of whom
were sick – resisted an onslaught from an estimated 4,000 Zulus (the
uNdi Corps, a reserve not employed in the attack on Isandlwana). The
base at least had warning of the impending attack, enabling Lieutenant
Gonville Bromhead (2/24th) and Assisting Acting Commissary James
Dalton, a former sergeant in the 85th Foot, to begin organising a
perimeter defence while Chard, the officer in command, closed down
the pontoon operations. Apart from two wagons, the perimeter con-
sisted of piles of mealie bags and biscuit boxes – ‘a broken and imper-
fect barricade at the best, and nowhere more than two feet high’.51
Private E. Stephens (B Company, 2/24th) informed his mother that
a farthing would have bought all our lives. Then we got our guns and
ammunition, struck camp, and barricaded the old storehouse as well as
we could. Some were posted one place and another, and about an hour
elapsed when we could see them coming. They say it was 4,000 alto-
gether. Every man was to his post, and all the 300 natives we got ran
away, and there was 146 of us altogether. We kept firing; it began about
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three o’clock – kept on for two hours – when they succeeded in setting
fire to the little house used as an hospital. It was getting dark then, and
we expected help. We thought the General would come to us, but not so.
We said we would die brave. We kept it up until daybreak, and, thank
God, they ran away, and we went round to bury the dead, and we killed
a good number.52
From the hospital a Dundonian in the 1/24th, almost certainly Private
John William Roy, who was mentioned in despatches, afforded a more
garbled account:
When we heard the rapid firing we fortified the Mission Station as well
as we could. The hospital was the missionary’s dwellinghouse, and the
sick (about 20 of us) manned that, while the company were inside the for-
tification. We had only about three-quarters of an hour to secure our-
selves as well we could. They came down upon us about three o’clock in
the afternoon . . . They very nearly overpowered us. They took the hos-
pital and set fire to it, while I and another old soldier were inside at the
back window, and we did not know they had taken it at the front. My
rifle got disabled, so I fixed my bayonet and charged out of the house . . .
There were about 30 Zulus chasing us, but the men inside the fort shot
them before they could harm us. There were four men burned alive in the
hospital, they being unable to move with the fever. We kept our position
until the morning and then the General came to our assistance.53
An anonymous account in the Warwick and Warwickshire Adver-
tiser was more informative. The Zulus initially ‘advanced quietly but
quickly at a run, taking advantage of every bit of cover. It seemed as if
they had expected to surprise the camp. Our men opened fire at 500
yards.’ As the advance party broke and scattered to their left, occupy-
ing
the garden and orchard, where there was plenty of cover . . . Others came
on in a continuous stream, occupied the hill above, and gradually encir-
cled the two houses. All men who had guns were stationed on the hill,
and kept up a continuous and rapid fire on the yard . . .. Had they been
good marksmen the place was untenable, but they fired wildly and badly
for the most part.
Meanwhile parties of 15–20 Zulus ‘repeatedly attacked the end room
of the hospital. They made these attacks in the most deliberate
manner, advancing after the manner of their dancing, with a prancing
step and high action; they cared nothing for slaughter’. They were
resisted with bullet and bayonet: ‘seven or eight times at least, Lieu-
tenant Bromhead, collecting a few men together, had to drive them off
with a bayonet charge’. The shooting was deliberate and effective: in
the morning, outside the window of the hospital defended by Private
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Joseph Williams, ‘a young Welshman, with under two years’ service’,
there were fourteen dead warriors ‘and several more down his line of
fire’. After the hospital was vacated, the ‘fighting in places became
hand to hand over the mealie sacks. The assailants used only their
assegais. These they did not throw but used as stabbing weapons.’ The
fighting continued until 4 a.m. when they gradually withdrew, carry-
ing as many of their dead and wounded as they could. ‘The last of them
left just before dawn. They left 370 dead on the field. These were
counted and buried in heaps.’54
On the same day as the battle of Isandlwana, Pearson’s column
encountered some 6,000 Zulus at the River Nyezane. The column had
spent ten days struggling across the river-laced terrain of long grass and
bush, gaining a foretaste of how slow and frustrating movement would
be in Zululand. The teams of 16 oxen pulling each of the 130 wagons
posed difficulties at river crossings where, as Sergeant Josh S. Hooper
(2/Buffs) noted, ‘we had to drag most of the waggons across as the bul-
locks instead of pulling have a great inclination to lay down in the
water’.55 The column’s length straggled over several miles, compound-
ing its vulnerability, and, at the Nyezane, the advance guard bore the
brunt of the Zulu attack. To prevent the Zulus from enveloping the
lead units, Pearson ordered the Naval Brigade under Captain H.
Fletcher Campbell, Lieutenant Lloyd’s artillery and two companies of
Buffs to seize the crest of a nearby knoll. This split the enemy’s
advance and brought into action two 7-pounders, rocket tubes and later
a Gatling gun, while the remaining Buffs, the 99th (Duke of Edin-
burgh’s Lanarkshire) and a portion of the Naval Brigade skirmished on
the flanks. Within an hour the enemy fled. While the column suffered
10 deaths and 16 wounded, official estimates of the Zulu dead exceeded
300.56
Although the participants tended to exaggerate both the length of
the battle and the number of Zulu casualties,57 they recalled key fea-
tures of the engagement. Once again the native auxiliaries fled (many
of their officers and non-commissioned officers could not speak the
auxiliaries’ language, and some could not even speak English). While
Dr Mansell, a surgeon with the column, appreciated that these were
poorly armed soldiers (only every tenth man had a rifle), he was
appalled that some tried to find shelter in the ambulance wagons. The
credit for the victory, he added, belonged to ‘about five hundred men
comprising a portion of the Buffs and the 99th Regiments’.58 Yet the
gunners, sappers, mounted troops and the Naval Brigade contributed,
too, with the sailors firing 300 rounds from the Gatling gun. While
Lieutenant Main described the Zulus as ‘splendid fighters, but stood no
chance against the white man & his Martini rifle, as long as the latter
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remained steady’,59 Zulu fire-power inflicted relatively few casualties
because it was aimed far too high: some sailors were among the first
injured because they climbed into trees to get a better line of sight and
were inadvertently shot.60
The column moved on to a Scandinavian mission at Eshowe, where
work began on the construction of a fort. This involved digging a
trench some 10–12-feet deep, and 20-feet wide, with stakes planted
inside. The earth from the trench was used to create a breastwork, with
steps inside, and beyond the trench smaller holes were dug, containing
sharpened stakes linked by wire to entangle the legs of any onrushing
Zulus.61 The labour of constructing the trench soon paled by compari-
son with the boredom of living within its vicinity. Despite some
mounted forays, several officers chafed at Pearson’s decision to wait for
relief lest it demoralise the men.62 The fort was isolated (until a helio-
graph link with the Tugela was established) as runners rarely reached
Natal (and, ironically, a couple who did get there brought news of the
disaster at Isandlwana). Once ‘the extent of the loss became known’,
wrote Mansell, ‘the men were much depressed about it’.63 Morale
flagged within the fort: as Lieutenant A. V. Payne observed: ‘I have not
had a single letter from home yet: we are reading some old papers we
found up here 10 years old, principally old Illustrated News.’64 Even
worse, fever and dysentery swept through the ranks as men endured
extremes of climate (fierce heat in daytime often followed by heavy
rain at night), impure water, cramped conditions each night in a sodden
earthwork fort and short daily rations (1⁄2lb of mouldy biscuit, 12oz
wholemeal, usually in the form of dark and sour bread, 3oz of preserved
vegetables and half the allowance of salt and pepper). By 5 March, ‘the
Church (our hospital)’, wrote Sergeant Hooper, ‘is full of men, many
raving and often too bad and weak to rave’; by 26 March, the sick on
‘Convalescent Hill’ were ‘all very much emaciated . . . not one is able
to lift his hand to even drive off the flies which continually worry them
. . . the stench in the hospital is beyond my description’.65
On 12 March another disaster befell the British forces near the
Transvaal border when 800 to 900 Zulus attacked a camp on the banks
of the Ntombe (Intombi) River. Their target was a convoy of eighteen
wagons carrying stores, ammunition and provisions from Lydenburg to
Natal, escorted by 106 soldiers of the 80th under Captain D. B. Mori-
arty. As the river had been swollen by heavy rain, sixteen wagons were
on the northern bank, arranged in a V-shaped laager (a formation criti-
cised by Major Charles Tucker when he visited the camp on the previ-
ous day because of the gaps between the wagons and the distance
between the ‘legs’ of the V and the river66).With the bulk of the men and
the oxen within the laager, thirty-four men were left on the southern
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bank, initially with Sergeant Anthony Booth in charge and later Lieu-
tenant H. H. Harward. Under the cover of an early morning fog the
Zulus crept to about 90 metres of the northern camp, whereupon, at
approximately 5 a.m., they opened fire and attacked the camp with
assegais. The only effective response came from the southern bank
where the men were standing to, following an earlier errant shot.
Sergeant Booth wrote: ‘I rallied my party by the waggon and poured
heavy fire into them as fast as we could . . . I commanded the party on
this side as Lieutenant Harward saddled his horse and galloped away
leaving us to do the best we could.’ Booth’s section provided covering
fire for some fifteen men, ‘all as naked as they were born’, who swam
the river, and then held off 200–300 Zulus by firing volleys in a phased
retreat to a mission station about 3 miles away.67 Captain Moriarty 
perished with seventy-eight men in this action, for which Booth earned
a VC. Harward, who rode off to alert Major Tucker at Luneburg, later
survived a court martial, but his career was ruined.68
Wood’s No. 4 Column, though expected to march towards Ulundi in
support of the Centre Column, had to pacify the territory en route to
ensure the protection of the border town of Utrecht and the hamlet of
Luneburg. Wood’s Column included two infantry battalions (1/13th
and 90th), an artillery battery less one section, six troops of mounted
volunteers (including a Boer contingent under Piet Uys) and two bat-
talions of locally recruited Zulus, known as ‘Wood’s irregulars’. They
were soon skirmishing with larger bodies of Zulus, burning their kraals
and capturing thousands of head of cattle, sheep and horses. Morale
soared as the enemy repeatedly broke before Wood’s fire-power. ‘We
gave them volley after volley’, wrote Private G. Betts (90th), ‘which
made them run in all directions.’69 ‘We are in good fighting trim’,
claimed a Crieff veteran, ‘we are old warriors (for this is our second
war), and are used to fighting darkies.’70 After receiving news of Isandl-
wana, Wood abandoned the march on Ulundi and established a camp
at Khambula. A medical officer noted:
On one side of the camp is a precipice and the other side is very steep. In
front there is a narrow open stretch of ground, and immediately in rear
of our camp, about 250 yards off, perched on a small isolated eminence
about 100 feet above us, is a fort with a deep ditch, mounting two guns.
The camp consists of two laagers, an outside square one composed of
about 90 waggons end to end, and an inner circle of about 50 waggons,
where the oxen are kept at night. In addition the camp is intrenched
[sic].71
A trooper of the Frontier Light Horse (FLH) described how mounted
outposts were positioned 5 miles from the camp and a mile at night,
men had to ‘sleep with their boots and clothes on, with their ammuni-
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tion around them’, and the ammunition boxes were ‘kept unscrewed
and ready for use’.72
Wood kept despatching mounted forces under Buller to seize cattle
and destroy nearby Zulu homesteads. Some Zulus surrendered,
swelling the ranks of Wood’s irregulars, but the refractory abaQulusi
frequently retreated to a mountainous plateau on Hlobane mountain.
On 28 March Wood attacked this stronghold using a pincer movement,
involving mounted troops and native levies. Although Buller’s force
(some 160 FLH and 200 irregulars) reached the summit and began dri-
ving off Zulu cattle, supporting units (the Border Horse) became sepa-
rated in the darkness and the abaQulusi harassed the rear guard. When
the other part of the pincer withdrew at the sight of a massive Zulu
army approaching along the valley below, Buller’s command had to
conduct a fighting retreat. An officer of the FLH described how
We galloped along the top of the mountain, and found the way down was
simply a sheer rocky descent . . . The Dutchmen in front rushed to try
and get down first, as the Zulus were only 500 yards behind us on top,
and the enemy approaching was apparently going to try and cut us off
below. Nothing more or less than a terrible panic ensued . . . I and my
horse fell a matter of 30 feet . . . On reaching the bottom I found men of
all the different corps massed together preparing for a precipitous flight
. . . the mass refused to listen to any of the eight officers down there. We
beseeched, threatened, and cursed them, calling them cowards, and had
actually to fire on them. It was no good, about 20 or 30 stopped, and we
waited for what men to come down who could. Most arrived dis-
mounted, and we had to watch helplessly the Zulus assegaing the brave
fellows at the top. It was an awful sight. We then picked up what men we
could get away, and made our way home.73 
If few British regulars were involved in this rout – a rare example of
a small body of men caught on a mountain top and harried by the Zulu
– they were appalled by the spectacle of bedraggled men returning to
Khambula. ‘It was an extraordinary sight’, wrote Lieutenant Fell (90th),
‘to see the men return into camp. All the horses deadbeat. Some carry-
ing three men. Many had thrown away boots, coats, trousers, arms, and
ammunition, in fact everything which could inconvenience them.’74
Even worse were the tales of the slaughter, involving the loss of 15 offi-
cers and 79 men, mostly colonial irregulars, and at least 100 of Wood’s
irregulars. During the night most of Wood’s remaining irregulars
deserted,75 and the Dutch contingent departed after the death of their
leader, Piet Uys. Forewarned of the approach of the Zulu army, some
20,000-strong, the 2,086 officers and men, including 88 sick, awaited
the attack on the following day. By mid-morning, wrote Corporal
Hutchinson, ‘the hills around us were black’76 as the Zulus advanced in
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five enormous columns. By despatching his mounted troops as skir-
mishers, Wood provoked the right horn into a precipitate attack,
whereupon it foundered, as Fell described, before ‘a storm of lead from
our men in the laager’.77 Over the next four hours the Zulus mounted
a succession of assaults, with their bravery all too obvious: ‘no matter
how many were killed’, Hutchinson recalled, ‘still they kept coming
on and still they were getting killed’.78 Although disciplined fire-power
disrupted their attacks and kept them from reaching the fort, the rifles
became so hot that soldiers could not hold them, whereupon ‘one party
cooled their arms while the other fired . . .’.79 A bayonet charge by two
companies of the 90th dispersed some Zulus who broke into the cattle
laager: ‘they did not stand it’, wrote Private John Graham (90th), and
many were shot retreating down the hill.80 When the Zulus eventually
withdrew, Wood let forth his mounted troops. An officer of the FLH
wrote: ‘We chased a column of 6,000, only 150 of us, but our blood was
up and the enemy in retreat. We were no longer men but demons,
screaming the same refrain “Remember yesterday!”’81 While Buller’s
troops left a trail of slaughter over 8 miles, a company of the 90th left
the fort, shooting and bayoneting the enemy. Fell claimed that this was
revenge for Isandlwana, but the battle in which over 2,000 Zulus died
(compared with 29 dead and 55 wounded within the camp) had a much
greater significance: as Private George Davies (mounted infantry)
observed, ‘The battle will greatly dishearten them and do us a great
deal of good . . .’.82
Bolstering morale was certainly necessary, as the remnants of
Glyn’s column languished in the cramped and unhealthy conditions at
Helpmekaar and Rorke’s Drift with little to do once they had fortified
the depots. In lengthy letters to his father, Lieutenant Charles E. Com-
meline, (RE), fully described the two months of tedium awaiting rein-
forcements, building earthworks and roads, bringing forward stores,
ammunition and equipment, and coping with transport difficulties.83
Amid the frustrations came criticisms of Chelmsford: ‘The Zulus have
completely out-generalled us’, wrote one of his column, while another
feared that they had lived ‘in such a fool’s paradise, over-estimating our
knowledge of the enemy and under-estimating their strength and tac-
tics’.84 As these concerns found reflection in the press, Commeline
doubted that Chelmsford ‘can remove the unfavourable impression
that has been created’.85
From mid-March onwards reinforcements began to arrive in Natal.
They included five infantry battalions, two cavalry regiments, addi-
tional artillery, engineers and other support services, with most of the
home-based units brought up to strength with volunteers from other
units. Huge crowds had cheered the ‘Avenging Army’ when it left
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Portsmouth and Southampton, while local newspapers, such as the
Ayr Advertiser and the Bridge of Allan Reporter, engaged officers –
from the 21st (Royal Scots Fusiliers) and 91st (Argyllshire) High-
landers, respectively – to write regular columns from the front. During
the voyage officers and other ranks practised with their weapons,
attended lectures on the Zulu, and read about events in Zululand (300
copies of the Graphic were sent to the steamship carrying the
Argylls).86 If this could hardly prepare soldiers for the stress of acclima-
tisation – what Private Charles Godfrey, a volunteer from the 45th to
the 58th (Rutlandshire), would describe as ‘very hard marches in the
burning sun of Africa’87 – they arrived at the front highly motivated and
eager to grapple with the Zulu.88
The Anglo-Zulu War: second invasion of Zululand
Chelmsford employed the reinforcements initially to relieve Eshowe.
On 29 March Chelmsford’s column (3,390 Europeans and 2,280
natives) entered Zululand, moving slowly across the swampy terrain
and forming wagon laagers with external entrenchments every night.
Travelling without tents, new soldiers, like Private C. Coe (3/60th
Rifles), despaired of the torrential rains at night.89 On the morning of 2
April, when the relief force was still ensconced within its entrenched
square laager at Gingindlovu, some 6,000 Zulus attacked. For an hour
they swept round the sides of the square, suffering heavy casualties
from the disciplined volleys and the Gatling guns at two corners (two
naval 9-pounders fired from the other corners). Once again Zulu fire-
power proved largely ineffective (leaving 15 killed, 49 wounded and 3
severely wounded), but their skirmishing and bravery were highly
praised. Captain William Crauford (91st) admired ‘very much the way
they advanced to the attack, our men can’t hold a candle to them . . .’.90
Whereas Private Coe regarded the fire-fight as ‘fine sport whilst we
were going at it’, a colour-sergeant of the 91st commented: ‘Nothing in
the world could stand our fire . . . yet very hard to see our fellow-crea-
tures sent to eternity’.91As the Zulus withdrew, the mounted infantry
and natives pursued them, killing many of the wounded and retreating
enemy. Dr A. A. Woods was appalled by the difficulty of treating the
wounded with ‘very defective’ medical stores and appliances; the con-
finement of wounded Zulu prisoners, left lying in the mud that ‘did not
by any means redound to our credit as a civilised nation’; and the
behaviour of the native auxiliaries: ‘Cowards naturally, they fear a
Zulu as one would a mad dog. Dirty, lazy, and gluttonous beyond all
conception, these are the allies who are helping to fight the Zulus, 
and whom their own officers utterly despise and treat as beasts.’92
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Gingindlovu, nonetheless, was another decisive victory with over 700
Zulus killed and the relief of Eshowe accomplished on the following
day.
Thereafter Chelmsford spent nearly two months accumulating
forces, stores and transport for another two-pronged invasion of Zulu-
land. Major-General E. Newdigate’s Second Division (5,000 men) was
to strike across from Blood River, joining with Wood’s renamed ‘Flying
Column’ (3,200 men) and later with Major-General H. H. Crealock’s
First Division (7,500 men), once it had pacified the coastal region, in a
joint thrust towards Ulundi. Only one day into the invasion (1 June)
Prince Louis Napoleon, who had volunteered to join the reinforce-
ments, was killed while sketching, but five of his eight-strong escort,
including Lieutenant J. B. Carey, escaped without him. On 2 June
Lancers, some of whom had recently completed a burial detail at Isan-
dlwana, recovered the body of the Prince Imperial, naked save for a thin
gold chain and scarred with seventeen assegai wounds. Captain R. Wol-
rige-Gordon (attached to the 94th) was not alone in regarding Carey as
a ‘coward’, who ‘ought to be shot’, and a sergeant in the 1st King’s Dra-
goon Guards correctly anticipated that the death would cause ‘a great
sensation in England and on the Continent . . .’.93
The Second Division pressed slowly onwards, forming entrenched
laagers at night, periodically stopping to construct fortified depots, and
suffering several night-time alerts in which some soldiers were shot by
nervous pickets.94 Officers and men seemed eager to confront the
enemy; they praised the rejection of Cetshwayo’s peace envoys, and
consoled companies left behind to garrison Fort Newdigate and Fort
Marshall.95 As mounted patrols skirmished with Zulus and burnt
kraals, some of the Flying Column bemoaned the slowness of the
advance, attributing it to the ‘vacillation which has characterised the
Commander-in-Chief’s actions ever since the fatal day of Isandala
[sic]’.96 Notwithstanding Chelmsford’s caution, the delays derived
chiefly from the difficulties of moving 700 ox-driven wagons (when the
Second Division joined with the Flying Column) over roadless, undu-
lating terrain. Crealock’s Division moved even slower, with fewer
oxen and many of them emaciated, struggling across rivers and marshy
ground. It never made the assault on Ulundi. ‘A British army’, observed
a Royal Scots Fusilier, ‘is a terribly cumbrous machine, and quite inca-
pable of rapid movement.’97
On 30 June after waiting in vain for Crealock, and knowing that
Wolseley had been sent to supersede him, Chelmsford ordered the final
advance on Ulundi. With 15 miles to go, the columns screened by the
mounted troops, descended ‘into a great bushy valley’. Engineers and
pioneers led the way, ‘axe in hand, felling timber all the way’, to the
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White Mfolozi River. As the wagons had to move three or four abreast,
an engineer recalled: ‘We were knocked up and expected an attack at
every minute.’98 Having laagered near the river, they suffered another
false alarm on the night of 1 July, whereupon the native pickets and a
company of the 24th stampeded into the laager: Wolrige-Gordon noted:
‘A sergeant, private, and drummer of the 24th are to be tried for it.’99
Two days later the regulars watched anxiously as the mounted horse
crossed the river, with Baker’s Horse dispersing 30 Zulu snipers and
then acting as a covering party for Buller’s 500 horsemen as they under-
took a reconnaissance mission and narrowly avoided a Zulu ambush.
Meeting 4,000 Zulus, Buller conducted a skilful retreat, with only 3
dead and 4 wounded.100
Before dawn on the following day Chelmsford launched his final
advance, with 4,166 white and 958 black soldiers, 12 pieces of artillery
and 2 Gatling guns. Once across the river, they advanced in square for-
mation, ‘four deep, the ammunition and tool carts in the centre, the
cavalry out all around us’, a difficult formation in which to manoeu-
vre over ‘rough and bushy’ ground, especially with wagons and carts.101
By 8.30 a.m. the square, having set one kraal on fire, reached the 
area reconnoitred by Buller on the plain of Ulundi. An army of
15,000–20,000 Zulus advanced towards the square: ‘We saw them’,
wrote one engineer, ‘on our right, then front, then left, then they
worked their swarms to our rear face . . .’.102 Mounted troops, includ-
ing the Basuto scouts, fired on the Zulus, bringing them within range
before retreating in orderly manner into the square.103 Soldiers mar-
velled at the manoeuvring of the Zulus: James Lambert (veterinary
surgeon, 17th Lancers) described how they took ‘advantage of every
bit of cover afforded by the inequalities of the ground and a very few
bushes, and only showing their heads above the long grass’.104 Once
the artillery and Gatlings opened fire (before the latter jammed),
volley-firing followed, with the rear two ranks standing and the front
two kneeling, pausing periodically to let the smoke clear. This fire-
power kept the enemy, as a corporal of the 90th claimed, at ‘a respect-
ful distance’, but the artillery had to fire case as well as shrapnel and
rockets, and at some points the Zulus got within 30 yards of the line.105
The Zulus appeared less determined than previously: as Corporal Roe
(58th) observed, it only took about half an hour before they began to
withdraw from the ‘dreadful fire of our rifle and canon’, and some
Fusiliers complained that they had not even fired ten rounds of
ammunition (the average consumption was only 6.4 rounds per
man).106 Lancers and Dragoons harried the retreating enemy over 3
miles, crossing a deep donga and riding through high grass and over
pot-holed ground. The Dragoons, as one of their number described,
T H E  V I C T O R I A N  S O L D I E R  I N  A F R I C A
[ 52 ]
chap 2  9/7/04  9:02 am  Page 52
‘galloped as hard as we could, but the Zulus ran very nearly as fast as
we, so instead of losing time in dismounting we, with one consent,
halted and fired.’107 Yet the Lancers, despite losing a few men and
many horses, claimed at least 150 victims, and returned with all their
lances red with blood.108 When the Zulus reached the nearby hills and
began to mass out of reach of the cavalry, the 9-pounders were moved
out and began firing: ‘Oh! how they bolted’, wrote Mr France, a wagon
master in the square, ‘But to little purpose, for shell after shell fol-
lowed them and told most effectively on them.’109 Buller’s Horse com-
pleted the Zulu humiliation by burning the king’s kraal and all the
nearby kraals. 
Having buried their 12 dead (another would soon die), the square col-
lected their 69 wounded men and withdrew. As Wolrige-Gordon
recalled: ‘We passed several dead Zulus, all of whom having their stom-
achs ripped open; this was done by our natives, who, as soon as the
battle was over, began to get plucky, and went about killing the
wounded without mercy.’110 Soldiers, though, realised the magnitude of
their achievement. They had defeated the Zulu army in the open,
exactly in the area between the Nodwengu and Ulundi kraals where
Cetshwayo had wanted to fight. ‘We evidently astonished them’, wrote
a Bristolian with the Flying Column, ‘by marching close to their kraal
. . . and fighting them sans protection of earthwork of any sort’.111 The
young short-service soldiers, despite the false alarms, had proved
steady in battle (and apparently steadier than some of their comrades
when Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Northey fell mortally wounded at
Gingindlovu): ‘a British force’, argued a Fusilier officer, ‘properly han-
dled can easily defeat four times its numbers’.112 Lord Chelmsford, who
planned the battle and remained mounted throughout it, impressed
many observers: in the opinion of Sergeant O’Callaghan (58th), he had
‘proved himself an able general, and a cool, brave, and determined
leader’.113 At home, however, such comments failed to assuage criti-
cism of Chelmsford’s command or of his costly and cumbersome trans-
port arrangements.114 Nevertheless, Chelmsford had routed the Zulu
army, killing some 1,500 warriors and undermining the authority of
Cetshwayo (who would be caught on 28 August 1879 by a squadron of
dragoons). ‘The battle of Ulundi’, asserted Lambert, had ‘re-established
the prestige of the white man over the black, and probably decided the
fate of southern Africa for many generations.’115 
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In superseding Chelmsford as GOC, South Africa, Sir Garnet Wolseley
assumed wide-ranging powers as both high commissioner in south-
eastern Africa and governor of Natal and the Transvaal. He sought to
impose a settlement upon both Zululand and the neighbouring Trans-
vaal (the former South African Republic that Britain had annexed in
1877). Setting aside the confederation plans of Sir Bartle Frere, he
resolved that Zululand (other than the disputed territory left in Boer
hands) should be ruled by thirteen minor chiefs.1 He then moved into
the Transvaal to restore British prestige by overthrowing Sekhukhune,
whom the Boers had failed to defeat in 1876. The strategy had only
short-term impact and, after barely a year, 4,000 Boers at their national
convention voted to restore the South African Republic, by force of
arms, if necessary. In the ensuing conflict, the First Anglo-Boer War
(1880–81), soldiers had their first encounter with a well-armed African
foe, who was mobile, adept at skirmishing and capable of conducting
siege warfare. Some 1,800 soldiers served in the Transvaal and all were
besieged in isolated garrisons throughout the war, with few managing
to send letters beyond their beleaguered posts. Even the relief force
from Natal struggled to maintain its line of communications, and few
war correspondents reached the front (none covered the first two bat-
tles and only three observed the final battle at Majuba). As the war
lasted little more than two months, contained a series of unrelieved
disasters, and divided British opinion about its propriety, it aroused
scant enthusiasm at home. Indeed the newspapers, at least latterly,
were preoccupied with the assassination of the Tsar and the death of
Benjamin Disraeli.2
To attack Sekhukhune, Wolseley assembled a formidable composite
force, comprising the 2/21st and the 94th (2/Connaught Rangers), with
two companies of the 80th, four guns, a party of Royal Engineers with
explosives, a troop of mounted volunteers under Commandant Fereira,
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another mounted troop of volunteers and natives under Major Car-
rington, and about 8,000 Swazis. As the force advanced into the east-
ern Transvaal, it endured extreme heat and had to move through thick
bush. The sappers, wrote Commeline, were ‘employed from dawn till
dark’, cutting pathways, preparing drifts for ox-driven wagons, and
organising the construction of forts: by comparison, he added,‘the Zulu
war was a joke’.3 On 28 November Lieutenant-Colonel Baker Russell
launched a two-phased assault on Sekhukhune’s stronghold, employ-
ing the Carrington Horse to attack the town from the north and the
Fereira Horse to attack the kraal from the south, while the Swazis
seized the flat-topped mountain above. Once those objectives were
secured, British regulars attacked Sekhukhuni’s ‘Fighting Kop’, a sepa-
rate rocky salient some 200 feet high that overlooked the town and
kraal. As the kopje was honeycombed with caves and crannies, some
of which were protected by stone walls, artillery proved relatively inef-
fectual, forcing the infantry to storm the kopje and take terrace after
terrace in fierce hand-to-hand fighting.4 Even so, many of the Pedi
would not yield, prompting the sappers to spend an hour-and-a-half
placing charges of gun cotton into as many of the caves as possible.
Commeline ruefully reflected that ‘they did not kill very many . . . yet
wounded many and from the dust and smoke produced terrible thirst,
and reduced the garrison to a most pitiable condition’. The attacking
force had suffered, too:
We had been fighting for seven hours and our casualties are very heavy,
probably 200 is under the mark as the Swazis lost a great number . . .
Almost all the wounds have been inflicted at close quarters, they are as
a rule serious and probably the death toll will yet be considerably
swelled. As a battle Ulundi could not be compared to this one where we
were the attackers.5
Lieutenant-Colonel Philip R. Anstruther, (94th), who commanded the
fight in the valley, recalled that the Pedi ensured that ‘I had a very
rough time of it the whole night. As the beggars kept trying to bolt out
of the caves . . . we were firing hard the whole night through’. He also
reckoned that the Swazis were responsible for much of the carnage –
they were ‘grand fellows and most picturesque’ (wearing ‘leopard skins
and huge bunches of black feathers’), but fearful demons (‘they don’t
spare any living thing, man, woman, child’): ‘I don’t know what we
could have done without them. You see a British soldier is all very
well, but he is no match in moving about hills – for these naked sav-
ages.’6 Once the Pedi surrendered on the following day, the British had
to protect them from ‘the fury of the Swazis’.7 Three days later
Sekhukhune was captured.
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Wolseley hoped that the parading of Sekhukhune through the
streets of Pretoria would overawe the Boers, whom he disparaged as ‘in
some respects far inferior to the Zulu, and . . . certainly the most igno-
rant & bigotted [sic] & small-minded of white men’.8 Anstruther
agreed; he thought that the victory would have ‘an immense effect’ on
the Boers, whom he regarded as ‘nasty, cowardly brutes’.9 Corporal
William Roe (58th) observed how ‘thousands of people’ came out to see
Sekhukhune as he was escorted through Pretoria on 9 December 1879,
and noted that many cheered Wolseley when he later addressed the
townsfolk. Roe thought that this display of force, followed by a field
day, the award of a VC to Lieutenant Darcy of the Light Horse and the
arrest of two Boer spokesmen would settle the ‘Dutch question’. Given
the relatively large number of experienced soldiers still in the Trans-
vaal, Roe maintained that if the Boers ‘had started to fight, we should
show them no mercy at all’.10
Within four months Wolseley returned to England, claiming: ‘The
quiet and settled aspect of the Transvaal is even to me a matter of sur-
prise: I attribute it greatly to the arrests I made, and to the show of
force.’11 He was replaced in July 1880 by another Asante veteran, Sir
George Pomeroy Colley. Meanwhile the Boers’ hopes of independence
had been raised by the election of a Liberal Government under William
E. Gladstone in April 1880, only to be dashed by the inability of the
cabinet, split between Whigs and Radicals, to devise an agreed policy.
Thereafter Boer grievances mounted over the revenue-raising activities
of Sir W. Owen Lanyon, the administrator of the Transvaal, and the
behaviour of the British soldiery. The British forces in the Transvaal
were reduced when Wolseley departed, and were cut again under
Colley until he had only 1,800 men, with no cavalry and only four
guns. The soldiers were also widely dispersed in six isolated posts.12 As
the men endured a dreary and monotonous existence under canvas in
all seasons, bereft of a varied diet, many found solace in drink and some
sought the charms of Boer women. Desertions reached unprecedented
numbers as soldiers were tempted by the propinquity of the diamond
fields and mining interests in the Orange Free State. A Royal Scots
Fusilier explained: ‘Life here is provocative of every vice, not for vice’s
sake, but by way of protest against the aggressive morality not only of
the Boers, but also of the British who are only different from them in
name and birthplace. They have all the narrowness of Scottish elders
without their good qualities.’13
The rebellion was triggered by local events, namely the attempt of
the authorities to recover ‘legal costs’ by selling the wagon of Piet Bez-
iudenhout at Potchefstroom after a dispute about his tax arrears. When
local Boers blocked the public auction (11 November), Lanyon
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despatched a field force with two 9-pounder guns to aid the civil power
at Potchefstroom, without anticipating ‘any serious trouble’.14 The
Boers, however, brought forward their national convention from Janu-
ary to December, and, on 13 December, demanded a restoration of the
republic. They established a provisional capital at Heidelberg, where a
‘Triumvirate’ – Paul Kruger, Piet Joubert and Marthinus Pretorius –
was to organise a government. With about 7,000 Boers liable for active
service, the first shots were fired at the garrison at Potchefstroom and,
three days later, shots were exchanged near Pretoria.15
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The first engagement of the war occurred at about 12.30 p.m. on 20
December 1880 nearly two miles from Bronkhorst Spruit, where a
column of the 94th, marching to Pretoria, was intercepted by a Boer
commando led by Commandant Frans Joubert. The column, under the
command of Anstruther, included a convoy of thirty-four wagons
stretching out over a mile on the road, accompanied by 268 men of all
ranks, 3 women and 2 children. En route since 5 December, the
column marched with little sense of apprehension – only 2 mounted
scouts preceded it, the regimental band about 40-strong and unarmed
was playing at its head, and a rearguard of twenty men was about
200–300 yards behind the last of the wagons. Conductor Ralph Egerton
(Army Service Corps), who was one of the more lucid commentators,
had ridden ahead with the colonel and his adjutant, Lieutenant H. A.
C. Harrison, to select a camping ground. When the band ceased play-
ing, they turned around to see 150 armed, mounted Boers, spaced about
ten paces apart, along a ridge on the left-hand side of the road. Egerton
rode to meet a Boer horseman under a flag of truce, and took a sealed
despatch from him to the colonel, who had dismounted. The despatch
stated that the Transvaal had been declared a republic, and that any
advance by the column beyond the spruit would be interpreted as a
declaration of war. Given two minutes in which to reply, Anstruther
insisted that he must follow orders and proceed towards Pretoria. The
two parties returned to their respective forces, but the Boers, who had
filtered through thorn bushes to about 200 yards from the column,
opened fire before Anstruther rejoined his column. ‘The fire of the
Boers’, wrote Egerton, ‘was directed on the officers, oxen, and ammu-
nition wagons, the latter being denoted by a red flag.’16
The opening volleys caught the column before it could deploy, hit-
ting soldiers lolling on the tops of three wagons as well as the unarmed
cooks, grooms, bandsmen and prisoners seeking ammunition, and all
but three of the rear guard.17 After a fire-fight of only fifteen minutes in
which fifty-seven officers and men were killed and another 100, includ-
ing a woman, were wounded, the column surrendered. Many, like the
colonel, had suffered severe and multiple gunshot wounds – an average
of five wounds per man – as calculated by Dr Harvey Crow, who came
out from Pretoria to tend the wounded. Another twenty men would die
of their wounds, including Anstruther after his leg was amputated.18 In
the immediate aftermath few of the survivors could explain the deba-
cle other than by claiming that the Boers had carefully planned the
ambush (which seemed plausible), and that they had an overwhelming
advantage in numbers (which was less likely).19 One of the survivors
recalled that the Boers took advantage of any available cover – ‘a sort
of “little bush”, and an incline in their favour’, and that they ‘told us
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afterwards they had everything arranged beforehand, the distance
having been ascertained exactly’.20 Although the 94th, as Private
Thomas Crann recalled, had tried to follow the colonel’s injunction
and kept firing, they soon found their ammunition running low (as
they were carrying only thirty and not seventy rounds of ammunition
per man).21 Egerton recognised, too, that their firing was relatively inef-
fective, and a corporal explained that the soldiers ‘in their hurry
sighted their rifles at 650 yards’.22 E. H. Brett, a wagon master, almost
certainly exaggerated when he claimed that the Boers had suffered 
significant casualties – twenty-seven dead and ‘a large number of
wounded’ – Egerton saw one dead and five wounded, while Crow
counted only ten dead horses ‘close to the camp’ (the Boers claimed
that two commandos died and five were wounded).23
If the British were appalled at the spectacle of the Boers riffling
through the pockets of the dead, they appreciated the permission
granted them to pitch their tents, care for the wounded and bury their
dead. Egerton and Sergeant Bradley were also allowed to seek further
medical assistance from Pretoria (enabling Egerton to smuggle out the
regimental colours, to the immense relief of the dying Anstruther).24
The survivors realised that the Boers had not only prevented a concen-
tration of soldiers at Pretoria but had captured valuable arms, ammu-
nition and wagons. All soldiers, other than the thirty left to tend the
injured, were taken prisoner and others were removed to Heidelberg
when they recovered from their wounds. Dr Crow, who spent three
months tending the wounded, expressed admiration for the calm and
courageous way that Anstruther met his death, for the many acts of
kindness by local Boers and for the unremitting efforts of Dr Ward, the
regimental surgeon, and Mrs Smith on behalf of the wounded. How-
ever severe the loss to the 94th and to British ‘prestige’, Crowe could
not blame ‘our men’, who ‘had no cover at all – nor time to get under
cover, but had to lie on a wide level road . . .’.25 Their uniforms, as Lieu-
tenant J. J. F. Hume later conceded, had compounded this vulnerabil-
ity, namely ‘scarlet jackets, white helmets, white pipe-clayed belts and
equipment straps, pouches, etc.’.26
Colley recognised that the disaster of the 94th had ‘changed the
whole aspect of affairs. The loss of 250 men out of our small garrison
was no trifling one, and the moral effect, of course, much greater.’27 He
feared lest the conflict would precipitate a wider war between the two
white races in South Africa, and that the Transvaal Boers would attract
support from the Orange Free State and the Dutch populations of Cape
Colony and Natal. Hence, in planning to relieve the British garrisons,
he resolved to assemble a field force without enrolling volunteers from
Natal and Kimberley but insisted upon the inclusion of cavalry (in case
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a guerrilla war ensued) and artillery to exploit the ‘moral effect which
guns have on the Boers generally’.28 Having chosen Newcastle, a small
town in northern Natal as a place of assembly, he brought together
1,474 of all ranks, including a strong body of infantry (five companies
of the 58th, five of the 3/60th Rifles and a draft of the 2/21st), a
mounted squadron (and some mounted Natal Police), a Naval Brigade
(with two Gatling guns and three 24-pounder rocket tubes), and six
guns (four 9-pounders and two 7-pounders).29
Delays in procuring transport and in moving soldiers across rain-
sodden terrain prevented the Natal field force from assembling fully
before 19 January. A Rifleman recalled that the march was a ‘a hard
dragging’ ordeal, with the men pulling ‘mules and wagons along by
sheer force’.30 Spirits improved when they arrived at Newcastle: sol-
diers cheered Colley’s speech after a parade of the field force, while
Lieutenant Percy Scrope Marling (3/60th Rifles) wrote that the Gov-
ernment should not ‘show any misplaced weakness as regards the
Boers, they have committed the most cruel & cold blooded murders &
ought to be punished accordingly. They have treated the Kaffirs also in
the most brutal manner’.31 Even when the field force began its advance
towards the Natal–Transvaal border on 24 January, it could move only
a few miles each day, struggling across drifts and up a rocky hill known
as Schuinshoogte before reaching Mount Prospect on 26 January. Piet
Joubert had anticipated this incursion, moving his forces inside Natal
as early as 1 January and, when he learned of Colley’s advance from
Newcastle, moving forward to occupy the heights above the key pass
of Laing’s Nek along the road from Mount Prospect.
‘Torrents of rain’, as described by Lance-Sergeant W. J. Morris
(58th),32 prevented any advance on 27 January, but, on the following
day, Colley ordered an advance with four companies of Rifles, five of
the 58th, the mounted squadron, most of the Naval Brigade, some sup-
porting troops and about fifty mounted police (the remainder guarded
the camp). At 9.30 a.m. he ordered the shelling of the Boer positions
with rockets and the 9-pounders firing shrapnel. Although Joubert
admitted that the Boers ‘suffered heavily’ from the bombardments,
their losses were many fewer than some British infantry anticipated.33
Accordingly, when the mounted squadron of 100 men, led by Major
William Brownlow and Troop Sergeant-Major Lunny (King’s Dragoon
Guards), charged up Table Hill – on the left of the Boer position – the
leading troopers encountered volleys of rifle fire. All observers praised
the ‘splendid’ charge with Brownlow and Lunny (the latter was killed
in the attack), exhorting their men onwards, but the squadron soon
retreated (with 17 killed, wounded or missing, and 32 horses lost).34
The charge had foundered, in the opinion of Sergeant Jeremiah Madden
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(King’s Dragoon Guards), because the squadron was a mixed body
‘made up of K.D.G.’s and transport train’ (and some mounted infantry),
the climb was very steep (‘the true summit . . . was invisible to us’),
and the Boers opened fire while they were ‘wheeling’. So,
before the left troop had completed its movement to bring us again in
line, the order to charge was heard. In a moment we were face to face
with the Boers, who fired sharp at us. The Sergeant-Major, with his
revolver, got right in amongst the men, and shot one dead, wounding
another with his pistol, when he fell – horse and man shot down
together.35
The 58th, led by Colonel Deane, struggled up the steep open spur of
the hill and came under fire from front and right (where Commandant
Bassa’s picket provided enfilade fire after thwarting the mounted
troops). The letter written by Morris, much of which was reproduced by
Emery, exaggerated the odds against the 58th who, he said, were ‘out-
numbered by five to one’ and made claims about a final charge that were
at variance with Colley’s official report (‘when the men got near the top
they were too fatigued and breathless for a charge’).36 Private M. M.
Tuck, 58th, confirmed that an order to charge was made but as the men
were ‘so much exhausted it could not be done to any good advantage’.37
Nevertheless, Morris endorsed the official report by lauding the gal-
lantry of Colonel Deane before he fell mortally wounded and by prais-
ing the resolve of the Boers, who charged the British soldiers at short
range and harried them in their retreat. He noted that the Boers were
‘dead nuts’ in targeting officers and non-commissioned officers, and
identified Sergeant Bridgestock as the soldier who saved the colours.38 
Private Joseph Venables, (58th), who was captured after the attack,
gave another perspective:
Our path was through the grass, and the march very exhausting. (The
incline was 1 in 15) . . . The advance was steadily continued, but the men
were teaming from perspiration, which ran into their eyes. We got flank
fire from a hollow, and half a company was thrown back to check it, but
was at once shot away, but one man standing when I saw it. Then we met
the enemy almost muzzle to muzzle, with some of the guns all but
crossed . . . I reckon the force opposed to us at 80 men. The extended
companies fought very well, but the exhaustion of the men, and the
deadly accurate fire, forced them down. An immense number fell, and I
was all but alone when the artillery re-opened, hurting many of our
wounded in the attempt to check the Boers now charging and shooting
down the retreating companies.39 
Riflemen looked askance at the 58th being ‘literally slaughtered’ and
the ‘regular butchery’ as they reached the summit and then retreated.40
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Although Sergeant Henry Coombs (Army Hospital Corps) was reason-
ably accurate in his estimate – ‘We lost 70 men killed, seven officers
killed, and 119 men wounded’ (some of these men later died of their
wounds) – he thought that the Boers might have suffered ‘between 400
and 500 casualties’ (whereas Joubert reported losses of only ‘twenty-
four of our best men’).41 
In official correspondence Colley remained resolutely confident that
the ‘political effect’ of Laing’s Nek would not be great: the Boers, he
affirmed, would soon tire of the war, and the arrival of large reinforce-
ments from India and England would protect Natal. Privately, he con-
ceded that the repulse ‘had a bad effect, both in prolonging the
investment of our garrisons and in giving further encouragement to the
Boers’.42 The vulnerability of Colley’s camp at Mount Prospect was
soon exposed by a Boer attempt on 7 February 1881 to intercept the
mail along his line of communications to Newcastle. On the following
day, Colley led a small column of five companies of the 60th Rifles, a
detachment of 38 mounted men, 2 field and 2 mountain guns with
some medical support to patrol the road for part of the way. After 5
miles the column reached the Ingogo River where Colley detached one
company and the two 7-pounder guns to guard his retreat, while the
remainder crossed the river. Within another 3 miles, scouts encoun-
tered a large body of Boers which Colley decided to engage from the
bolder-strewn plateau at Schuinshoogte. An officer of the Rifles recog-
nised that the ‘position was much too large for our numbers, which
were only 290 all told . . .’. Outnumbered (by possibly 300 Boers, later
reinforced to between 800 and 1,000) and almost surrounded, he added:
‘Half an hour after the fight began everyone considered the fight as
hopeless . . .’ because the Boers
are the perfection of skirmishers, taking advantage of every atom of
cover, and shooting with the greatest accuracy and precision. Before the
first five minutes were over the guns were firing case. This will give you
an idea how rapidly the Boers advanced . . . They directed their fire prin-
cipally at the guns, and very soon they had killed every man but one at
one of the guns, including poor Captain Greer . . .
The action commenced at twelve and went on until eight p.m. We
were exposed not only to frontal fire but also to enfilade and reverse – in
fact, there was a perfect hail of bullets coming over us from all four sides
for eight hours . . . The whole of our men behaved like heroes. They were
as cool and well disciplined as if they had been at a review, never throw-
ing a shot away for we had no reserve ammunition.43
Once the Boers withdrew, soldiers gathered the wounded together
(about 50 per cent of the fighting strength), with many, like Lieutenant
Haworth, suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. ‘We had been 12
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hours without food’, wrote Coombs, ‘and were quite tired and worn
out’,44 but, as only a withdrawal could avert the prospect of a surrender,
Colley ordered a retreat at about 10 p.m., leaving the wounded behind.
As an officer of the Rifles admitted, this seemed a ‘dreadful’ decision:
it was, however, ‘imperative’ as the column lacked either ambulances
or a water cart and had only one doctor. The officer was nearly drowned
crossing the swollen Ingogo (an officer and seven men drowned either
in the retreat or in returning to assist the wounded); and he encoun-
tered further difficulties: ‘I was in command of the advanced guard, and
it was very hard work finding the road, for there was a tremendous
storm, and the night was as dark as pitch. This was a good thing, as it
concealed our movements from the Boers.’45 Retrieving the guns
became a desperate ordeal, ‘as there were only twelve horses left, and
two of them were wounded. One gun came in with four horses, one of
which was shot through the knee. Going up the hill the horses were
taken out, and our fellows pulled them up the three-mile hill with
drag-ropes.’ After twenty-one hours the Rifles returned to camp,
having fought for eight hours and marched for 18 miles, half of that dis-
tance at night, without any food and only a canteen of water apiece:
‘Our getting back to camp was one of the luckiest things on record. Our
men behaved quite magnificently.’46
As five officers and sixty-one men had been killed at Schuinshoogte,
and another four officers and sixty-eight men wounded, confidence in
Colley began to ebb. After Laing’s Nek one veteran officer doubted that
Colley should be trusted with a corporal’s guard on active service, and,
in his diary of 10 February, Marling wrote: ‘The General telegraphed
home the fight at Ingogo was a success – we certainly did pass the mails
through to Newcastle and remained on the field of battle, but one or
two more Pyrrhic victories like that and we shan’t have any army left
at all.’47 Colley seemed oblivious of these concerns: he lauded the men
after each reverse, commending ‘the conduct of the young soldiers of
the 60th at the Ingogo’ and claiming that the ‘health and spirit of the
troops remain excellent’.48 He was correct inasmuch as the mood
within the camp fluctuated rapidly: even the Riflemen whom Colley
ordered on 12 February to exhume the bodies of officers at Schuin-
shoogte for re-burial at Mount Prospect (a thoroughly nauseating task
in rain-soaked conditions) were enjoying athletics and cricket in the
camp three days later.49 Spirits rose on 23 February when the first rein-
forcements from India arrived, including the 15th Hussars, 2/60th
Rifles and the 92nd (Gordon) Highlanders (all veterans of the Second
Afghan War), a Naval Brigade from HMS Dido and HMS Boadicea, and
some drafts for units already based at Mount Prospect. As Colley pon-
dered a riposte to the reported Boer fortifications of the Nek (by seizing
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‘some ground which has hitherto been practically unoccupied by either
party’), he affirmed: ‘These fine Indian regiments will make a most
valuable addition to my force; but I doubt if even they, fine soldiers as
they are, can fight better than my young soldiers have done on the two
late occasions.’50 
So the seeds were sown for the fateful decision to occupy the
summit of Majuba, a mountain 2,000 feet above Laing’s Nek, on the
night of 26 February, with a mixed force (two companies of the 58th,
two of 3/60th, three of the 92nd, a company-strength Naval Brigade
and smaller supporting units). As Major T. Fraser, RE, recalled, each
man was ordered to carry seventy rounds of ammunition, a blanket,
greatcoat, water bottle and three days’ rations, with six picks and four
shovels per company. In great secrecy (only Colley, Fraser and Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Herbert Stewart, Colley’s replacement military secre-
tary, knew the destination), the march began at 10.30 p.m. Two
companies of Rifles and, further on, a company of Highlanders were
detached to guard the line of march as the force scrambled up the
mountain, enabling Colley with his staff and some 350 infantry to
occupy the summit between 3.40 a.m. and 5.40 a.m. Fraser had ‘never
had such a climb . . . the men were very done and the General too’.51
Colley had the men dig two wells but reportedly considered them too
tired to make entrenchments or fortified positions. He and his staff
seemed to regard the summit as unassailable,52 but some soldiers con-
structed small stone walls as they were dispersed at intervals of about
fifteen paces around a perimeter of three-quarters of a mile (other than
an unformed mixed reserve of about 110 men). More significantly, as
Fraser testified, discipline slipped when some men opened fire, with-
out orders, on the Boer patrols below, thereby revealing their position
and prompting a Boer counter-attack (once it was clear that the British
lacked any guns on the summit).53
Utilising long-range covering fire to pin down soldiers and sailors on
the perimeter (mortally wounding Commander Romilly, RN, in the
process), the Boers exploited the ‘dead ground’ and natural cover to
scale the northern slopes. They then extended unseen around a grassy
terrace below the outer knoll held by five or six Highlanders and began
to mass in vastly superior numbers. Fraser confirmed that Lieutenant
Ian Hamilton, who commanded the Gordons on the forward knoll,
repeatedly requested reinforcements; but Colley, who slept for part of
the time, was unperturbed. In any case, detecting the Boers or estab-
lishing a good field of fire remained problematic, even after the first
Boer fusillade had overwhelmed the Gordons on the forward knoll and
driven back the few survivors. Although Colley belatedly deployed his
reserves, another series of rapid Boer volleys drove them back to a cen-
B AT T L I N G  T H E  B O E R S
[ 69 ]
chap 3  9/7/04  9:03 am  Page 69
tral ridge. Here Colley still held the Highlanders in check, refusing to
let them mount a bayonet charge (which may or may not have worked,
but was the one riposte that the Boers actually feared).54 From the cen-
tral ridge, admitted Fraser, ‘we had but little command of the ground,
which rolled from the crest up to it in rounded form’, and so when the
Boers launched their next attack, firing on the British positions from
three sides, ‘with extraordinary rapidity . . . We could see nothing but
rifle-muzzles and smoke; I told my men to fire at the grass; they did so
for a few moments and then, without any order to retire . . . they began
to fall back’.55 In the ensuing rout Colley was killed, and morale col-
lapsed save for about twenty men, mostly of the 58th, who stood at a
kopje with Second Lieutenant Hector Macdonald, (92nd), until all but
two were dead or wounded. In only thirty minutes the British were
swept from the summit, with the numbers killed, wounded or taken
prisoner representing 78 per cent of the officers engaged and 58 per cent
of the other ranks. They had suffered latterly from indiscriminate fire
as experienced by Lance-Corporal Farmer, AHC, who earned a VC
when he waved a white bandage as a flag of truce over some wounded
men and was promptly shot, first in the right wrist and then the left
elbow. He reckoned that ‘even a “savage” foe would have respected
such a signal’.56
Morale plummeted in the camp: ‘Our men’, wrote Private Tuck, ‘are
getting in low spirits through these defeats.’57 Hampered by rain-
sodden conditions, and fatigued by alerts lest the Boers attack the
camp, soldiers had the arduous task of bringing down the wounded and
burying the dead. As some of the wounded languished on Majuba for
twenty-four hours, they were in a pitiful state, ‘soaked through and
through with the rain and mud’.58 What exacerbated the anguish of the
burial parties was their inability to find any Boer wounded or dead,
giving credence to Piet Joubert’s claim that the Boers had suffered only
a single fatality and five wounded.59 In these circumstances resent-
ments mounted: Colley may have died gallantly, prompting Fraser to
describe him as a ‘Homeric hero’, but death, argued Marling, may have
been ‘most fortunate’ for this ‘much liked man’. ‘After Ingogo’, wrote
Marling, Colley ‘hardly slept at all’, and many officers felt that he ‘was
determined to get Laing’s Nek before some other General came up to
supersede him’.60 There were regimental recriminations, too. After
Fraser specifically praised the 92nd in his official report (‘The conduct
of the 92nd was excellent throughout’), Colonel W. D. Bond took every
opportunity to defend the reputation of the 58th.61 Many blamed
Colley for employing a mixed force. Captain Charles W. H. Douglas,
(92nd), who was not present at the battle but who interviewed several
survivors, reckoned that some of the 92nd ‘should have behaved better,
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& not have been carried away by the 58th . . . I think the ninety twas
[sic] might have made a better fight of it & undoubtedly they c[oul]d
have had the whole Reg[iment] been up Majuba instead of a mixed
force’.62
If they had not done so before, most soldiers now recognised that
they had greatly underrated the Boer as a fighting man. ‘There is no
doubt’, wrote Douglas, ‘the Boers are magnificent skirmishers, and A1
shots, and as plucky as possible’; they also possessed, in the opinion of
a staff officer, Major Fitzroy Hart, the ‘best’ of rifles (predominantly the
Westley Richards) and benefited from ‘a life spent in the stalking of
game, the judgment of distance, and the practice of aiming . . .’.63 Such
recognition only made British soldiery even more determined to pre-
vail in battle and avenge fallen comrades. The British believed that
reinforcements under Sir Frederick Roberts would bring superior num-
bers, artillery and cavalry to turn the tide against the Boers.64 Hence
they felt deeply affronted when the armistice talks between Piet Jou-
bert and Sir Evelyn Wood, the acting-governor of Natal and high com-
missioner of the Transvaal, evolved into peace negotiations at the
behest of Gladstone’s Government (and after a conciliatory letter from
Paul Kruger). When an agreement was signed, on 23 March 1881, Mar-
ling claimed: ‘Everyone is cursing Gladstone and the Radical Govern-
ment . . . A more disgraceful peace was never made.’ Douglas agreed
that it was a ‘disgraceful peace’, and Fitzroy Hart wrote that he felt
‘inclined to weep with vexation . . . the vexation of not being allowed
to fight it out to the end’.65
As controversy raged over the peace, Wood’s role in producing a set-
tlement and, within military circles, the failure to award a campaign
medal,66 there was little interest in the post-war accounts of the belea-
guered garrisons in the Transvaal. Apart from official despatches and
testimony before courts of enquiry, only a few letters were published
in contemporary British and colonial newspapers, and a couple of
longer accounts in periodicals.67 The Reverend C. M. Spratt, the mili-
tary chaplain at Standerton, was disappointed that he had not been able
to emulate the achievements of the Reverend George Smith, who had
distinguished himself at Rorke’s Drift. The well-provisioned and forti-
fied garrison had provided refuge for some 60–70 civilians and, apart
from an engagement with the Boers during a sortie on 29 December,
had not encountered any ‘fighting of importance’. As the Boers were
too ‘cowardly’ to attack and settled for long-range firing,
Our Commandant has contented himself with holding his own and con-
structing outworks to keep the enemy at a distance while he has attended
to the Commissariat with a view to feeding the whole town and garrison
equally until the Relief Column under Sir George Colley arrives.68
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At Wakkerstroom two companies of the 58th provided the garrison for
the camp and town, where they protected thirty-three civilians. Once
again, as described by Sergeant M. O. O’Callaghan, it was largely a pas-
sive defence in the face of long-range fire, much of which ‘was quite
harmless and caused us a deal of amusement’. As the garrison awaited
reinforcements, O’Callaghan’s motivations ran the gamut from patrio-
tism (‘all our hard work is for the glory of Old England’) to contempt
for the ‘most cowardly race of men on the face of the earth’, and, fol-
lowing news of the Bronkhorst Spruit massacre and the killing of Cap-
tain Lambert, ‘many a vow of retributive vengeance has been registered
against them’. He repeatedly thanked ‘our heavenly Father’ as bullets
whistled harmlessly by, and remained ‘proud of the uniform I wear and
the gallant regiment I am serving in. I am proud of the officers too. No
better gentlemen are in our Army.’69
Despite the debacle at Bronkhorst Spruit, Pretoria remained the
largest, best-supplied and best-equipped garrison in the Transvaal, with
the aid of about 170 mounted volunteers and 150 foot volunteers. It
was able to protect some 3,700 men, women and children either in the
military camp or the fortified laager that bounded the gaol and con-
vent. Sappers, as Commeline recalled, had ‘an immense amount of
work’, constructing shelters, cattle kraals and blockhouses on hills
overlooking the camp. Each of the blockhouses were manned by 25–30
men and held Krupp 4-pounder guns (liberated from the arsenal of the
former republic) to keep the Boers at bay. Commeline, who regarded
the Boers as a ‘foe worth fighting’, spent his time in command of a
blockhouse, strengthening his position, watching the movements of
the enemy and signalling to the camp below (by flags during the day
and lanterns at night). He also monitored several sorties from the
camp, which were feasible from the Pretoria garrison by virtue of its
relatively large proportion of mounted men. Even so, by 6 February, he
feared that the Boers would never attack Pretoria ‘because their loss
would be so great as to cripple them for any future resistance’.70
Another anonymous letter, dated 7 April 1881, concluded that the
Pretoria defence was ‘most successful. The Boers never came within
six miles. Five successful sorties were made. Provisions were plentiful,
and the laagers strong enough to defy any possible attack.’ By contrast
it reported that the Potchefstroom garrison ‘suffered severely from
their daily exposure to the enemy’s fire and the scarcity of food’.71 At
Potchefstroom, where the only surrender occurred, Lieutenant-
Colonel R. W. C. Winsloe (21st/Royal Scots Fusiliers), commanded 213
soldiers, including 45 officers and men of N battery, operating two 9-
pounder guns, 26 mounted infantry, 2 companies of the 21st and sup-
porting units. Outnumbered from the start of the siege, they were also
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ill-positioned and poorly provisioned. They had tried to hold a small
fort – partially built at the outset and only 25 yards square when com-
pleted – as well as the office of the Landrost (magistrate) and the gaol.
Under heavy fire from close quarters, the Landrost garrison soon sur-
rendered and the garrison withdrew from the gaol to the fort after suf-
fering several casualties from Boer bullets that penetrated the
loopholes in the lower walls and passed through upper walls which
were only one brick thick.72 Thereafter the small fort, bereft of ade-
quate supplies, accommodated some 200 soldiers, 48 refugees and 61
native drivers and leaders. Although the garrison found an adequate
supply of water, Winsloe admitted: ‘For food we were badly off the
whole time.’73 By 5 March 1881, as casualties from wounds and disease
mounted, Second Lieutenant James R. M. Dalrymple-Hay recorded
that ‘enteric, dysentery and scurvy are rife amongst us’.74 Although a
majority of the refugees and natives left the fort, thirty-three remained
to the end, sharing the meagre supplies of mealies and corn (all dam-
aged after three months on the parapets), with the sick receiving pre-
served meat and rice. By 20 March the garrison held only 24lbs of
preserved meat and 16lbs of rice for the sick; and, as General Piet
Cronjé was unwilling to honour the terms of the armistice by letting
eight days’ supply of provisions and firewood through to the garrison,75
Winsloe surrendered on 23 March. However galling the fate, Winsloe
took comfort from his ability to modify the Boer terms, so surrender-
ing his guns and rifles (but not any ammunition), and leaving with full
military honours and not as prisoners of war. The ‘“battle of words”’,
he reckoned, had ended ‘much to our advantage’.76
So 23 March involved both a surrender and a peace settlement, an
ironic twist of timing that compounded the sense of frustration felt by
the British military. Wood negotiated the settlement but affirmed that
the British ‘should have undoubtedly taken the nek about the end of
March; and I think, such a victory would have been a gain to all – Eng-
lish, Dutch, Kaffirs, and to humanity generally’.76 Although the sur-
render was later rescinded by the ‘triumvirate’, and the two guns and
most of the rifles returned, resentment persisted. It reflected a linger-
ing contempt for the Boers and a feeling that tactical errors by Colley
had thwarted the British soldiery just as much as, if not more than, the
Boers’ proficiency in skirmishing and short-range marksmanship.
Wood felt that the tactical errors made it difficult to draw lessons from
the war, other than a need to improve standards of shooting. He
believed, too, that the presence of long- and short-service soldiers on
Majuba rendered it ‘useless to argue on short or long service from this
illustration’.77
B AT T L I N G  T H E  B O E R S
[ 73 ]
chap 3  9/7/04  9:03 am  Page 73
Notes
1 This was an unstable arrangement that fuelled tribal battles when Cetshwayo
returned in 1883 and a clash with the Boers in 1886: J. Guy, The Destruction of the
Zulu Kingdom (London: Longman, 1979), ch. 5; I. Knight, Great Zulu Battles
1838–1906 (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1998), pp. 165–92. 
2 Emery, Marching Over Africa, pp. 100–2; Lady Bellairs (ed.), The Transvaal War
(Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1985), pp. 27–8.
3 Gloucestershire Record Office (GRO), D 1233/45/26, Lt C. Commeline to his father,
23 November 1879; see also Major G. Tylden, ‘The Sekukuni Campaign of Novem-
ber–December 1879’, JSAHR, 29 (1951), 128–36.
4 The Memoirs of Major-General Sir Hugh McCalmont KCB, CVO ed. Sir C. E. Call-
well (London: Hutchinson, 1924), p. 174.
5 GRO, D 1233/45/26, Commeline to his father, 29 November 1879.
6 NAM, Acc. No. 5705/22, Lt-Col. P. R. Anstruther, letters of 30 November and 7
December 1879.
7 GRO, D 1233/45/26, Commeline to his father, 29 November 1879.
8 Preston, Wolseley’s South African Journal, pp. 134, 138–9, 179, 186–7.
9 NAM, Acc. No. 5705/22, Anstruther, letter of 30 November 1879.
10 NRMC, 397, Roe, TS diary, paras 123–6.
11 Preston, Wolseley’s South African Journal, p. 264.
12 Pretoria, Rustenburg, Lydenburg, Marabastad, Wakkerstroom and Standerton. When
tensions mounted in November 1880, the British also established a garrison at
Potchefstroom.
13 Quoted in D. Blackburn and Captain W. Waithman Caddell, Secret Service in South
Africa (London: Cassell & Co., 1911), p. 108; see also Bellairs, Transvaal War, pp.
32–42.
14 PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2740 (1881), LXVI, No. 61, Sir W. O. Lanyon to
the Earl of Kimberley, 14 November 1880, p. 109.
15 I. Bennett, A Rain of Lead: The Siege and Surrender of the British at Potchefstroom
(London: Greenhill Books, 2001), pp. 43–59; J. Lehmann, The First Boer War (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1972), ch. 3; Tylden, ‘British Army and the Transvaal’, 164.
16 ‘The Disaster to the 94th Foot’, Broad Arrow, 29 January 1881, p. 149; see also PP,
Further Correspondence, SA, C 2866 (1881), LXVII, pp. 47–8.
17 PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2866 (1881), LXVII, pp. 47–8; ‘What a 94th Cor-
poral Said’; and Sergt. Hook in ‘Bronker’s Spruit’, Natal Mercury, 14 January 1881, p.
3, and 4 March 1881, p. 3; Bellairs, Transvaal War, p. 86.
18 ‘With the Wounded at Bronkhorstspruit’, Transvaal Argus, 16 April 1881, p. 3;
Brigadier General J. J. F. Hume, ‘A Narrative of the 94th Regiment in the Boer War,
1880–81’, The Ranger, 4:8 (1925), 163–77.
19 While the military authorities came to believe that 1,000 or more Boers were
involved, Egerton reckoned that no more than 300 attacked the head of the column
– an estimate only marginally larger than the Boer claims. Compare PP, Further Cor-
respondence, SA, C 2866, p. 48, with evidence of Pte. D. Campbell, PP, C 2866, p. 56;
Bellairs, Transvaal War, p. 82; and ‘The Transvaal Insurrection’, The Times, 8 Feb-
ruary 1881, p. 4. 
20 ‘Transvaal Insurrection’, p. 4; see also ‘What a 94th Corporal Said’, p. 3.
21 ‘Narrative of the Disaster’, Natal Witness, 11 January 1881, p. 3; ‘The Transvaal
Insurrection’, p. 4; Bellairs, Transvaal War, p. 82.
22 ‘Disaster to the 94th Foot’, p. 149; ‘What a 94th Corporal Said’, p. 3.
23 ‘A True Statement of the Bronker’s Spruit Massacre’, The Times of Natal, 28 Febru-
ary 1881, p. 6; ‘Disaster to the 94th Foot’, p. 149; ‘With the Wounded at
Bronkhorstspruit’, p. 3; Lehmann, The First Boer War, p. 118.
24 ‘With the Wounded at Bronkhorstspruit’, p. 3.
25 Ibid.; see also ‘True Statement of the Bronker’s Spruit Massacre’, p. 6; and evidence
of Pte King, PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2866, p. 57.
26 Hume, ‘Narrative of the 94th Regiment’, 177.
T H E  V I C T O R I A N  S O L D I E R  I N  A F R I C A
[ 74 ]
chap 3  9/7/04  9:03 am  Page 74
27 The extract from his letter of 7 February was published in the Sheffield Daily Tele-
graph, 5 April 1881, p. 3.
28 PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2866, Colley to the Earl of Kimberley, 25 January
1881, pp. 15–16.
29 Ibid., Colley to H. C. E. Childers, 1 February 1881, pp. 89–94. 
30 ‘The Boer Rebellion’, The Times of Natal, 16 February 1881, p. 3.
31 NAM, Acc. No. 7005/21, Private M. M. Tuck diary, 23 January 1881, p. 54; GRO, D
873/C110, Lt P. S. Marling to his grandmother, 22 January 1881.
32 Emery identified the author of this long but not entirely accurate letter, entitled ‘The
Disaster at Laing’s Nek, Northamptonshire Man’s Account of the Fight’, Supple-
ment to the Northampton Mercury, 19 March 1881, p. 1; see also Emery, Marching
Over Africa, pp. 103–4.
33 Compare ‘The Boer Version of Laing’s Nek Fight’, Liverpool Mercury, 4 March 1881,
p. 5, with ‘Disaster at Laing’s Nek’, p. 1 and ‘Boer Rebellion’, p. 3.
34 Lehmann, The Boer War, p. 152.
35 ‘Interesting Letter from Lange’s [sic] Nek’, Natal Witness, 31 March 1881, p. 3; see
also ‘The Boer Rebellion’, p. 3 and PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2866, p. 91.
36 Compare ‘Disaster at Laing’s Nek’, p. 1, with PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C
2866, p. 91.
37 NAM, Acc. No. 7005/21, Tuck diary, 28 January 1881, p. 59. 
38 PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2866, pp. 91–2, 94; ‘The Disaster at Laing’s Nek’,
p. 1.
39 ‘Interesting Letter from Lange’s Nek’, p. 3.
40 ‘The Battle of Laing’s Nek. Descriptive Letter from a Gloucestershire Officer’, Citi-
zen, 19 March 1881, p. 3; ‘The Boer Rebellion’, p. 3.
41 Colley reported that 7 officers and 76 other ranks died, 111 were wounded and two
were taken prisoner; see Lehmann, The Boer War, p. 155; ‘The Transvaal War. Letter
from a Sheffield Soldier’, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 5 April 1881, p. 2; ‘Boer Version
of Laing’s Nek Fight’, p. 5.
42 Compare his letter of 7 February in the Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 5 April 1881, p. 3,
with PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2866, Colley to the Earl of Kimberley, 1 Feb-
ruary 1881, p. 88.
43 ‘The Rifles in South Africa’, Hampshire Chronicle, 9 April 1881, p. 5; on Boer num-
bers, see PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2866, Colley to Childers, 12 February
1881, p. 183.
44 ‘Transvaal War’, p. 2.
45 ‘Rifles in South Africa’, p. 5.
46 Ibid. Those dragging the guns took another five hours to reach camp: ‘Transvaal
War’, p. 2.
47 P. S. Marling, Rifleman and Hussar (London: John Murray, 1931), pp. 41 and 51; see
also Bellairs, The Transvaal War, p. 378.
48 Colley to Childers, 16 February 1881 in Lt-Col. Spencer Childers, The Life and Cor-
respondence of the Right Hon. Hugh C. E. Childers 1827–1896, 2 vols (London: John
Murray, 1901), vol. 2, pp. 21–2. 
49 Marling, Rifleman and Hussar, pp. 49–52; NAM, Acc. No. 7005/21, Tuck diary, 15
February 1881, p. 64.
50 Colley to Childers, 23 February 1881 in Childers, Life and Correspondence, vol. 2,
p. 24.
51 Maj. T. Fraser, ‘Majuba’, REJ, 11 (1 June 1881), 114–17.
52 T. F. Carter, A Narrative of the Boer War: Its Causes and Results (London: John Mac-
Queen, 1900), pp. 264–5; Maj. T. Fraser, ‘The Battle of Majuba Hill’, Army and Navy
Gazette, 7 May 1881, p. 353; and for a contrary view on the tiredness of the men, see
General Sir Ian Hamilton, Listening for the Drums (London: Faber & Faber, 1944), 
p. 133.
53 PRO, WO 33/38, ‘Correspondence Relative to Military Affairs in Natal and the
Transvaal’, Maj. J. C. Hay, 2 March 1881, p. 221; Fraser, ‘Majuba’, 115. 
54 British Library Asia Pacific and Africa Collections (hereafter APA), MSS Eur
B AT T L I N G  T H E  B O E R S
[ 75 ]
chap 3  9/7/04  9:03 am  Page 75
F108/91, White MSS., Capt. C. W. H. Douglas to Sir G. White, 5 April 1881; Major
G. Tylden (translation), ‘Majuba, 27th February, 1881: A Contemporary Boer
Account’, JSAHR, 17 (1938), 9–12.
55 Fraser, ‘Majuba’, 115; see also PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2950 (1881), LXVII,
p. 79.
56 ‘The Only Man Who Won a V.C. at Majuba’, Cheltenham Chronicle, 6 January 1901,
p. 1; PRO, WO 33/38, ‘Correspondence . . . in Natal and Transvaal’, 2nd Lt H. A.
Macdonald, 13 April 1881, p. 221; I. Castle, Majuba 1881: The Hill of Destiny
(London: Osprey, 1996), pp. 78–83.
57 NAM, Acc. No. 7005/21, Tuck diary, 28 February 1881, p. 70; Marling, Rifleman and
Hussar, pp. 54–5.
58 A Rifleman in ‘The Battle of Amajuba’, Transvaal Argus, 13 April 1881, p. 3; see also
NAM, Acc. No. 7005/21, Tuck diary, 27 February 1881, p. 69; S. G. P. Ward (ed.), ‘The
Diary of Colonel W. D. Bond, 58th Regiment’, JSAHR, 53 (1975), 87–97.
59 ‘The Transvaal War’, Kentish Gazette, 8 March 1881, p. 3; ‘Joubert’s Report of the
Engagement on Majuba Hill’, Ilkley Gazette, 7 April 1881, p. 2.
60 Marling, Rifleman and Hussar, p. 55; Fraser, ‘Majuba’, 117.
61 PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2950, Fraser to General Officer Commanding,
Natal, 5 March 1881, p. 79; Ward, ‘Diary of Colonel Bond’, 93, 97.
62 APA, MSS Eur F108/91, White MSS., Douglas to White, 5 April 1881; see also Hamil-
ton, Listening for the Drums, p. 139; Marling, Rifleman and Hussar, p. 55.
63 APA, MSS Eur F108/91, White MSS., Douglas to White, 5 April 1881; Maj. Fitzroy
Hart to May, 30 March 1881 in, Letters of Major-General Fitzroy Hart-Synnot ed. B.
M. Hart-Synnot (London: E. Arnold, 1912), p. 187.
64 Letters of Major-General Fitzroy Hart-Synnot, pp. 187–88; Marling, Rifleman and
Hussar, p. 55.
65 Marling, Rifleman and Hussar, p. 56; APA, MSS Eur F108/91, White MSS, Douglas
to White, 5 April 1881; Fitzroy Hart to May, 30 March 1881, in Letters of Major-Gen-
eral Fitzroy Hart-Synnot, p. 188; see also Memoirs of Sir Hugh McCalmont, p. 196.
66 On the general controversy, see Lehmann, The First Boer War, pp. 280–4, 289–92;
Wood to Childers, 31 May 1881 in Childers, Life and Correspondence, vol. 2, pp.
27–8; Bennett, A Rain of Lead, p. 239.
67 PRO, 33/38, ‘Correspondence . . . in Natal and Transvaal’, Appendix, pp. 269–61; W.
E. Montague, ‘Besieged in the Transvaal: The Defence of Standerton’, Blackwood’s
Magazine, 130 (1881), 1–20; R. W. C. Winsloe, ‘The Siege of Potchefstroom’, Macmil-
lan’s Magazine, 47 (1883), 443–63.
68 ‘The Siege at Standerton’, Natal Witness, 6 April 1881, p. 3.
69 ‘The Boers’ Treachery’, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 29 March 1881, p. 2.
70 ‘The Transvaal War. Letter from Lieut. Commeline, R.E.’, Citizen, 11 May 1881, 
p. 3; see also PP, Further Correspondence, SA, C 2950, p. 46; ‘The Transvaal: The
Story of the Siege of Pretoria’, Natal Witness, 22 April 1881, p. 3.
71 ‘The Transvaal: A Letter from Pretoria’, Western Morning News, 18 April 1881, p. 3.
72 Winsloe, ‘Siege of Potchefstroom’, 446; ‘The Defence of Potchefstroom. December,
1880–March 1881. Leaves from the Diary of 2/Lieut James R. M. Dalrymple-Hay,
21st Foot’, Journal of the Royal Scots Fusiliers (henceforth, JRSF), 2 (1929), 106–11;
Bennett, Eyewitness in Zululand, p. 145.
73 Winsloe, ‘Siege of Potchefstroom’, 455.
74 ‘The Defence of Potchefstroom’, JRSF, 3 (1930), 30–4.
75 On Cronjé’s strategy, see Bennett, Rain of Lead, ch. 17.
76 Winsloe, ‘Siege of Potchefstroom’, 456–8; ‘Defence of Potchefstroom’, 34.
77 Wood to Childers, 31 May 1881 in Childers, Life and Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 27.
78 Wood to Childers, 14 July 1881 in Childers, Life and Correspondence, vol. 2, pp.
29–30.
T H E  V I C T O R I A N  S O L D I E R  I N  A F R I C A
[ 76 ]
chap 3  9/7/04  9:03 am  Page 76
[ 77 ]
Intervention in Egypt contrasted dramatically with recent campaigns
in Africa and Afghanistan. It involved the largest expeditionary force
despatched by Britain since the Crimean War and achieved a decisive
outcome in less than two months, that is, from the passing of a vote of
credit by the House of Commons for an expeditionary force (27 July
1882) to the crushing victory at Tel-el-Kebir (13 September) and Wolse-
ley’s entry into Cairo (15 September 1882). The campaign avoided any
embarrassing reverses like Isandlwana, Maiwand (27 July 1880) or
Majuba, and reflected impressive co-operation between the armed ser-
vices (with the navy assisting in the transportation of 35,000 men to
the Egyptian theatre, deploying Marines and a 565-strong Naval
Brigade as direct support, seizing the Suez Canal, transporting supplies
along the Sweetwater Canal, and providing fire support from Gatling
machine-guns, artillery and an armoured train).1 Many soldiers used
the new Army Post Office Corps to send letters home, describing their
‘baptisms of fire’, the rigours of campaigning in Egypt, the battle of Tel-
el-Kebir, and the reporting of their achievements. When such letters
were passed on to newspapers, they often embellished reports from
special correspondents which were censored for the first time.
Although Emery quoted from nineteen letters in his account of the
campaign, there were many more (and at least that number from the
Black Watch alone).2 This chapter relies primarily, if not exclusively,
upon previously unused correspondence.
The intervention was a response to the growth of the nationalist
movement in Egypt under the military leadership of Arabi Pasha, the
Egyptian minister of war, and its burgeoning hostility towards Euro-
pean control over Khedive Tewfik’s Government and its finances. This
hostility reached a crescendo when riots erupted in Alexandria (11 June
1882), involving the so-called ‘massacre of Christians’ and the flight of
many Europeans. As these activities seemed to vindicate the alarmist
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reports of Sir Edward Malet, the British consul-general in Cairo, and Sir
Auckland Colvin, who along with his French colleague was responsi-
ble for Egypt’s ‘financial credit’, Gladstone’s cabinet authorised mili-
tary intervention to restore order in Egypt.3 Several weeks of planning
ensued. A naval bombardment of Arabi’s fortresses at Alexandria on 12
July confirmed that military resistance was likely and that a substan-
tial force under Wolseley would have to be sent ashore.4 Meanwhile the
reluctance of the Porte or France to support intervention ensured that
this would be an exclusively British affair. The entire First Class Army
Reserve (11,600 men) was called out (contrary to Cardwell’s expecta-
tion that it would be employed only in a national emergency) and
forces were despatched from England, the Mediterranean garrisons and
India. As early as 3 July Wolseley intimated that he planned to advance
on Cairo along the Sweetwater Canal from Ismailia, a route 45 miles
shorter than that from Alexandria. He hoped to deceive Arabi by ini-
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tially deploying forces near Alexandria and by conducting active oper-
ations in that vicinity.5
Egypt was a convenient theatre for British forces – only a twelve-day
sail from Britain and a much shorter one from Gibraltar or Aden.
Advanced units under Sir Archibald Alison arrived in Alexandria on 17
July and others soon followed. Forces based in Britain left to rapturous
send-offs: when the 1/Black Watch, as Bandsman A. V. Barwood
recalled, travelled by train from Edinburgh to London, ‘people, know-
ing we were going to war, turned out in great numbers at every station
to cheer us’.6 Even larger crowds gathered in London for the departure
of the Guards, thronging the route from their barracks to the point of
embarkation (Westminster Bridge Pier), whereupon ‘the cheering was
deafening’, wrote Private Macaulay (1/Scots Guards), ‘as we passed
down the river’.7 While the Seaforths endured ‘a very rough sail’ from
Aden, the Black Watch, in Private Lauchlan McLean’s opinion, enjoyed
a ‘delightful’ voyage, with reasonable liberty, books, papers and
evening concerts, ‘more like an excursion party than anything else’.8
However rough or long the voyage, soldiers had to adapt rapidly to
Egyptian conditions, a more daunting experience for soldiers coming
directly from Britain. ‘In passing through Alexandria’, added McLean,
‘the heat was something fearful, the sand about six inches deep, and
the dust so thick that we could not see three paces in front of us’.9
Soldiers were observant, nonetheless, as they moved through
Alexandria and camped near Ramleh. Private George Snape, having
seen Alexandria prior to the naval bombardment, now described how
the ‘forts, houses, shops, and public buildings in some parts were a
mass of ruins – something dreadful to look at’.10 Macaulay, like others,
could distinguish between collateral damage from the naval bombard-
ment and the pillaging of houses at Ramleh by Arabi’s followers. Pri-
vate W. Bond (1/South Staffordshires) was appalled by the way Arabi
and his army ‘had plundered and ravished all he came across’, while
McLean added: ‘Arabi’s vermin destroyed everything they could not
take away.’11 After several minor engagements near Ramleh, British
soldiers formed a very low opinion of the enemy’s military capacity.
‘Arabi Pacha [sic]’, noted Snape, ‘has plenty of men, but they are not up
to much;’ while another Marine observed: ‘The Arabs are very poor
marksmen, or else they could have killed every man in my company,
for it advanced across a plain as open as any man could be exposed, and
there was not one single man wounded all through the fight.’12
Private S. Smith (1/South Staffordshires) described some of the early
fighting near Ramleh:
There are only two regiments here, us and the 60th Rifles, and we have
our work cut out, I can tell you. We are on some duty from morning till
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night, and every third night all night doing outlying picket and outpost
duty, which is very hazardous work, as we are being fired upon continu-
ally. My company . . . have had a regular battle with the enemy’s out-
posts, but none of our side were injured; besides which we had one
pitched battle with the main body, which lasted about two hours and a
half. We were outnumbered fearfully, but eventually succeeded in dri-
ving them off. Their bullets . . . were all too high, otherwise the slaugh-
ter must have been terrible indeed. As it was we had four killed and
twenty-seven wounded, some of whom have since died.
He added perceptively: ‘Arabi Pasha is not our only enemy out here. We
have another formidable enemy in the shape of the heat, which is
cruel, especially when you have to go out trench digging with arms and
70 rounds of ball cartridge.’13
Alison’s mission was to convince Arabi that the troops in and
around Alexandria were preparing to attack his entrenchments at Kafr
ed-Dauar and then move on to Cairo. Hence he periodically launched
forays along the railway line and its adjacent canal, utilising the
armoured train with skirmishing columns in support. On 5 August the
mounted infantry advanced, as recounted by one of its number, Private
Bond, with the infantry in the rear and the Naval Brigade on the right:
When near his stronghold, his cavalry met us and the battle commenced.
We were only thirty-seven strong, but not a flinch. We exchanged a few
shots, then the Infantry joined us . . . We continued fighting until, with
his heavy losses and his entrenchments taken, he retired . . . out of our
small band of 37, we had lost one officer killed, one private killed, and
three wounded. The Naval Brigade lost a few, also the Marines.14
For many soldiers, these minor engagements constituted their bap-
tism of fire. Sergeant John Philip (2/Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry)
subsequently recalled their feeling of ‘trepidation’ as the DCLI
advanced through the Egyptian shellfire: men had ‘quivering lips and
firm-set teeth’ and uttered the occasional ‘forced’ laugh as shells flew
harmlessly overhead. The ‘Dukes’ were relieved when the Naval
Brigade returned ‘the compliment from their guns on the train’ and
even more so when they themselves opened fire: in the place of ‘ner-
vousness . . . came a fierce desire to push on, and close with the
enemy’.15 The 1/Gordon Highlanders had similar experiences on 20
August when engaged in late afternoon skirmishes. Lieutenant Henry
W. D. Denne, writing about his ‘baptism’, described the men as ‘per-
fectly steady’, but Lieutenant Heywood W. Seton-Karr observed their
relief whenever the artillery retaliated, ‘as it proved demoralizing to be
shelled without firing a shot in return’. He also thought that his men
entertained ‘a great dread of cavalry even when they are only
Bedouins’.16
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The Gordons had followed the advanced party from Malta, finding
the heat no worse than at Malta, with the agreeable sea breeze and
opportunities to bathe regularly at Ramleh. However Denne was by no
means alone in regarding the ‘glare very bad indeed’; he referred also to
the discomfort occasioned by ‘insects you can’t imagine’ – ‘1⁄2 doz. fleas
is a moderate bag when you take off your clothes, the flies settle on you
all day long & bite . . . They don’t settle one at a time but in hundreds.
The mosquitos very bad at night.’17 Soldiers soon found distractions in
the nearby towns: 3 Gordons were found drunk on guard from Alexan-
dria and 12 Riflemen were seen lying ‘dead drunk’ in Ramleh railway
station. Deprived of the lash, which had been abolished on active ser-
vice in 1881, military authorities struggled to respond, the colonel of
the Gordons having been initially in favour of shooting the offenders,
though he was later content to fine and imprison them with hard
labour.18
When Wolseley ordered the re-embarking of units at Alexandria, he
tried to deceive Arabi that the objective was Aboukir, though he
planned to sail through the Suez Canal to Ismailia. As he sought to
maintain the utmost secrecy by informing only his chief of staff, Sir
John Adye, Denne was certainly perceptive in observing: ‘The Guards,
60th & 46th embarked on Thursday last for Ismailia, it is said.’19 Secrecy
was more apparent on the transports, and as soon as the convoy passed
Aboukir, conjecture became rife: ‘Fifty different places’, recalled a Dun-
donian Marine, ‘were named, supported by as many theories.’20 Yet the
journey through the canal was uneventful, apart from the grounding of
the transports, Catalonia and Batavia, after the French authorities
refused to provide pilots. The navy soon had control of the waterway,
with two small gunboats specially rigged with ‘Gatlings ready for action
in their tops’ and torpedo boats cruising up and down.21
Wolseley knew that occupying the Suez Canal was only a temporary
expedient, conveniently linking the forces from Britain and the
Mediterranean with those of the Indian contingent, and that it was
potentially hazardous. As soon as Arabi learnt of the deception, he
could cut the supplies of fresh water to Ismailia and Suez, and block
the rail link alongside the Sweetwater Canal.22 Consequently while the
navy was securing the Suez Canal, HMS Seagull and HMS Mosquito
carried 200 Seaforth Highlanders from Suez to Shaluf, where some 600
Egyptian infantry guarded the lock gates. In a brief encounter the Egyp-
tians were easily routed and the lock gates closed (as were the gates at
Serapeum on the following day). Inevitably a Seaforth Highlander
regarded this engagement as not simply a means of ensuring the flow
of drinking water to Suez, but an occasion to test ‘what kind of stuff
they (the enemy) were made of’.23
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After the landing at Ismailia on 21 August, Wolseley ordered the
seizure of the nearby railway junction at Nifshia by a detachment
under Major-General Gerald Graham, VC. As sappers and fatigue par-
ties laboured to expand the dock facilities at Ismailia, unloading stores,
horses and ammunition, and repairing rail and telegraph connections,
water levels in the Sweetwater Canal began to fall. Local intelligence
confirmed that dams had been constructed at Magfar, about 10 miles
from Ismailia, and then further inland at Tel el-Maskhuta, where the
enemy forces were entrenched in force. Wolseley sent reinforcements
to Graham and ordered a westwards advance along the railway line to
Magfar. ‘It was fearful heavy marching’, recalled a corporal with the
Army Hospital Corps (AHC), ‘it was ankle deep in sand.’24
Having quickly dispersed the skirmishers at Magfar, Wolseley
sought to engage the enemy at Tel el-Maskhuta but the protracted
artillery duel, involving two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery (later
supported by two Gatling guns), deterred the enemy and prompted a
withdrawal. ‘For once’, wrote a Marine, ‘we had nothing more serious
to do than watch our artillery shell Arabi’s forces out of the village of
Tel-el-Mahuta.’25 As the Egyptian guns fell silent, three squadrons of
Household Cavalry, the 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards, and some
mounted infantry followed. A cavalry charge into the large camp at
Mahsama was repulsed by heavy fire from artillery and well-
entrenched infantry: ‘I never expected to come out of that alive’,
claimed Private Robert Gamble (7th Dragoon Guards), ‘the shells were
dropping all around us, there was a lot of horses shot, but there was
only two men killed.’26 An artillery bombardment and fire from the
mounted infantry prepared the way for a second charge. Trooper T. Git-
tins (1/Life Guards) described the advance from a walk to a trot and
then a gallop: ‘The sight was too much for the Egyptian warriors, for
they bolted, leaving us in entire possession of the camp baggage, hun-
dreds of arms, and tons of ammunition, seven breech-loading Krupp
guns (beautiful weapons) and last, but not least, a train load of stores,
etc. (about 80 trucks).’27 Although another train escaped, a detachment
of 4th Dragoons moved ahead to seize Kassassin Lock on 26 August,
enabling Graham’s Brigade to occupy the Lock area on the same day.
His forces were now within striking distance (some 7 miles) of the
main Egyptian entrenchments at Tel-el-Kebir.
Soldiers realised the risks that Wolseley had taken by advancing 
so rapidly ahead of his transport and supplies. The Guards and the
DCLI, who followed as reinforcements in the heat of the day (24
August), suffered acutely. Many men fell out on the line of march,
water-carts broke down and the guardsmen could not be prevented
from drinking polluted water. ‘All day’, bemoaned a Scots Guardsman,
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‘we toiled through the burning sand, our tongues parched with heat
and thirst.’28 The ‘Dukes’ at least found a field of melons and so were
able to slake their thirst, while the sick toll among the Scots Guards
grew alarmingly ‘after drinking bad water from the swamp after the
march . . .’.29
Lieutenant Charles Balfour (1/Scots Guards) deplored the ‘disgrace-
ful’ lack of medical stores as the Guards had ‘no provision for the
wounded’. Admittedly the Foot Guards with a royal duke, the Duke of
Connaught, in command, were not exposed in the front line (and so
grumbled about the lack of action);30 but those in range of the Egyptian
gunnery regarded it as highly accurate. As shells with percussion fuses
burrowed into the sand on impact, casualties were kept to a minimum,
but when a direct hit shattered the leg of a Life Guardsman, the bearer
recounted: ‘We had to carry him about five miles back to camp, and we
were all parched with thirst, and could not get a drop of water . . . I fell
down twice, and could scarcely get up again. I passed dozens of men
lying down exhausted from thirst, crying for water. And then we got
nothing to eat for two days.’31
Throughout the early advance from Ismailia, medical support
remained problematic. Working in single-lined tents Dr Alex S. Rose
struggled in the intense heat and the recurrent sandstorms and with
the all-pervading flies, as wearing veils was ‘not always convenient
when we had our medical duties to perform’. He despaired of the water
from the canal, the smell and taste of which was ‘more easily . . . imag-
ined than described’, and of the bread which was ‘anything but good’.
Even worse, he could not find any horses to carry the hospital stores:
‘Unfortunately, the transport service had broken down, the result
being that we were much hampered in all our movements, and some-
times were left quite helpless.’32
At least those who reached the Egyptian camps at Tel-el-Maskhuta
and Mahsama found provisions, clothing and tents in abundance. At
the former, a Dundonian Marine regarded the ‘biscuits and tents left by
Arabi’s troops’ as ‘very acceptable, the heat being overpowering’. In
Mahsama, the Marine wrote, ‘we got a fresh supply of camels, all their
tents, and plenty of rice, flour, onions, beans, biscuits, and tinned soup
. . . without Arabi’s stores we should have been absolutely starving’.33
The men needed all their energy as they had to dredge numerous
corpses (both men and animals) from the canal, breach both dams
across the canal (particularly arduous tasks), and remove a major
blockage from the railway. Further forward, soldiers constructed
entrenchments to protect their exposed position at Kassassin.34 
On 28 August Arabi Pasha challenged Graham’s weak brigade at
Kassassin which comprised Marine Artillery, small detachments of
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mounted infantry and the 4th Dragoon Guards, the DCLI and the York
and Lancaster Battalions, a troop of 7th Dragoon Guards and two 13-
pounders (another two were soon sent forward). After a preliminary
cavalry charge failed, the Egyptians launched a major infantry assault
in three lines, with massive reserves and sixteen cannon. Sergeant
Philip, who was in the firing line of the ‘Dukes’, remembered opening
fire ‘with a vengeance’ from within 900 yards and, after several hours
of continual firing, suffering a severely bruised shoulder from the recoil
of his rifle. Like others he lauded the achievements of the Marine
Artillery, who had mounted one of the captured Krupp guns on a
couple of trucks and continued firing long after the horse artillery.35
Although Graham’s force held its position, brought up reinforce-
ments and saw the enemy retire, the ‘moonlight charge’ by the House-
hold Cavalry from the right flank turned the repulse into a rout. The
cavalry, as Trooper Gittins recalled, had already been called out ‘in the
heat of the day’ to wait for hours in support before returning to camp.36
When summoned again, they marched for 5–6 miles until they encoun-
tered the enemy’s fire. Thereupon, as Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon.
Reginald Talbot (1/Life Guards) recorded,
General [Drury] Lowe shortly ordered our guns to unlimber and reply,
and the 7th Dragoon Guards to clear the front of our guns, which they did
by retiring, making us the first line. The Household Cavalry continued
to advance at a walk, when in a moment became visible a white line of
infantry in our immediate front, which opened a tremendous fire upon
us. Not a moment was to be lost: ‘Form front in two lines!’ ‘Draw
swords!’ ‘Charge!’ and we were upon them . . . We rode them down in
solid rank; but, as they dispersed, we opened up and pursued. They fell
like ninepins.37
Troopers appreciated that the proximity of the initial encounter had
served them well: ‘They opened a terrific fire on us at a very short dis-
tance’, wrote Gittins, ‘and lucky for us it was a short one, for they
invariably fire high.’38 Life Guardsmen recounted vicious hand-to-hand
fighting, with Trooper Browning claiming that he had decapitated two
of the enemy before he himself fell unconscious.49 Some found the
aftermath an appalling spectacle: ‘It was a ghastly sight’, recalled Pri-
vate H. Tripper (7th Dragoon Guards), ‘to see the enemy’s dead lying
about in the moonlight’, while Private Richard Williams (AHC)
observed ‘some fearful sights among the wounded’.40 None of the cav-
alrymen mentioned charging the enemy’s guns, so vindicating the offi-
cial historian’s review of the battle as distinct from contemporary
mythology.41
On the following day four companies of Marines and a cavalry escort
toured the battlefield, finding large quantities of ammunition and sev-
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eral mutilated corpses of cavalrymen. These findings only added to
their sense of enmity and the desire to attack Arabi, a prospect made
more feasible by the arrival of the first train bringing supplies to Tel-el-
Maskhuta on 28 August.42 The railway company under Major Wallace,
RE, had had to repair 230 yards of track from Ismailia to Magfar and
bring engines from Suez to Ismailia (as they could not be unloaded at
Ismailia) before they could send even one engine along the line. By 31
August they sent a train to Kassassin, and increased the number of
trains to 2 per day from 1 September, increasing to 4 per day from 7 Sep-
tember. The engineers also established telegraphic connections
between Ismailia and Tel-el-Maskhuta by 31 August and between
Ismailia and Kassassin on the following day. As supply boats began to
operate beyond Magfar on 2 September, stores accumulated rapidly and
more units were pressed forward.43
By 8 August a Marine recorded that the Kassassin camp now
included ‘the Royal Irish (18th); Duke of Cornwall’s (46th); York and
Lancaster (84th); 3rd Battalion King’s Own Rifles (60th); West Kent
(50th); Marine Artillery; Marine Light Infantry; and about 2000 cav-
alry’. In a nearby camp, he added, the Bengal Lancers appeared and ‘it
was a grand sight to see them, with gay pennons on their lances . . .’.44
Stores were now plentiful but the numbers suffering from dysentery,
diarrhoea and fever rapidly grew, including medical staff such as Dr
Rose. Fortunately many of these illnesses proved transitory, but sol-
diers ‘were getting sick of this place’ and wanted to take the offensive,
especially as an armoured train had now appeared.45
Early on the morning of 9 September Arabi launched another assault
on Kassassin, with some 8,000 men, supported by twenty-four guns.
Outpost patrols of the 13th Bengal Lancers detected the advance and
raised the alarm at about 6.45 a.m. While the Indian Cavalry Brigade
sought to delay the Egyptians, Graham prepared a counter-offensive
with his Marines and Riflemen along the line of the canal and railway.
He had the DCLI and Royal Irish in support, with the Yorks and Lancs
ready to counter any move from the northern sandhills, and cavalry on
the right to thwart any flanking movements. The infantry pressed for-
ward, as Marling recounted, ‘by short rushes of from 50 to 100 yards’
and maintained ‘a tremendous musketry fire on them’,46 but the
artillery duel was once again decisive. Initially the Egyptian gunners
sustained a heavy and accurate bombardment: ‘shells were flying about
like hailstones’, recalled a corporal of the Engineers,47 and twice the
engineer sections at the extreme front had to vacate their positions.
Direct hits, as seen by Sapper Powell, could be devastating – one Rifle-
man lost both legs – but many shells buried themselves in the sand: as
Lieutenant-Colonel Kendal Coghill (19th Hussars) observed, ‘Their
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artillery fire is very good, but bursting of shells bad.’48 Once the British
gunners limbered up and advanced, they wrecked the range-calcula-
tions of their Egyptian counterparts and opened up an effective
counter-battery fire. By 9 a.m. the infantry began to advance and
within an hour-and-a-half the combined British force had driven the
Egyptians from the field, capturing 40,000 rounds of ammunition and
three guns. They pursued the enemy to within 5,000 yards of the
entrenchments at Tel-el-Kebir.49 As many soldiers had rushed into
battle without breakfast and even with unfilled water-bottles, the
Marines and Riflemen had many exhausted men, with several cases of
sunstroke, when they returned to camp.50
Wolseley had halted the pursuit, preferring to assemble his full army
for a pre-dawn assault on Tel-el-Kebir (to minimise casualties and so
ensure that he could follow up via Belbeis and Zagazig to seize Cairo).
He now brought forward the Guards Brigade, the remaining artillery
and cavalry, and the four battalions of the Highland Brigade that had
languished on ships off Ismailia since 1 September. They had disem-
barked only to undertake fatigues, and on the 4th the Camerons had
received a welcome draft of reservists (3 officers, 12 non-commissioned
officers, 3 drummers and 150 privates); but these reservists, contrary to
official claims, came from different regiments. Captain and Adjutant
Kenneth S. Baynes recorded: ‘Amongst them were a few old 79th men,
but the majority were from the 93rd, 91st, and other regiments.’51 On
the 9 September the brigade began its march at 3.30 p.m. – ‘the hottest
part of the day’, as bitterly remembered by a Yorkshireman in the Black
Watch.52 With cavalry on one flank and artillery on the other, the Gor-
dons led the march, followed by the Camerons, Highland Light
Infantry (HLI) and then the Black Watch. During the first day men sank
to their ankles, sometimes their knees, in soft sand,53 struggling
through the dust to cover 6 miles by sunset. The camp site, as recalled
by the Camerons’ Quartermaster John Ainslie, had ‘nothing to be seen
to the front, right or left but a sea of sand. Behind us the tall masts of
the transports rose like a forest out of gathering gloom.’54 Many never
appreciated the view as they had fallen out along the line of march and
had to catch up by morning. Some officers of the Black Watch were less
than candid in claiming that ‘very few’ or ‘some twenty or thirty of our
men fell out’, whereas private soldiers reckoned that ‘about 100 of
ours’ succumbed. Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan Macpherson later con-
ceded that ‘the men were as game as possible, but one day 150 fell out
from exhaustion, and one died’.55 The brigade continued to suffer from
the lack of food and shelter during the next two days. Lieutenant Henry
H. L. Malcolm (Camerons) claimed that ‘another 200 men fell out’ on
the second day, ‘principally from the 75th’, before reaching Mahsama
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where the ‘stink was excessive’ from the rotting Egyptian corpses.56
Seton-Karr admitted that sixty-five Gordons had fallen out on 10 Sep-
tember, and that everyone was relieved to reach Kassassin on the fol-
lowing day, where tents had been brought up by train and the men
could eat, rest and recuperate.57
By 12 September 17,401 British and Indian officers and men, with 61
guns and 6 naval Gatlings, were ready for the assault. After several
days’ reconnaissance and gathering evidence from spies, Wolseley and
his staff had studied the enemy’s defences, manned by 20,000 soldiers
and seventy-five guns, and observed the laxity of their pre-dawn watch.
His plan of maximising surprise by a silent evening march over the 7
miles to Tel-el-Kebir, with unloaded rifles, had an immediate appeal
for Highlanders such as Drummer Bogle (1/Black Watch). The High-
land Brigade would lead the charge (flanked by Graham’s Brigade to the
right and the Indian contingent to the left) and it would ‘be done in the
old Scotch style – by the bayonet’, with no firing until inside the
entrenchments.58 The men were to carry 100 rounds of ammunition,
one day’s rations (not two as often claimed) and water bottles filled
with tea.59 With each battalion marching slowly in two lines, in half-
battalion columns of double companies, they bivouacked for an hour-
and-a-half at Ninth Hill, where a rum ration was issued to widespread
approval.60
At 1.30 a.m. the march resumed, utilising telegraph poles laid out
over 1,000 yards from the hill, and with Lieutenant Rawson, RN,
directing the Highlanders by the stars. Private George Bedson (Black
Watch) recalled the ‘grand sight to see the two lines advancing in the
night; they looked like walls moving’.61 Apart from a drunken private
of the HLI, who was quickly suppressed, the sound of the march was
also memorable: ‘the monotonous tramp’, wrote Captain Baynes,
‘the sombre lines, the dimly discerned sea of desert, faintly lighted
by the stars, were at once ghastly and impressive’.62 So deep was the
silence that when Quartermaster Ainslie with his water carts and
pack mule fell behind, he could detect the sound only by listening,
ear to the ground, and so hearing ‘a murmur like the sea breaking on
the shore to my right’.63 When clouds concealed the stars, the two
wings of the Highland Brigade turned inwards and virtually faced
each other, but the alignment was restored and just before dawn the
brigade found itself about 200 yards from the Egyptian lines. One
shot from the enemy was followed by others ‘until the whole hori-
zon’ seemed to a Black Watch bandsman ‘one mass of flame’.64 The
Highlanders, who were 600 yards ahead of Graham’s Brigade, were so
close that most of the fusillade passed harmlessly overhead. ‘As soon
as they opened fire’, added Sergeant Charles Riley (Camerons), ‘we
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fixed bayonets, and with a good ringing British cheer we charged the
trenches’.65
An Egyptian officer admitted that the surprise was complete, and
that their guns had been sighted for a range of 2,000 yards: 
Instead of 2,000 yards, they must have been 200 off. We fired, but most
of our shots must have gone over their heads. Almost at the same
moment . . . they were scrambling over us, first over our right [where the
Highlanders attacked] and then rolling down the line like a wave. We
never expected a war like this. Our soldiers stood fire at a distance very
well . . . but these men came close up to us and the only way to save life
was to run away.66
Soldiers’ memories of the battle, which lasted barely an hour, were per-
force limited. As for the Highlanders, who were unsupported for the
first 10–15 minutes, they had the experience of plunging into the 5-
foot-deep ditch with perpendicular sides and then scrambling up a
parapet on the other side. Private Donald Cameron (Cameron High-
landers) was the first man up and the second killed as the Camerons
and Gordons were the first into the enemy’s trenches. ‘We were mixed
up’, recorded Seton-Karr in his diary, ‘75th and 79th in inextricable
confusion, but keep advancing after the flying masses, while those in
the rear drive their bayonets through those the front men have shot
down.’67 On the right of the line, where the Black Watch had to cut
steps with their bayonets in the 14-foot-high embankment, Private
Donald Campbell (Black Watch) characterised ‘our men’ as ‘half-mad
to see their comrades falling before they were able to strike a blow; 
and whenever they got within reach of the enemy they fought like
lions’.68 On the left the 2/HLI attacked a five-gun battery protected by
a formidable ditch and suffered the heaviest casualties of any Highland
battalion. ‘There were cross fires in all directions’, wrote Lieutenant-
Colonel Abel Straghan, and the artillery fire had a ‘demoralising’ effect
until his men worked round to an easier ditch on the left and climbed
into the redoubt.69
Soldiers of every rank described their near escapes, or, in some cases,
their multiple injuries. They praised the achievements of fallen com-
rades, such as Sergeant-Major John McNeill (Black Watch), who led his
men over the parapet before being shot in the thigh, stomach and
groin.70 They acknowledged the havoc caused by cross-fire from the
shelter trenches in the rear, with the Camerons having to turn a Krupp
gun on the enemy, but they persevered with their bayoneting. As
Bandsman George Paterson (Black Watch) observed: ‘You should have
seen the faces the poor wretches put on as the bayonet was driven into
them. It is a sight I shall never forget all my life.’71 They were grateful,
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too, when the horse artillery appeared and the infantry helped to lift
the guns over the parapet. Viscount Fielding (RA, N/2 battery) then gal-
loped down ‘one side of a long line of entrenchment’, periodically stop-
ping to enfilade the enemy while the Black Watch ran along the other
side of the trenches: ‘We went on like this down the whole of the line,
nearly two miles’, sometimes firing case at only 200 yards.72 While N/2
went on to shell Arabi’s train, the following battery had, according to
one of its gunners, ‘great practice; but it was cruel butchery. A shell
from my left gun took a man’s head clean off, and then went on, burst,
and killed five more. After four or five rounds from each gun, we lim-
bered up, and advanced to Arabi’s camp’.73
Graham’s Brigade made rapid progress in its sector. Although the
Marines and the infantry had to cross a longer fire zone, most of the
Egyptian fire was aimed too high. The Yorks and Lancs company of
Sergeant McChesney
took no notice of being a support, what we wanted was to be up in the
front . . . we took no notice of any orders, but fixed our bayonets, and off
we went like wild men, charging and shouting till we were hoarse again.
The scene was awful when we got up to the trenches, as it was every man
for himself. However, it did not last long, it was all over in about half an
hour.74
The Royal Irish Fusiliers advanced in short rushes, and, unlike the
Royal Marines, fired several volleys before charging the entrench-
ments, where Sergeant R. D. Healey found large numbers of Arabs
either killed or wounded: 
We bayoneted all who came in our way. You should have heard the yells
of the beggars as we ‘let daylight into them’. It was something terrible.
The majority retreated to another ridge, where they again opened 
fire, but a few shots, a cheer, and charge, had the effect of making them
move at a pace unusual with their habits. Then their retreat became
more general . . . We followed them for a couple of miles, halting ulti-
mately to let the Artillery and Cavalry perform their part of ‘not a bad
day’s work’.75
South of the canal the Indian contingent and the Naval Brigade
moved against the well-fortified right flank, where the Seaforths
advanced towards trenches filled with Egyptians and four 7-pounder
guns. A non-commissioned officer described how the Seaforths
responded in kind to the Egyptian volleys and made ‘great gaps in the
rebel ranks. For over half-an-hour this work continued, the enemy
gradually retiring and we occupying their trenches. One gallant com-
rade near me fell dead, being shot through his Afghan medal.’ Follow-
ing Brigadier-General Oriel V. Tanner and a young subaltern, they
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charged the enemy’s guns, precipitating a wholesale retreat: ‘All ran
but the gunners, who, to their credit be it said, remained to the last and
were cut down.’76 Another Seaforth veteran reckoned: ‘It was about the
shortest fight that ever I had, and as cheap a medal that ever an army
got.’77
The cavalry poured through on both sides of the canal, albeit at dif-
ferent rates. While a squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry tried to cut off
fugitives from the southern side of the canal, the main Indian Brigade
advanced from the north ahead of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade which, as
Coghill asserted, ‘had not calculated on such a sharp & decisive busi-
ness so crept slowly round the enemy’s right’. Meanwhile Coghill’s
squadron of the 19th Hussars galloped through the centre, making
straight for the railway where he claimed to have blocked the departure
of three trains by ‘dropping a camel’ across the tracks. Although there
were competing claims for the disruption of the rail network, Coghill
is correct in maintaining that the rapidity and depth of the cavalry pur-
suit, with the hussars chasing for about 12 miles, ‘completely routed
and demoralised’ the enemy,78 and secured both Belbeis with its tele-
graph office and Zagazig later in the day. 
For the Foot Guards and other units coming up in reserve, the
brevity of the engagement was an intense frustration. As Balfour
reflected, ‘we never did anything during the fifty minutes the action
lasted’, claiming that ‘the Egyptians made such a poor showing no sup-
port was required by the first line’.79 Most soldiers agreed, one Black
Watch officer even asserting: ‘How they can run, those Arabs, and what
a capital ‘fox’ they would make for a paper chase at home!’;80 but they
exempted the Egyptian gunners, who died at their posts, and the black
Sudanese soldiers. As Major Robert Coveny (Black Watch) acknowl-
edged: ‘The Soudan warriors, thick-lipped negro-typed creatures in
light blue tunics, died very game, their bodies lying perfectly thick in
the trenches.’81
Many were appalled by the aftermath of the battle in which a total
of perhaps 2,000 Egyptians died as well as 57 British soldiers (with
another 382 wounded and 30 missing). Private James Judson, another
Yorkshireman in the Black Watch, found the scene ‘heartrending’, that
is ‘the sight of the dead and dying, who lay all around us – an old man
here, a young man there, or a riderless horse galloping madly on in the
confusion’.82 One of his comrades described the canal as ‘full of dead
and dying horses, camels, and men. Confusion reigned everywhere, our
cavalry firing and mowing them down, the artillery stretching dozens
at a time. We captured about 50 tons of ammunition at the station, and
stores of every description, including horses and camels – in fact, all his
camp equipage.’83 The wounded were in a desperate state: many cried
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out for water and some buried their heads in the sand to cool them-
selves. A Crieff soldier, in trying to help, filled his water bottle from
the canal ‘with water that you would not wash the door-step with, as
it was thick with blood and mud’.84 Several chronicled the dangers of
moving over the battlefield, when some Egyptians either feigned injury
or turned on those who gave them water, and, as soon as they passed,
shot them in the back.85 None of these incidents deterred soldiers from
the wholesale looting of Arabi’s camp: ‘Lots of our fellows’, admitted
Quartermaster Ainslie, ‘picked up valuable articles . . . and near the
station were immense stores of all sorts, and they all fell into our
hands, along with a great number of baggage animals and cavalry
horses’.86
The AHC, as Private Richard Williams recalled, struggled to cope:
‘We could see some of the firing, but, after a time, our work com-
menced. The wounded began to be carried in and oh! to see some of the
poor fellows smothered in blood and arms and legs blown to pieces, and
they were groaning and crying for water, which was something dread-
ful to hear.’ After treating the British wounded, he confirmed that the
AHC spent several days assisting the Egyptian wounded, whose num-
bers overwhelmed their services. Within a few days they had 300 Arabs
under treatment and were losing ‘five or six a day’, with the flies and
mosquitoes tormenting all concerned.87 On 17 September an AHC cor-
poral led a party of eleven men and six carts across the battlefield,
where some dead lay unburied and the ‘stench was fearful’. They col-
lected another thirty-six Arabs, whose ‘wounds were in a fearful
state’.88
Wolseley’s priority had been to complete the dispersal of Arabi’s
army and reach Cairo as quickly as possible. Accordingly the Indian
contingent marched on to Zagazig (15 miles from Tel-el-Kebir) by the
afternoon of the battle, while the mounted infantry and 4th Dragoon
Guards rode ahead to Belbeis. After a short rest they proceeded to
Cairo, arriving at the Citadel at 5 p.m. on 14 September, where Arabi
and 8,000 soldiers surrendered to 120 men from the mounted infantry
and dragoons. The Foot Guards arrived by train on the following day:
as Private Geddes (Scots Guards) informed his parents, ‘We marched
triumphantly into this city . . . amidst the cheers of the Europeans and
all the native Christians, who were intoxicated with delight at our suc-
cess’.89 Many Egyptian soldiers were keen to ingratiate themselves,
with Sapper Powell finding them to ‘take a great interest in trying to
catch and repeat different English words, and . . . very anxious to show
their good feeling, bringing us oranges, dates, sugar, cigarettes, etc.’.90
Arabi’s several hundred prisoners were particularly glad to see the
Guardsmen and recount their tales of torture and food deprivation: the
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Guards fed the prisoners and put ‘the officer (a Bey) who carried out
Arabi’s orders . . . in irons’.91
Although soldiers were restricted in their movements, they were
impressed by Cairo and the nearby pyramids. ‘Without doubt’, wrote
Bandsman Paterson, ‘Cairo is as pretty a city as ever I saw. The streets
are lined with tall, shady trees on each side, while the houses (in the
principal part of the city) are magnificent.’92 Soldiers were not so
impressed by the quarters that they had to inhabit. Both the Citadel and
the Kasr-el-Nil barracks were found utterly squalid and verminous.
Sergeant Charles Spraggs (Scots Guards) recorded how a great many
men preferred to sleep at night on the parade ground to avoid ‘the large
number of Bugs and insects’.93 Several palaces were found to be in sim-
ilar condition – ‘dusty and filthy in the extreme’ to quote Dr Rose 94 –
so that many units remained in encampments on the outskirts of Cairo
or near Zagazig and Belbeis before quarters were established on the
island of Bulak. Conditions were grim: the Black Watch spent eight
days outside Belbeis with no tents, sleeping in their kilts and consum-
ing nothing but hard biscuits, preserved meat and muddy water.95 The
number of those sick rapidly mounted, with the Gordons, after twelve
days at Tantah, forced to send off 5 officers and 140 men for medical
treatment.96 Once again the medical authorities struggled initially: Dr
Rose found himself ‘very much overworked’ and had only 4 orderlies to
treat 245 patients sent in on a single day.97 Patients suffered from fever,
ophthalmia and diarrhoea, with Sergeant Spraggs finding the medical
remedies for severe diarrhoea somewhat drastic, namely ‘some Castor
oil and oppium [sic] to see if that will do me any good’.98
Soldiers wrote many of their letters as they languished in encamp-
ments after Tel-el-Kebir, and some moved beyond descriptive narra-
tives to praise the tactical planning of Wolseley, especially the night
march prior to battle. A Scots Guards private called it ‘a splendidly-
planned attack’, while a corporal of the Royal Engineers regarded Sir
Garnet ‘as a fine General; his Generalship was unsurpassable’.99 Yet
Wolseley’s reports on the battle proved profoundly contentious. As the
telegraph unit, with 10 miles of cable, had followed the infantry across
Tel-el-Kebir to establish a telegraph office at the railway station,
Wolseley was ‘greatly pleased’ to send news of the victory with
unprecedented rapidity.100 Rumours quickly circulated that his
despatch had heaped praise on the Guards under their royal duke (so
appeasing the Queen), on the achievements and discipline of the young
soldiers (so endorsing the Government’s army reforms) and on the effi-
ciency of the support services (so concealing the main shortcomings of
the campaign). Privately, Wolseley, who expected (and received) a peer-
age and a pension for his services, insisted: ‘The government owe me a
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great deal . . .. The battle of Tel el Kebir has been worth millions to
Gladstone’s administration’, while the Queen’s ‘only sympathies &
solicitude are for Her own selfish self and Her family’.101 
The Marines and Highlanders were incensed. Whereas the former,
who suffered the heaviest casualties of any unit at Tel-el-Kebir,
regarded themselves as ‘second to none’, the latter considered that they
did ‘the whole of the work’. Both deplored plaudits for the supporting
units; ‘The Guards, etc.’, wrote a Black Watch sergeant, ‘were – I don’t
know where; anyhow they did nothing’ and the 3/60th, in the rear of
the Gordons, were in Denne’s words ‘not so swift to the front that they
trod our heels off’.102 Aggrieved soldiers believed that Wolseley had
exploited his powers of censorship: ‘the correspondents’, asserted a
Black Watch private, ‘are not allowed to send home any news but what
is approved of by Sir Garnet Wolseley’.103 Soldiers had mixed feelings
towards the war correspondents: they had enjoyed their company
socially but criticised the risks they took in battle, which could bring
down fire on themselves, and deprecated some of their reporting. If
Lieutenant Walter S. Churchward, RA, exaggerated in claiming that
‘newspaper men are all liars & wrote absurd accounts in the papers
especially The Times and Standard’, soldiers complained in their let-
ters about the failure of the transport and commissariat, aware that the
press could not do so.104 By 15 October, Denne readily observed: ‘The
correspondents, now supervision has ceased, are showing up the
comm[issaria]t & hospital defects, all they say & more is true.’105 
On the issue of whether the campaign vindicated army reforms, as
claimed by Wolseley and Childers,106 opinions divided. While Sergeant
Healey agreed that the young soldiers had proved themselves in Egypt,
Denne reckoned that the 72nd (1/Seaforths) were ‘a fine regt. of old sol-
diers & the smartest I have ever seen’.107 In fact, there was not a sharp
gulf between the home- and India-based battalions. Many of home-
based units had left behind all soldiers under 20 years of age and most
had a nucleus of older or long-service men.108 Even more impressive,
argued Sergeant-Major Greig, RA, were ‘our native Indian troops,
strong muscular fellows, and like greyhounds on the leash eager to be
at the foe’.109 The achievements of all these soldiers were magnified by
the incapacity of the Egyptians: as Denne remarked, ‘Sir F. Roberts had
much greater difficulties to contend with [in the Second Afghan War]
& did much more than Wolseley’.110
Most soldiers, though, emerged from the campaign with their sense
of self-esteem enhanced. They had overcome natural obstacles and
numerical odds, and believed that they had done so in a righteous
cause. The chorus of Drummer Bogle’s poem ‘The Highland Brigade’
extolled
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The success to the few, the gallant few,
Of that famous Scottish band,
Who are ready to fight in the cause of the right,
And the honour of their native land.111
Soldiers appreciated the profusion of medals and promotions awarded
(not only a campaign medal with a clasp for those at Tel-el-Kebir but
the Khedive’s bronze star and 165 Orders of the Osmanieh and the
Medjidieh from the Sultan of Turkey). They relished, too, the parade in
review order before the Khedive on 30 September. As the culminating
spectacle of the campaign, Sergeant Philip maintained that the purpose
‘was to overawe and instil into the dull native mind the overpowering
strength of the nation they had been opposing . . . [and] to give the ruler
and his subordinates a sight of the army that beat and sent their coun-
trymen flying from the trenches at Tel-el-Kebir in such a short time on
that eventful morning’.112
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Gladstone’s Government consolidated victory at Tel-el-Kebir by estab-
lishing a temporary military occupation of Egypt (both to protect the
Suez Canal and to preserve internal order in Egypt). Given the minimal
size of the army of occupation, the arrangement worked conveniently
within Egypt but difficulties soon arose when Egypt, on behalf of the
Porte, sought to crush the rebellion launched by Mohammad Ahmed –
the Mahdi, or ‘Expected One’, in the Sudan. Egypt employed a retired
British officer, Lieutenant-General William Hicks, to lead an army of
11,000 men against the Mahdists, an offensive that ended in spectacu-
lar failure on the plain of Shaykan, near El Obeid (5 November 1883),
where his army was annihilated with only a few hundred survivors. As
the rebels threatened further towns, including Khartoum, Gladstone’s
cabinet wanted to evacuate the remaining Egyptian garrisons from the
Sudan. Confronting a popular outcry fanned by the influential Pall
Mall Gazette, it responded by sending Major-General Charles ‘Chi-
nese’ Gordon (18 January 1884) up the Nile to ‘consider and report’ on
the situation.1 In eastern Sudan, however, where the British wished to
retain the Red Sea ports round Suakin (both for their commercial value
and to prevent them becoming outlets for the slave trade), the Beja
tribes (including the Hadendowa, Amarar, Bisharin and others) under
Osman Digna commanded the trade route to Berber and besieged the
garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar. The Mahdists destroyed another Egypt-
ian relief force under Major-General Valentine Baker at El Teb (4 Feb-
ruary 1884) and overwhelmed the garrison of Sinkat four days later as
it tried to march to the coast. The slaughter of Egyptian soldiers and
civilians from Sinkat, with the capture of their women and children,
aroused fervent demands for intervention, not least from Queen Victo-
ria. Gladstone, according to his private secretary, reluctantly agreed to
send a British relief force to Tokar; ‘It is’, added Edward Hamilton, ‘in
a small way a response to the unreasonable cries of public feeling.’2
C H A P T E R F I V E
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The ensuing campaign was extremely brief, but represented the first
encounter of British forces with the Mahdists and their first experience
of campaigning in the eastern Sudan. Some 4,000 men, drawn from the
garrisons in Egypt, Aden and India, served under Sir Gerald Graham,
VC; they comprised two brigades of infantry, including a body of Royal
Marine Light Infantry, a cavalry brigade under Colonel Herbert 
Stewart, and a naval detachment operating three Gatling and three
Gardner machine-guns.3 Of this small force, composed of soldiers
already serving overseas, relatively few wrote letters to family and
friends in Britain. Newspapers were also less dependent on them, as
several war correspondents had accompanied the ill-fated relief force
under Baker Pasha and were ready to report on the next campaign.
Given the experience and rivalry of these ‘specials’, including Francis
Scudamore (Daily News), John Cameron (Standard), James Mellor
Paulton (Manchester Examiner), Frederic Villiers (Graphic), Bennet
Burleigh (Daily Telegraph), Alex MacDonald (Western Morning News)
and Melton Prior (Illustrated London News), this brief campaign was
fully reported.4 Burleigh gained prominence by ‘scooping’ his rivals 
in reporting on the second battle of El Teb (29 February 1884) and by
fighting the Hadendowa in the broken square at Tamai (13 March
1884).5
Soldiers who had been based in Egypt were delighted to leave a coun-
try where cholera had claimed all too many victims and to see action.6
They also grasped the sense of urgency that characterised the cam-
paign. On 14 February the 1/Black Watch was issued with a new grey
field kit and told that it would leave for the Sudan on the following
morning, which was ‘not much notice’, Bandsman Barwood reflected:
‘All night most of us sat up drinking and singing, but dozed off towards
morning.’ He consoled a disconsolate friend who had to remain behind,
then left on the train for Suez between 6 and 7 a.m. At Tel-el-Kebir the
train stopped, allowing the Black Watch to visit the cemetery where
several soldiers took feathers out of their red hackles ‘and stuck them
in our comrades graves’.7 After this poignant scene, the train pressed on
to Suez where men and horses were crammed into troopships for the 6-
day voyage to Trinkitat. The Orontes carried 44 officers and 1,169
men, but its lack of horse fittings meant that the mounted infantry, as
Marling recalled, had to tie ‘the horses up to the ship’s rail, where they
fought and bit one another worse than ever’.8
Whether the voyages were enjoyed, as Captain A. O. Green, RE, later
claimed, paying numerous tributes to the entertainment by the Black
Watch band on board the Orontes, or were ‘very miserable’, as remem-
bered by Private Peter McRae (1/Gordon Highlanders) on board the
Thibet, moments of anxiety recurred.9 These included immediate con-
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cerns as the ships travelled slowly, often stopping, in the shallow
coastal waters south of Suakin (the Neera foundered); longer term fears
that Tokar could fall before the troops landed; and the practical diffi-
culty of disembarking troops, horses and stores over the coral reefs at
Trinkitat. Green and his sappers had to erect a suitable pier and then
construct troughs and tanks to hold the 13,000 gallons of water, con-
densed from the Red Sea, which soldiers and animals required on a
daily basis. Marling saw the water coming into ‘the canvas horse
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troughs so hot that although the horses were almost mad with thirst
we had to take them away for ten minutes to let it cool’.10
As the soldiers began to disembark on 21 February, the first news of
Tokar’s surrender came via an exhausted Egyptian soldier. He was de-
briefed by Green for the intelligence department and was then ‘exam-
ined and cross-examined’ as he was rowed out to the Orontes.
Confirmation of the garrison’s fall was passed on to London by 23 Feb-
ruary when Graham had the bulk of his army ashore.11 Sir Evelyn
Baring (later the Earl of Cromer), who was the British agent and consul-
general in Cairo, now found himself pressed by senior military officers
to continue the campaign. Although he doubted that further action
(beyond leaving a secure garrison round Suakin) would serve any pur-
pose, the Government could not contemplate the political costs of a
precipitate withdrawal. As Lord Granville, the foreign secretary, delib-
erated whether a march to El Teb might be feasible to protect the fugi-
tives and bury the European dead or, if Suakin was threatened, to
mount an offensive from Trinkitat or Suakin, it soon became too late
to prevent an advance by Graham.12
Soldiers were none too impressed by their first few days in the
Sudan. They had to work from morning until night unloading vessels
and had ‘nothing here to cover us’, as McRae noted, ‘but the sky and a
blanket’, a combination that had to withstand tropical downpours
every night for a week.13 If strictly rationed to one bottle of water per
day, they could at least bathe in the sea each morning and were spared
the extremes of heat – Green confirmed that over ‘four days the sig-
nallers have not been able to utilise the heliograph from absence of sun
. . .’.14 On 25 February the Gordons marched ahead with the Irish
Fusiliers, an artillery detachment, a squadron of the 19th Hussars and
mounted infantry to establish a forward base at Fort Baker, some 3
miles distant. McRae described how they ‘had to march up to the knees
in mud and then through prickly bushes which scratch our knees ter-
rible’; the fort built by Baker’s Egyptian troops was, however, impres-
sive: as Private John Morrison (Black Watch) commented, ‘it is a very
strongly fortified place indeed’.15
As ever in colonial warfare, the first priorities were base security and
logistical supply. Once the engineers had erected a wire entanglement,
soldiers were able to bivouac in and around the earthwork, whereupon
they laboured to bring stores, artillery and, above all, supplies of fresh
water across the marsh. ‘Everyone had been crying out for everything
simultaneously’, wrote Green, but packing casks, tanks and miscella-
neous water containers onto camels and then sending them to Fort
Baker was his priority; by 27 February he had some 8,000 gallons stored
at Fort Baker. Graham completed his base defences by leaving a com-
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pany of Riflemen, ‘all sick and weakly men’ and the departmental
details at Trinkitat, and another three companies of Riflemen with a
Krupp gun and two bronze guns at Fort Baker.16
On 28 February the relief force congregated at Fort Baker, with the
1/Yorks and Lancs, who were the last to arrive from Aden, crossing the
bog at night. Graham and his staff then deployed his force in a ‘rectan-
gular parallelogram of 400 x 250 feet’, leaving the men in full kit
through another night of rain (albeit fortified by tots of rum).17 By 8.15
a.m. on the following day, the relief force was ready to assume the
offensive, and a sailor claimed: ‘The 750 mounted troops looked splen-
did, and . . . [the] pipers of the 75th and 42nd Highlanders played some
of their old stirring war-marches as the force moved over the rough
ground’.18 The rain-sodden ground, ‘thickly dotted with scrub . . . about
21⁄2 ft. high’,19 ensured that the first 2 miles were very arduous, particu-
larly for the gunners and sailors dragging their guns by hand. As the
fierce sun compounded the fatigue (even if it eased their marching over
firmer ground for the final 2 miles), there were frequent halts en route.
Near El Teb cavalry scouts crossed the battlefield where Baker Pasha’s
forces had foundered: ‘It was a frightful sight’, recalled Private C.
Stream (19th Hussars), ‘nothing but dead bodies . . . They had been
lying there for over a month. The stench was something frightful.’20
By about 10 a.m. those scouts found their enemy counterparts and
reconnoitred the Mahdists’ position, including shallow earthworks,
rifle pits and fortified buildings in front of the village and wells of El
Teb. Graham, who estimated that the enemy numbered 6,000,
marched his formation to the right in the hope of turning the enemy’s
left but, by 11.20 a.m., his forces came under fire from the rifle pits and
two Krupp guns captured from Baker Pasha’s expedition. To Private
Morrison’s relief, the infantry were ordered to lie down while the
artillery and naval machine-guns returned fire and ‘soon silenced the
enemy, upsetting their guns. We continued to move steadily up to
them, fighting our way, and succeeded in capturing their guns, and our
artillery turning upon them soon made sad havoc.’21
Effectively the left face of the Yorks and Lancs, supported by Royal
Marines, composed the firing line, with the Gordons and Black Watch
on either flank. Private W. G. Martin, a Welsh Gordon Highlander,
described how they
started at a very slow rate. We halted in front of the first fort, where they
came down upon us in thousands, but we kept them at bay. The rebels
are a lot of brave men. They would come right up to the point of the bay-
onet when we were firing a storm of bullets into them, and they would
not retire, so they all fell by bayonet or shot.22
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In the ferocious combat, a young Dingwallian was mightily impressed
by the example of the senior officers: Baker Pasha was shot in the face
but required a ‘great deal of persuasion’ before he dismounted to get the
wound treated; Colonel Fred Burnaby was wounded in the arm but
killed 10 men with 20 shots; and Captain A. K. Wilson of the Hecla,
who would earn a VC, saved several lives and made ‘some dreadful
havoc’ among several Arabs with the hilt of his broken sword before
suffering a scalp wound.23
Close-range fire-power proved decisive as the soldiers and sailors
worked their way through the defensive position. Lieutenant Denne
(Gordons) testified to the ‘great stand’ made at a brick house and huge
iron boiler: ‘the niggars lay in heaps round it’, and, once inside the vil-
lage, ‘our infantry opened on them at close range & so did the Naval
Brigade guns’. Then the Mahdists ‘threw away their rifles’ and charged
with their spears: ‘Nothing stopped them till the hail of bullets &
machine guns floored them mostly at the feet of the front rank of the
square, one black hit thro’ the body came on & stabbed one of our men
in the face before being finally shot down.’24 Marling regarded the
Mahdists as ‘the pluckiest fellows I’ve ever seen’; Sergeant William
Danby (10th Hussars) agreed that ‘these Arabs are the most fierce,
brave, daring & unmerciful men in the world[,] they fear nothing, give
& expect no quarter . . .’.25 Having lost their gun emplacements, and
with the Krupp guns turned against them, Osman Digna’s forces grad-
ually withdrew.
Unlike what had been experienced at Tel-el-Kebir, a Mahdist with-
drawal was not a retreat, as the 10th and 19th Hussars soon discovered.
Denne watched the spectacle unfold as ‘amid loud cheering the cavalry
came round our right flank & charged’.26 He saw how the thick scrub
broke up the close-order formation, while the enemy crouched in the
bushes beneath the range of cavalry sabres and then used spears and
knives like billhooks to hamstring the horses before stabbing any
fallen troopers. ‘The cavalry lost very heavily’, he noted, a view con-
firmed by Trooper Stream:
We had a pretty hard fight at Teb with the blacks. We had a charge, both
regiments that are here. The ground was very bad; we could not see
where we were going to properly. When we got into their village, they
were down in holes, and we could not reach them with our swords. As
we went over them they cut the horses down and there was no chance
for anyone whose horse fell. 27
Major Percy H. S. Barrow (19th Hussars), who was severely wounded
by a spear, nevertheless wrote about his ‘glorious luck’: after Lieu-
tenant-Colonel A. G. Webster’s wing had become separated, and his
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own wing became the first line, ‘and still better came upon a large mass
of the enemy. The leader of the 1st line was not long in communicat-
ing his views to the Brigadier [who] you may be sure [was] not long in
preparing for attack. There was no hurry or confusion. When we did go
the men rode straight and well and deserve all the credit that they have
received.’28
In several charges the cavalry lost 20 killed and 48 wounded (out of
a total of 30 killed and 142 wounded). Danby’s twelve-man section fol-
lowed a ‘mad order’ to gallop back amidst ‘an enemy 400 strong’ and
recover 6 fallen troopers (2 of whom died and another 2 required ampu-
tations). The sight of mutilated corpses inflamed passions further,
notably the stripped corpse of Major M. M. Slade (10th Hussars) with
‘about 30 wounds from spears . . . & all his fingers broken to get his
rings off’.29 Thereafter, explained Marling, ‘We shot or bayonetted [sic]
all wounded as it was not safe to leave them as they knifed everyone
they could reach.’30 Overall Denne regarded the three-and-a-half-hour
battle as ‘a very tough job much worse in my opinion than our great Tel
el Kebir . . .’.31
He was much less impressed by the subsequent advance on Tokar (1
March), which was entered without a shot being fired:
The General made an ass of himself by having a sort of triumphal march
with some cavalry round the town . . . It is just the sort of bunkum I
should expect of him. The relief of Tokar was in fact all humbug, we were
too late, the place had fallen & the guns been carried off. The enemy &
Egyptians had been living on friendly terms inside together till we came
up, when the enemy bolted & our friend the Egyptian remained as there
was nothing to be afraid of in us . . . I imagine that the fact of our having
been too late to really relieve the place will be hushed up.32
Graham, nonetheless, had accomplished his mission. He had safely
evacuated 600 Egyptian men, women and children from the garrison to
Trinkitat and buried the dead, not only the British and some 2,000
dervish dead at El Teb33 but the decomposed bodies of the Europeans
from the previous battle (an exhausting and nauseating burial detail
undertaken by half of the Black Watch). He withdrew all his forces
safely and, by 6 March, had the first of his units sailing for Suakin. For
the next four days the soldiers worked from morning to night, unload-
ing all their vessels at Suakin in temperatures that reached 110 degrees
Fahrenheit in the shade.34
Graham now planned to advance on Osman Digna’s camp at Tamai
some 16 miles from Suakin, with 2 squares of infantry and 12 guns (116
officers and 3,216 men), supported by cavalry and mounted infantry (41
officers and 696 men). Major-Generals Davis and Buller commanded
the two infantry brigades, and the force as a whole was to undertake
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short marches (to limit the risk of sunstroke) and to protect itself by
constructing zarebas (defensive perimeters about 4-feet high and 6-feet
deep made out of mimosa bush) whenever it halted. Graham chose the
Black Watch to lead the advance on 10 March, but on the previous day
publicly rebuked the battalion for its purported ‘unsteadiness’ at El
Teb, both its ‘wild firing’ and then its failure to cease fire when ordered.
He declared that the battalion would be able to restore its reputation
by its advanced position on the line of march. Captain Andrew Scott-
Stevenson was ‘astonished’ by the speech and appalled by its demoral-
ising effect; Bandsman Barwood was surprised that a mutiny did not
follow, especially as the general closed the canteen after his speech: ‘we
did not deserve it’, he added.35
The travails of the Black Watch persisted on the march, where over
fifty men fell out with exhaustion and sunstroke on the first day and
the column had to wait until the stragglers were brought in. At ‘Baker’s
zareba’ where they were due to bivouac overnight, a carelessly tossed
match caused a bush fire that had to be extinguished with coats and
kilts. The Highlanders then constructed a large zareba for the follow-
ing convoy that Graham condemned as too large and so they had to
begin again. Barwood explained that they
had to use nothing but green bush, as the black ones caught fire, being
too dry; it was no easy job to get all green bush. After a good deal had been
cut, we were given a rope which we had to tie to staples in the ground;
besides this, we had to fill numbers of bags with sand and attach them to
the rope, which was reeved into the bush . . . and then bury the bags in
the earth with the rope round them, so that the bush could not be pulled
away.36
After the remainder of the column reached the zareba on the fol-
lowing day, the advance was resumed on 12 March. Officers and men
were issued with one pint of water each, which had been brought up
from Suakin on camels and ‘smelt horribly’.37 They marched another 7
miles until they reached a slight hill within range of the enemy’s camp,
where they built another zareba and replied to enemy shelling and
rifle-fire with fire from their 9-pounders and Gardner machine-guns.
During the overnight bivouac men were issued with rum, and when
Barwood found his ‘fighting chum . . . insensibly drunk’, he ‘had an
awful bother to get him to lie still and hold his tongue’.38 The officers
had other refreshments, with Scott-Stevenson, his subaltern and Cap-
tain Rolfe (RN), consuming two magnums of champagne.39
On 13 September, after the cavalry and mounted infantry had
located the enemy masses, possibly 9,000 in number, Graham
launched his attack at 8.30 a.m., with the 2nd Brigade (Black Watch,
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Yorks and Lancs, Naval Brigade and Marines), screened by Abyssinian
scouts, moving in advance of the 1st Brigade. Within half-an-hour the
Hadendowa were fiercely engaging the scouts at the edge of a gully, and
so Graham, who had assumed command from Davis, ordered the Black
Watch to charge. The regiment, still smarting from his previous
rebuke, responded with alacrity, but the ensuing engagement proved a
disaster, as graphically recounted by Captain Scott-Stevenson, whose
original letter has survived, as well as many anonymous, abbreviated
and carefully edited or paraphrased versions in various newspapers.40
Scott-Stevenson explained how Graham had failed to order the
Yorks and Lancs to charge and so a gap quickly opened on the right-
hand corner of the square. On reaching the edge of the gully, the Black
Watch, realised that the Hadendowa had cleared their front and were
working their way round towards the right. Enfilade fire had only lim-
ited effect because the ‘smoke was too awful’ and the guns never came
into action, so enabling the Arabs to pour through the gap and attack
the Black Watch from the rear. Regimental survivors confirmed that a
ferocious hand-to-hand combat followed; several guns, though locked,
fell into the hands of the enemy as their naval officers perished; and
‘victory’, as Sergeant Connan claimed, ‘seemed to hang in the bal-
ance’.41 Much of Scott-Stevenson’s prose proved too lurid for publica-
tion. ‘My trusty claymore’, he wrote, ‘found its way to the hilt into
several black devils. I clove a piece out of one of their heads just as one
does an egg for breakfast & saw his white brain exposed. I was mad
with rage and fury. . . I fought like a demon & only wanted to kill, kill,
kill these awful plucky demons.’42 Another soldier commented more
dispassionately on the retreat of the broken square:
Our men fought as well as they could, but were too crowded. The square
now collapsed into a mass, with the Marines lumped in the middle, and
the 65th and 42nd, on the right and left flanks respectively, moving
slowly back – the outside men nearest the enemy turning to fire and bay-
onet as best they could . . . The enemy had never surrounded the square,
but persistently pushed it back in front and flanks – a form of tactics
most favourable for their object of keeping us crowded up, narrowed, and
unable to use our weapons.43
As the broken square lurched 800 yards backwards, Denne depre-
cated the effects on the other brigade, especially the Egyptian camel
drivers who mounted their animals and fled. ‘The correspondents’, he
added, ‘were no better as they legged it to a man, several were stopped
by the cavalry but two got straight into Suakin without drawing rein &
one [Cameron] went to the admiral [Sir W. Hewett] with news of the
annihilation of one square’.44 In fact, dismounted fire from the cavalry
and mounted infantry assisted in dispersing the Arabs on the left flank
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of the retreating square, while case shot from Major Holley’s battery on
the right followed by enfilade fire from Buller’s Brigade, once it had
warded off an assault on itself, proved decisive on the right. ‘Our
square’, wrote Denne,
stood well all the time & bowled over the niggers in style without letting
them get up close . . . I thought when I saw the square coming back it was
all over & it was Isandula over again, but the second square not being
moved at all by the attack saved us in my opinion.45
Davis’s square was able to reform, recapture the guns and advance
with the 1st Brigade to seize Osman Digna’s camp by about 11.40 a.m.
Once the brigades moved on to the offensive and crossed the gully,
there was little resistance, save from the flanks, and the camp was
almost unoccupied when taken. An estimated 2,000 of the enemy died,
though the British casualties were relatively heavy, with over 100
killed and about the same number wounded.46 The Black Watch had
the largest number of killed and wounded (61 and 33, respectively), and
some of the wounded had horrendous cuts to their legs. Many of their
survivors blamed Graham, and most regimental comrades agreed: ‘The
Black Watch’, noted Marling, ‘were very bitter about Graham, and who
can blame them?’47 Scott-Stevenson blamed Graham, and also asked, in
another unpublished aside: ‘Who is to blame for this[?] I wish old Glad-
stone had been in that square.’48
After burning Osman Digna’s camp, Graham withdrew his force to
Suakin. Thereafter he launched some minor reconnaissance operations
to Handub (10 miles north-west of Suakin), Otao (a further 8 miles
westwards) and into the Tamanieb valley. On 25 March, he led his two
brigades against an enemy force at Tamanieb, dispersing the Mahdists
and burning the village (with the medical officers inconvenienced
mainly by the number of men succumbing to the heat – 50 within a
mile of Suakin and another 130 during the remainder of the opera-
tion).49 The futility of these actions was all too obvious: Marling reck-
oned: ‘We ought really to go right across by the desert route to help
Gordon, but old Gladstone, they say, won’t let us, or buy sufficient
camels.’50 On returning to Suakin (29 March), Graham was ordered to
close the campaign, and, apart from leaving two battalions to assist in
garrisoning the town, embarked the remainder of his force on 3 April.
Soldiers left the Sudan impressed by the enemy, if not the outcome
of the campaign. Major Robert Coveny, a Black Watch veteran of the
Asante and Egyptian campaigns, claimed: ‘I never saw such fellows to
fight as those Hadendowa Arabs; they know not what fear is in most
cases.’51 Another soldier graphically described their fearsome appear-
ance at the battle of Tamai: ‘The half-naked black savages, having
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heads huge with lumps of woolly hair on end upwards and sideways,
brandishing their spears and curved sticks used as shields and clubs,
dancing madly behind the retreating square looked through the smoke
like real demons.’52 Several officers, including Scott-Stevenson and
Graham, also recognised the tactical finesse of these warriors – their
ability to use the ground and the cover of smoke to creep up close and
then attack the corners as the weakest part of square formations.53
While soldiers grumbled over the issue of medals – restricted to
those who had not previously served in Egypt, and those with Egyptian
medals received only clasps –54 most were glad to leave the Sudan.
Although they had avoided being lured into the desert and had twice
defeated Osman Digna’s forces, the Mahdists remained in Sinkat, com-
manded the route to Berber and reoccupied Tokar. Understandably, sol-
diers dwelt less on the strategic implications of the campaign than the
experience itself. A Fifer wrote:
For Britain’s honour we have fought,
And suffer’d heat, fatigue, and toil;
Defeated Osman’s swarthy host,
And made them quick disgorge their spoil.
While for companions loved we mourn,
Struck down by roving Arab’s spear;
To Britain we will glad return,
From Afric’s deserts, dry and dear.55
Characteristically, Denne was much more blunt: ‘everyone is heartily
sick of this useless waste of life to bolster up government & hopes we
are to have no more’.56 Ironically, even Gladstone admitted privately
that the military operations round Suakin were a great mistake, and
the ever-sceptical Baring agreed that the political and military out-
comes were hardly commensurate with the lives and resources
expended.57
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From the outset of Gordon’s mission doubts existed about whether it
was an advisory or an executive role, about what Gordon could accom-
plish once appointed governor-general of the Sudan and about what
would happen if his life became endangered. Whatever Gordon’s
motives,1 he felt compelled to remain in Khartoum and the Govern-
ment dared not order him to withdraw. As the Mahdist siege tightened,
so the question of whether to relieve Gordon, an ‘icon of his age’,
became a matter of press, parliamentary and cabinet debate. Gladstone
still opposed any ‘forward’ policy from Egypt, described the Sudanese as
‘a people struggling to be free and they are struggling rightly to be free’,
and dreaded the risks, costs and long-term implications of a relief expe-
dition. Only at the beginning of August 1884 did he relent (primarily to
avert resignations from his cabinet) and approve the moving of a vote
of credit for a relief mission.2 Thereafter the Government endorsed the
plans of Wolseley and his Red River veterans for an expedition up the
Nile (1,650 miles) as a purportedly less expensive, less risky and less
difficult option than constructing a railway from Suakin to Berber (over
280 miles), with another 200 miles upstream to Khartoum.3
The ensuing expedition involved the despatch of 9,000 men and
40,000 tons of stores and munitions up the Nile.4 On 9 September
Wolseley arrived in Cairo with plans to send his soldiers by train and
steamer to Wadi Halfa, then south of the second cataract by specially
designed whale-boats. By Christmas he had sufficient forces at Korti to
send a desert column mounted on camels and horses across the Bayuda
Desert and a river column in 200 whale-boats, supported by mounted
troops, up the Nile. Despite failing to relieve Gordon, who was killed
in the storming of Khartoum (26 January 1885), Wolseley’s forces
remained in the Sudan until mid-summer, while Graham commanded
another 13,000 soldiers in operations near Suakin (March–May 1885).
After the withdrawal of both forces, residual units remained on the
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Egyptian–Sudanese border, where they periodically engaged the
Mahdists, notably at the battle of Ginnis (30 December 1885).
The protracted hostilities afforded many opportunities for letter-
writing for the large number of soldiers involved. A ‘Camel Grenadier’
even wrote while riding on top of his camel as the ‘difficult feat’ pre-
vented ‘drowsiness’ and distracted attention from saddle sores!5 Some
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doubted that letters would evade the attacks on the mails,6 while Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Philip H. Eyre (1/South Staffordshires), and perhaps
others, saw little point in sending informative letters as ‘crowds’ of
correspondents were present ‘and no doubt every move is reported’.7
Difficulties, though, bedevilled the despatch of all news from the front
and so letters, if not too tardy, were generally welcome (and much
more extensively reported than the seven cited by Emery).8
The expeditionary force, including a Naval Brigade, travelled slowly
up the Nile by rail and Thomas Cook steamers, either carried or towed
by the latter, covering the 793 miles to Wadi Halfa in about three
weeks. Soldiers had ample time to gaze at the fertile country alongside
the river (and the barren rock and sand hills between Shellal and Wadi
Halfa), to barter with villagers and Greek traders for supplements to
their diet of hard biscuits and preserved meat, and to write diaries and
letters (some – to girls in Cairo – which were clearly not for publica-
tion).9 They watched out for crocodiles, marvelled at the temples and
ancient ruins, and some, like Telegrapher H. Emmerson, described the
beauty of the Nile sunsets: ‘As the sun dies away behind the yellow
sand hills, the sky seems broken up into a veritable rainbow, the
colours blending together splendidly, and the effect, once seen,
remains vividly impressed on anyone for a lifetime.’10
Wadi Halfa, as Emmerson observed, became ‘the headquarters of the
Ordnance and Commissariat, and all stores for the front are made up
and despatched from here’,11 but the railway track and rolling stock
along the 33 miles to Sarras were not fully serviceable until mid-
November (when two trains completed the journey on a daily basis).
This slowed all movement, requiring boats to be hauled through the
second cataract or carried round the rapids. The delays and damage suf-
fered by so many boats (by 22 November sappers had overhauled 450
whalers12) meant that the advance upstream did not commence until 2
November.
Soldiers were delighted to leave Sarras – ‘an awful place’ where, as a
Royal West Kent officer recalled, ‘the duststorms and heat were fear-
ful’.13 They travelled in 30-foot whalers, each of which could carry ten
fully equipped soldiers and a crew of two, later reduced to eight soldiers
and a Canadian voyageur.14 Each boat carried a prodigious weight in
stores and rations – ‘a little under 7,000 lbs.’ in the first sapper boats to
leave Sarras; ‘about two tons of provisions, besides personal baggage’ in
boat No. 785 carrying Lance-Corporal W. Cook (2/Essex); and ‘over 700
cases of provisions, varying in weight from 10 to 64 lbs’, besides rations
for fifteen days, in a West Kent boat. The West Kent officer added: ‘The
boat’s gunwale when loaded is within a foot – in some cases less – of
[sic] the water.’15
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The boats travelled in groups of 4–5 and had to be hauled over vari-
ous rapids (particularly the 7 major and many minor obstacles between
the second and third cataracts). Cook recalled:
Whenever we came to the cataracts we had to unload our boats and carry
the provisions about a mile, and sometimes more. Then we had to go
back and pull our boats over. We had to unload and do this eight times
altogether. To get the boats over the cataracts we had to use a very long
rope, and it took as many as 50 men to pull one boat over. Sometimes
each boat took an hour to get over.16
Many soldiers found the work exhausting even when assisted in the
portage by West African Kroomen. They travelled quite quickly in
their whalers over the long stretches of clear water (the first sapper
boats covered the 42 miles south of Dongola in less than 48 hours), and
companies raced each other, seeking the £100 prize offered by Wolse-
ley for the fastest boat to Debbeh.17 Yet the stresses involved in hitting
rocks, running aground or crossing rapids were all too memorable.
After a day spent hauling his boat, Bandsman Barwood felt ‘quite
exhausted, my hands cut and blistered, wet through all day, scarcely
any clothes whole, and my feet and legs also cut’.18
The work was frustrating and dangerous, too. Quite apart from the
riverine hazards of cataracts, rapids, rocks, sandbanks and unpre-
dictable currents, ‘the boats’ seemed to one officer ‘absurdly unfit for
their rough work and usage, being very fragile’.19 They suffered broken
rudders and holes from rocks, some capsized, and a handful broke up –
all adding to the strains, delays and dangers of the expedition.
Although remarkably few were seriously damaged, and relatively few
men drowned,20 the perception of danger was acute, particularly
between the second and third cataracts. As a West Kent officer
remarked: ‘It is a great responsibility feeling one’s way up a dangerous
river, with little or no knowledge of it, and with men in the boat some
of whom don’t know the stern from the bow.’21
The Camel Corps, comprising volunteers formed into Guards,
Heavy, Light and Mounted Infantry Camel Regiments, represented the
fastest means of reaching Khartoum. Most of these forces, inexperi-
enced in camel-riding, had ridden their animals from Wadi Halfa to
Dongola where they practised column formations, fighting dis-
mounted in squares and making bivouacs with their camels. A ‘Camel
Grenadier’ (almost certainly Lieutenant Count Gleichen) found the
journey from Wadi Halfa ‘dismally monotonous’ and distinctly
uncomfortable on saddles so broad that his legs formed an angle of 120
degrees when the camels were fully loaded. He learned about the ter-
rain that was composed of hard, often gravelly, sand – ‘capital’ for walk-
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ing but so undulating that guardsmen often ‘had to dismount’ to lead
their animals. He also found that camels’ powers of endurance were
distinctly limited (his own animal got ‘a sore back after four days’,
needed water after ‘five consecutive days’, required ‘a vigorous appli-
cation of the koorbash’ before it would run ‘more than 250 yards at a
time’ and, in walking, never exceeded ‘two and a half miles per hour’).22
After an outbreak of smallpox at Dongola, Brigadier-General Sir Her-
bert Stewart led his mounted forces on to Korti where they ren-
dezvoused with other elements of the Camel Corps. The latter
included the 1/Royal Sussex, which had been a leading unit through-
out the expedition, building forts at Dongola and Debbeh, and now at
Korti, which Captain Lionel Trafford characterised as a ‘hot dirty
place’.23 Those soldiers who spent a memorable Christmas at Korti
(where imaginative puddings were made from ground biscuit, goat’s
milk and dates) soon found the location increasingly unhealthy. By 4
January a dragoon reckoned that 14–15 of the Camel Corps had already
died at the base,24 and, after a month at Korti, Private F. Daykin (18th
Hussars) wrote: ‘We are getting tired of this place, as it is very
unhealthy, and the poor fellows are dying every day. It seems so sad to
see such fine, strong fellows put under the sands of the desert in a blan-
ket.’25 By arriving relatively late at Korti, the Naval Brigade avoided
these concerns but sailors had barely a week (and in some cases only a
couple of days) to practise their camel-riding.26
On 30 December Stewart marched with a convoy of 1,000 soldiers,
200 natives and 2,000 camels to establish a forward base at Gakdul
Wells, halfway across the Bayuda Desert, and then returned with the
camels to bring forward the remainder of the Camel Corps. The time-
wasting double trip, necessitated by the failure of Wolseley’s staff to
procure sufficient camels, left Corporal F. H. Middleton unimpressed:
‘we returned . . . to Korti’, he wrote, ‘marching 182 miles in 126 hours
– very good marching for camels; not much time for sleeping, I can tell
you’.27 Even worse was their first experience of the Bayuda Desert. Sol-
diers may have begun their marches ‘in the highest spirits’, buoyed by
the novelty of riding camels and ‘the expectation of seeing some hard
fighting’, as Trafford averred,28 but their accounts dwelt on the
‘appalling’ heat and ‘terrible’ sandstorms.29 During the marches to
Gakdul Wells, a Bradford soldier recalled ‘suffering for four days for
want of water’ (the allowance was 2 pints of water per day),30 while an
officer noted that the salt meat became ‘very trying’ in these condi-
tions: ‘it parches the lips and tongue. Some men’s lips are quite blue.’31
Once revived at Gakdul Wells, Stewart resumed his advance on 14
January with some 1,800 soldiers, 350 natives, 2,900 camels, 150
ponies and three 7-pounder guns. After two days, they encountered a
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large ansar (Mahdist army) about 3 miles from Abu Klea Wells.
Bivouacking within a zareba overnight, they endured an evening of
long-range rifle-fire and enemy drumming. Although few men and ani-
mals were killed or wounded,32 the experience was remembered as ‘not
very pleasant’, ‘very unpleasant’, even as ‘a night of terror’ by Private
Harry Etherington (1/Royal Sussex).33
At mid-morning on 17 January, Stewart left his baggage under guard
in the zareba and advanced on Abu Klea. Trafford recalled how indi-
vidual commanders, in the absence of any formal orders, had to send
out skirmishers to protect their flanks and criticised the square as
unbalanced and poorly aligned, with the rear face constantly broken by
camels. Shortly after noon they reached the crest of a ridge and saw ‘a
sea of standards’ as the ansar launched an assault on the left front,
where the mounted infantry, once their skirmishers had retreated,
responded with volley-firing.34 The Mahdists wheeled off to attack and
penetrate the rear corner where the Heavy Cavalry had broken forma-
tion, a naval machine-gun became exposed (with the Gardner jam-
ming) and only a mass of camels blocked the enemy. Middleton
claimed that the ‘Cavalry on left face, Horse Guards, etc., made awk-
ward infantry men’, and Gunner Dixon asserted that Colonel Burnaby,
though ‘very brave and cool . . . exposed himself too much. If he had
kept within the square he would not have been killed.’35 The confusion
became ‘terrible’, recalled Trafford, when the Heavy Cavalry ‘retreated
back to their proper place & came on the top of our men with the Arabs
on the top of them’, and the shooting of the ‘Heavies’ was ‘very wild’.36
Yet the square reformed and discipline held as the rear ranks turned
about: ‘For about ten minutes’, wrote Marling, ‘it was touch and go, but
we beat them off & every nigger who got inside was killed. Our loss
was very heavy, 9 officers and 66 men killed, 9 officers and 72
wounded.’37 Trafford was mightily impressed by the ‘glorious sight’ of
the Arab charge: ‘one thought they were charging to certain death yet
they not only reached the square but punctuated it’. Even when forced
to retire by superior fire-power, they retreated not by running but by
‘swaggering off’. Trafford was confident, nonetheless, that ‘Gordon was
as good as saved’.38
When soldiers reached the muddy water of the Abu Klea Wells, they
spent an exhausting twenty-four hours, building defences, deepening
wells, bringing forward the wounded and baggage, and filling water
skins for the final advance to the Nile. Leaving another 100 Royal
Sussex to guard the wounded, the march resumed at sunset, with many
men sleeping in their saddles as they rode through the night. On the
following morning confusion reigned: ‘those on quick camels’, noted
Trafford, had ‘got to the front, while those on slow animals [were] in
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the rear’.39 As cavalry scouts detected another ansar gathering ahead,
Stewart halted the corps under enemy fire near the village of Abu Kru
(Gubat). Middleton laconically observed: ‘Made a zareba, and stayed in
it till two officers, one correspondent [Cameron], one conductor, and
eight men were killed, and the general wounded [mortally]. Thought it
was time to go out then.’40
Sir Charles Wilson, RE, assuming command from Stewart, left the
Hussars, Naval Brigade, Royal Artillery and half the ‘Heavies’ to guard
the zareba, and ordered an advance towards the river (under the execu-
tive command of Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Edward Boscawen) in a
slow, tight, square formation. When the ansar charged the front face it
met, as Middleton described, ‘a beautiful little square this time; all
infantry. Received charge without a wave in any flank. Enemy fell like
rotten sheep. Glorious time. Fight over by sunset, 19th inst., no moon,
marched on to river, about half a mile in the dark, rather dangerous pro-
ceedings, but had to be done.’41 Half of the ‘Heavies’ had served in the
rear face, but the engagement was over in five minutes and none of the
Arabs got within 50 yards of the square.
There was immense relief at reaching the Nile after three days with-
out a proper meal for the men, eight days without water for the camels
and 56 hours without water for the ponies of the 19th Hussars. The
remainder of the column was brought forward on 20 January; but the
wounded, as Marling remarked, had ‘an awfully bad time of it, most of
them lying on the ground without any covering at all’.42 Despite
Wilson’s abortive attack on Metemmeh (21 January) – a ‘disgracefully
mismanaged’ affair in Marling’s opinion43 – hopes revived with the
appearance of four steamers, packed with soldiers, from Khartoum. To
the delight of one soldier, they had brought a message from Gordon
‘saying he is quite well and can hold out till we get to him’.44
Once two vessels, the Bordein and the Talahawiyeh, were made
ready (24 January), Wilson commanded a relief force of 240 soldiers,
mainly Gordon’s black Sudanese but including 24 Royal Sussex. Traf-
ford noted that they followed Wolseley’s orders and wore red serge
jackets, in keeping with his belief that a small body of British troops
(albeit 1,500 in number) would overawe the ansar and raise the siege.45
Optimism persisted despite encountering rifle-fire within a couple of
days, and then capturing an Arab who claimed that Khartoum had
fallen and they would have to pass a fort with sixteen guns: ‘We only
laughed at him’, recalled a sailor, ‘and thought he was trying to frighten
us . . .’.46 However, on 28 January, spirits plummeted when Khartoum
was sighted without an Egyptian flag flying, and, in the subsequent
withdrawal under enemy fire, the Talahawiyeh foundered in the sixth
cataract and the Bordein hit a rock, leaving Wilson’s force stranded on
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an island. After a small boat, under Captain Gascoigne’s command, left
to seek assistance, a sailor commented: ‘You may picture our position
– twenty-three of us all told on an island, with two hundred niggers
whom we could not trust, and some of the Mahdi’s men on the main-
land on either side of us. Two or three times we abandoned hope.’47
After three days a crippled steamer appeared, under the command of
Lord Charles Beresford, and, after repairing its boiler, carried Wilson’s
force to safety.
Meanwhile on 28 December advance elements of the river column
began their journey up the Nile to establish a base at Hamdab, 40 miles
from Korti. During the following month sappers built a fort and
resumed their boat-repairing duties as the remainder of the column
under the command of Major-General William Earle gradually fol-
lowed in boats, on foot, or by horse and camel. By 16 January Captain
J. E. Blackburn, RE, reported that the troops at Hamdab were ‘in first-
rate health and spirits’ as the daytime heat was tolerable, the nights
cool, and they had plentiful supplies of fresh meat, milk and Dhowra
meal which made ‘excellent porridge’.48 The camp was alive with
rumours, including one that the Naval Brigade had reached Khartoum:
‘I should not be the least surprised’, wrote Lieutenant-Colonel Coveny
(1/Black Watch), ‘to get the order to go back at any minute, because I
don’t think these people care to trifle with England’s power’.49
Once Earle had a reasonably balanced force at Hamdab (24 January),
he ordered the boats to tackle the fourth cataract, assisted by 400
Egyptian fellahin on the bank, and with a squadron of the 19th Hussars
and the Egyptian Camel Corps scouting ahead. Day after day of excru-
ciating effort followed as men hauled their boats over the rocks, rarely
rowing for more than a mile at a time. ‘For the most part’, wrote Black-
burn, ‘it was the same monotonous grind, walking over slippery and
sharp-pointed rocks or through deep sand, hauling on ropes, wading in
the water to get boats off the rocks, and, on getting into bivouac,
zeriba-making and cutting pathways and ramps up the steep banks to
allow of horses and camels getting down to the water’. The rate of
progress ‘was very slow – for some time not more than three miles a
day, due to the long column of boats and the necessity of getting all
into the same bivouac by nightfall – so that the head of the column
often halted about noon, the rear not reaching the same spot till night-
fall’.50
News of the desert column’s two actions hardly inspired confidence:
‘the loss’, asserted Denne, ‘is enormous over 21 p[er] c[ent] in the 2
actions and though a junction has been effected with Gordon’s steam-
ers, the desert force is practically shut up on the banks of the Nile’. He
regarded the loss of officers as ‘utterly disproportionate’ and suspected
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that ‘the British Public will begin to appreciate that it is not a mere
picnic’.51
After the leading boats reached the oasis of Berti, they halted unex-
pectedly (4–7 February) as Earle was informed of Khartoum’s fall. He
kept the news from his men but was subsequently ordered to resume
his advance. In seeking to save time, he despatched the 1/South
Staffordshires, 1/Black Watch and 19th Hussars across the desert
towards Abu Hamed, where their path was blocked by some 1,500
Mahdists, armed with Remington rifles and deployed on hills near the
village of Kirbekan. On 10 February Earle feigned a frontal assault with
two companies of the South Staffordshires and a couple of guns, while
the remainder of the battalion, dressed in red jackets, and six compa-
nies of Black Watch, in their kilts, and the Hussars moved round 
the ridge to its rear. ‘As we neared the enemy’s stronghold’, recalled
Corporal W. Walton (South Staffordshires), ‘bullets were showered
amongst us, and a lot of our men were killed or wounded before we
could return a single shot.’52 As the cavalry attacked the Mahdist camp,
the Black Watch seized a knoll from which it enfiladed the enemy and
covered any retreat to the river. The South Staffordshires, facing the
highest ridge, sent D company forward advancing by sections in
extended order with covering fire from other companies. When the
latter followed as reinforcements, we ‘charged the hill with a cheer’,
wrote Walton; ‘a hand-to-hand conflict ensued’, blood ran down the
hill in streams, ‘enough to sicken the heart of any man’, and it was
‘blow for blow, and stab for stab . . . They were brave men we fought
with.’53 An officer of the Black Watch described how his men marched
across open ground ‘as steadily as if on parade, notwithstanding the
heavy fire’, and then attacked the enemy’s flanks before the Mahdists
launched a charge: ‘nearly all were shot dead and the others were shot
as they tried to swim the river’. The Black Watch, with pipes playing,
fought on from rock to rock ‘against a most determined enemy’,54 and,
after six hours, the position was secured.
In the only action fought by the river column, the Mahdists suffered
between 200 and 700 dead whereas the column lost 3 British officers
and 9 men killed, with 4 officers and 44 men wounded.55 Once again
senior officers – Earle, Coveny and Eyre – were slain in battle. Brack-
enbury assumed command and moved the column on to a point 26
miles from Abu Hamed before being ordered to return downstream.
Soldiers greeted the order with ‘woeful disappointment’ as the men had
recently learned of Gordon’s death and were bent on revenge. They
rightly sensed that the dilapidated condition of the desert column had
confounded Wolseley’s hopes of moving on to Khartoum,56 and they
remained depressed despite the quicker journey down river. On 13
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March Private Robertson (Black Watch) asserted that ‘This has been an
awful sickener of a job . . . It is a great pity General Gordon being killed,
and so many fine officers. I suppose it would cause a great consterna-
tion at home. I don’t see what benefit is to be derived from this coun-
try. We all wish they would withdraw the troops from it altogether.’57
Feelings were as intense at Gubat when men received news of Khar-
toum’s fall and Gordon’s death. In a censored report Burleigh asserted:
‘On all sides, among officers and men, there was universal dismay and
indignation at the catastrophe’, and, less plausibly, that there ‘was no
question of politics about the state of feeling’.58 In fact, condemnation
of Gladstone and his Government was widespread from Wolseley
downwards,59 but, unlike Wolseley, the desert column could not dwell
on recriminations. It spent a month at Gubat, strengthening defences,
mounting raids, and periodically attacking Mahdist positions down-
river from a steamer. All these activities, as an officer of the 19th Hus-
sars wrote, were undertaken in ‘a state of glorious uncertainty’, bereft
of any mail from Korti or information from spies as the ‘country all
around is hostile’. Having ‘anxiously awaited’ Major-General Buller,
the desert column’s spirits revived with his arrival on 11 February and
his prompt decision to withdraw in the face of a resurgent enemy.60
Chronically short of camels, he had to order the jettisoning of many
stores into the river and allow the commissariat to distribute portable
‘luxuries such as cocoa, condensed milk, brandy, soups, an innumer-
able other things’ to the troops.61
A convoy of the sick and wounded preceded the main body of 1,700
men, mostly on foot, in the slow, hazardous march across the desert.
Harassed by skirmishers, the column struggled on to Abu Klea and
Gakdul Wells, with several of the wounded, including Stewart, dying
en route. At Gakdul they formed another ‘sick convoy’ for the last 104
miles, with the two doctors bringing a ‘spade, pick, and shovel as part
of their hospital gear’. The commanding officer had 20 dismounted
hussars and 300 native auxiliaries to convey 26 stretcher cases, mainly
amputees, and another 20–30 officers, ‘more or less seedy, riding
camels’. He described how the auxiliaries sometimes ‘flatly refused to
carry the wounded when they considered they had done enough; they
were always shouting out for water . . . and the row they made carry-
ing the wounded, which were all the worst cases, was just about cal-
culated to finish most of them off. They dropped two poor fellows out
of the stretchers.’ Yet the convoy suffered only a single fatality and
reached Korti after seven days.62 By 16 March the main column arrived
in a miserable state. A Scots Guardsman recalled:
Every man had bad boots; some had no tops to them, while most had
soles worn through; some marching with their feet outside their boots,
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while others . . . contrived to make a pair of sandals . . . Our trousers were
almost as bad, all patched over with red and yellow leather.63
Soldiers sent many letters thereafter, chronicling their exploits in
the field, alluding to promotions for gallant conduct (Middleton was
raised from corporal to lance-sergeant), and comforting the families of
fallen comrades. Sergeant G. Baker (5th Lancers) wrote a poignant
letter to Mrs Lovell about her son:
[H]e and I joined the regiment about the same time, and ever since we
have been chums. We drilled together, and were made corporals together;
in fact, we have been close friends since he joined till the day of his death.
He was next to me all the battle till he was struck, and I can assure you
there was no one who felt his death so much as I did. I lost a true friend
and comrade.64
Meanwhile General Graham received instructions to destroy the
forces of Osman Digna near Suakin and facilitate the construction of
the Suakin–Berber railway line. He was given a substantial and well-
balanced force of 13,000 men, with battalions at full strength, a cavalry
brigade, balloon section and colonial contingents from India and New
South Wales. He had equally impressive support – hospital ships, ves-
sels able to condense 85,000 gallons of water daily, and 6,000 baggage
and 500 riding-camels. Camp sites had to be found for this multitude
outside the cramped and unhealthy confines of Suakin. ‘Sanitary
arrangements’, as Surgeon Porter noted in his journal, ‘governed the
siting of the regimental camps, on dry sandy ridges’ running out from
Suakin. They were sufficiently elevated to benefit from the fresh sea
breezes and to avoid both marsh fever near the coast and sandstorms in
the desert; but ‘these positions were inadequate for defence against
incursions of a bold and predatory enemy’.65
Night after night Osman Digna’s forces, in small groups, attacked
the scattered camps, by-passing the guards and arc lamps to hack and
kill soldiers asleep in their tents. Newly arrived units were particularly
vulnerable (the Australians suffered on their arrival in late March just
as the 1/Berkshires had done in early February) and the attacks had  a
demoralising effect. One soldier recalled being awakened by forty
Sudanese rushing through the camp: their yell ‘was something terrible
– fairly froze the blood in one’s veins. As our other tents faced us, we
could not fire on them, so stood back to back with fixed swords . . .’.
Later he had to treat the victims: ‘one had his arm almost cut off’ and
later died; another ‘had his stomach laid open, and half his head
dragged off’.66 Fortifying the camps with ditches, earthworks and bas-
tions helped, but alerts frequently occurred and, amidst the confusion,
crossfire was a recurrent hazard. By mid-March an officer recognised
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that the camps, though ‘too far apart for mutual protection’, were ‘near
enough to cause reciprocal damage’. He reckoned that 2,000 men ‘were
on guard every night, and what with fatigue duties all day we are nearly
worked off our legs. The thermometer is eighty-seven degrees in the
tents at night.’67
Even before Graham arrived in Suakin British forces had responded
to the nightly raids, by reconnaissance actions and the burning of rebel
villages. In scattering the bands of tribesmen, Private Charles Williams
(1/Berkshires) boasted: ‘We will make the Soudanese rue the day they
killed poor Gordon’.68 Graham planned to engage the main body of
Osman Digna’s army, located in the area of Tamai and Hashin, advanc-
ing towards the latter on 20 March where he bivouacked overnight. On
the following morning the Beja tribesmen mounted a series of attacks
from the surrounding hills. They inflicted significant losses on the
Bengal Lancers: ‘as the horsemen rode lance in rest’, noted Porter, ‘the
Arab would suddenly fall prone, and as the lance missed would as sud-
denly spring up, hamstring the horse, and bring down the rider. In such
a case it was sudden death to our men.’69 However, the main squares of
Guards, Indian Native Infantry, Sikhs and Marines stood firm: ‘We shot
them [the arabs] down like dogs’, claimed a Coldstream Guardsman.70
In skirmishes lasting about nine-and-a-half hours, fire-power both
kept the tribesmen at a distance and dispersed them from their vantage
points overlooking the wells. Corporal Fred Bennett, (RE), described
how the gunners pounded the enemy from two hillside redoubts,
‘every shot except the first telling; and we could see the rebels leap into
the air and fall never to rise again’.71 Corporal R. Haslam (Medical Staff)
saw the ‘British rifle’ wreak ‘fearful havoc in that day’, and praised the
Berkshires, who worked with the Marines, to clear tribesmen from
ridge after ridge.72 The 5th Royal Irish Lancers dispersed some Arabs,
claiming thirty-two kills and prompting Private Francis Ferguson (20th
Hussars) to observe that ‘Lances are the best to charge with. A sword is
not the least bit of good with these fellows.’73 Soldiers lauded the brav-
ery of the enemy and their use of the bush, but not their marksman-
ship. The Berkshires had seized their summit, claimed one of their
officers, despite ‘a sharp fire’ from the enemy, ‘but luckily they are bad
shots . . . our casualties were only two wounded’.74 Ultimately
Graham’s force returned to its prepared zarebas, having lost 22 officers
and men killed (and 43 wounded) compared with estimates of enemy
losses ranging from 250 to 1,000 dead.75
On 22 March Major-General Sir John McNeill, VC, led two large
square formations from Suakin to create an advance depot for supplies
and water some 8 miles towards Tamai. Within one square he enclosed
some 1,400 transport animals laden with food, water and ammunition,
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numerous water-carts, and litters for the sick and wounded. This cum-
bersome baggage train struggled through the thick and prickly bush,
repeatedly breaking down and requiring frequent halts to reload the
pack animals. ‘Owing to the excessively rugged nature of the terrain’,
claimed Porter, ‘the thick sand cloud always round the column and the
mass of material to be covered, progress was necessarily slow.’76 Having
covered only 6 miles by noon, McNeill decided to halt and build a zareba
before dusk, planning three separate squares of mimosa bush, placed
diagonally like squares on a chess-board. The strategy would consume a
large amount of space and time in hostile country, involving the cre-
ation of a large central square to hold the stores, animals and water,
flanked by two squares to hold the fighting troops and machine-guns.
The defences were still incomplete, with groups of men either
having their dinner or collecting brush wood, when the Mahdists
launched their attack just after 2.30 p.m. As Captain C. Mackenzie
Edwards (Berkshires) recalled: ‘The whole rush was so sudden and
everything so quick that it was a miracle how any of us got together;
the cavalry videttes galloped through us with the enemy alongside.’77
While the picket lines held firm to the north and west, they crumbled
in the south: Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. L. Holman (Royal Marines)
asserted that the dervishes, who followed the 5th Lancers through the
lines of the 17th Bengal Native Infantry, ‘outnumbered and outflanked
the unfortunate Bengalis, who, firing wildly in the air, bolted’.78 With
camels, mules and horses stampeding amid clouds of dust, the tribes-
men penetrated the incomplete zarebas. Soldiers rallied in separate
squares, ‘more like a mass of men in any shape’, claimed Edwards, and
four companies of the Berkshires fought as a group outside the zare-
bas.79 ‘Steady and incessant fire’ prevailed, as Private Harold D.
Smithies (Royal Marines) observed, but not before many men and
camels were caught in the crossfire.80
In a battle lasting twenty minutes some 1,000 tribesmen died as
well as over 130 British and Indian soldiers and 150 drivers. Particular
groups suffered severely: sailors in the unfinished southern zareba,
who were attacked before their Gardner guns were ready; 81 engineers,
who had piled their arms while cutting bush, and were either caught in
the open or found their arms taken by others;82 and unarmed drivers
and bearers who had tried running back to Suakin. On the following
day an officer rode along the route, observing the ‘sickening’ sight and
the smell of their corpses: it was ‘a heavy butcher’s bill truly’, he
added.83 Osman Digna’s forces had paid an even heavier price and prof-
fered scant resistance when Graham’s army subsequently occupied and
destroyed the village of Tamai. The rebels, noted Smithies, ‘are begin-
ning to hang back . . . finding the British are too good for them’.84
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Nevertheless, some soldiers joined the critics of the Tofrik battle. ‘The
small skirmish at Hasheen was nothing compared to this’, wrote
Edwards. ‘Of course someone blundered or it c[oul]d. never have hap-
pened . . . the surprise sh[oul]d. never have occurred.’85 Surgeon E. H.
Finn hoped that Wolseley would see
what a disgracefully ignorant lot of Generals we have and withdraw us.
No expedition was ever commanded so badly or so many gross errors
made – the attack on the Zereba on the 22nd was entirely due to General
McNeil’s [sic] swaggering ignorance . . . General Graham is also a gigan-
tic failure & everybody is thoroughly disgusted. 86
Others defended McNeill, implying that the under-strength cavalry
vedettes should have eschewed their drill book and fired warning shots
while on horseback.87
Soldiers continued their dreary round of convoy duty (sometimes, if
the wind was favourable, with a reconnaissance balloon above), sink-
ing wells and felling trees for the railway line. As temperatures rose,
morale sagged: Lieutenant Francis Lloyd (Grenadier Guards) regarded
the long march to an evacuated Tamai as a ‘fiasco’ and reported wide-
spread scepticism that the railway to Berber would ever be completed.88
Those who had hoped to come ‘home smothered in glory’ were dis-
abused; instead convoys regularly passed and repassed the ‘sickening
scene’ near McNeill’s zareba, where hundreds of kites and vultures fed
on the ‘festering bodies of camels and mules’, and hands and feet lay
thick on the ground, ‘dragged from their graves’ by hyenas.89
The arrival of the New South Wales contingent in its first imperial
campaign aroused great interest. While most recognised the potential
significance of the deployment, and some described the contingent as
‘a fine body of men’, Lloyd rated its soldiers as ‘worse than any Volun-
teer regiment and [they] swagger more’. He deprecated their limited
musketry skills and general indolence.90 When not on duty, soldiers
sampled the dubious delights of Suakin, dubbed by Corporal Haslam,
as ‘about the dirtiest place in existence’. In the bazaar, a long narrow
street, ‘all kinds of vendors’ could be found, ‘most of them indulging in
opium smoking, the smell of which is enough to make one sick. Beer
is “only” 1s [5p] a quart, while wines and spirits are very “cheap”, and
quite as “nasty”.’91 Fortunately British soldiers were soon spared these
temptations: on 2 May, Wolseley arrived in Suakin to warn Graham
that the Government was now more concerned with events in
Afghanistan. On 17 May, Graham and his staff left Suakin and the
withdrawal from the Sudan was underway.
As the process in northern Sudan was phased over several months,
soldiers were none too sure when they would leave. ‘The summer
T H E  G O R D O N  R E L I E F  E X P E D I T I O N
[ 125 ]
chap 6  9/7/04  9:07 am  Page 125
occupation’, claimed a DCLI officer, ‘is very unpopular; all the troops
hate the prospect of it.’92 Soldiers and sailors complained about the
monotony of camp life, the misery of sheltering in bell tents when the
temperature soared to 120 degrees Fahrenheit, and the mounting toll of
sickness and death. Within five weeks of forming a camp at Kurot, an
officer reported 7 deaths from typhoid fever and 150 men sick. ‘It is a
disgrace’, he affirmed,
to keep us in such a fiendish country. Nothing can excuse it. The food is
bad, and we are still in rags . . . For God’s sake write about it, and get
other correspondents to take it up. They are generally the best friends the
troops have; and now they have gone, everything is concealed, and there
is no one to say a word for the soldiers.93
Even when soldiers returned to Cairo, they still grumbled: ‘For the last
two campaigns’, wrote Barwood, ‘the men have received no decora-
tions, and the bitter feeling among the men is something awful. They
have simply put two honours on one bar, what a mean thing to do . . .’.94
Despite all these complaints, when the soldiers faced lengthy
encampments, as the Cameron Highlanders did, they made the best of
it. Based at Korosko for ten months, the Highlanders spent the summer
building mud huts, playing games of cricket and football, and rowing
on the river. They enjoyed fresh bread and fresh meat ‘in abundance’,
formed their own theatrical company and enjoyed cordial relations
with the natives, many of whom liked the bagpipes, even if soldiers
were banned from entering any native village.95 In October 1885 the
battalion was sent upriver to occupy the small fort of Kosheh, the most
southerly frontier post protecting the 87-mile railway from Wadi Halfa
to Akasheh.
As Khalifa ’Abdullah, the Mahdi’s successor, had resolved to expel
this infidel presence and invade Egypt, he sent a large ansar (possibly
6,000 strong) northwards to invest Kosheh and a flying column to cut
the vulnerable railway. Hitherto the Camerons had patrolled the river
in a stern wheeler, the Lotus, but, by early December, Kosheh and the
other frontier posts came under sporadic attack. Parts of the rail track
were destroyed, the telegraph cut and villages like Firket briefly occu-
pied, prompting the despatch of flying columns from Akasheh to dis-
perse the tribesmen. Meanwhile as the Kosheh fort was effectively
besieged, the Camerons engaged enemy snipers, mounted sorties to
dislodge their marksmen (notably on 16 December), gathered intelli-
gence from spies and deserters, and supported counter-battery fire from
artillery and machine-guns.96 By 19 December, the enemy came so
close that officers ‘distinctly heard the dervish cry – weirdly it sounded
in the stillness of night – summoning the faithful to prayer’. By Christ-
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mas the battalion had lost three killed and nineteen wounded out of
the fort’s casualties of eight dead and twenty-five more or less severely
wounded.97
The Camerons had bought sufficient time for General Sir Frederick
Stephenson and Brigadier William Butler to bring two brigades, with
mounted support, into action. In a pre-dawn advance (30 December
1885) their forces extended round the Mahdist positions at Ginnis and
Kosheh before launching a massive bombardment. Ferguson, whose
20th Hussars protected the left flank and assisted the Egyptian Camel
Corps, recalled ‘the rattle of the Gatling & the volleys of the Infantry
& the Artillery & us firing’, it was ‘terrific at one time’.98 Six compa-
nies of Camerons (about 450 men), flanked by 150 Sudanese blacks,
launched the frontal attack on the village of Kosheh. One of the
Cameron officers recounted their delight at ending their ‘imprison-
ment’ and their desire to advance ‘at the double’ in a ‘thin red line’ (this
was the final action fought by British soldiers wearing red):
When the order was given to fix bayonets, the ready click and the fierce
determined look of the men unmistakably told of pent-up revengeful pas-
sion about to find an outburst. The thought of comrades killed and
wounded like rabbits in a warren during all those harassing days in the
fort worked with revengeful fierceness in the mind of each . . . I had seen
the same set teeth, flushed cheeks, and wild glare in the eyes of the men
on the 16th December when they shot, bayonetted, and madly re-bayo-
netted the marksmen and others on the Rock.
The officer felt thwarted when the enemy retreated to the houses:
‘there was now nothing for it but attack the houses from loop-holes . . .
It was nasty work. There was a good many inside, and it was a desper-
ation stand with them.’99 The Sudanese blacks cleared ‘the Rock’ and
cover close to the river, and so: ‘When we met in the rear of the houses,
and had captured the enemy’s guns, we gave them a cheer to which
they lustily responded. It was a strange but hearty comradeship in
arms.’100
Overwhelming fire-power, and Butler’s adroit manoeuvring of the
brigades and camel corps, had produced a decisive outcome. After three
hours the ansar was in full retreat, leaving 500 dead and 300 wounded
compared with British losses of 7 killed and 30 wounded. The victors,
all of whom were entitled to the Egyptian medal and the Khedive’s star,
had thwarted the immediate threat of invasion and so facilitated the
final withdrawal from the Sudan.101 This process took several months
until the fortification of Wadi Halfa, the new frontier outpost, was
completed. Meanwhile British soldiers felt immensely frustrated about
the outcome of the relief expedition. If they were less critical of Wolse-
ley’s planning and staff system than some historians have been,102
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many felt that their mission had begun too late, and that they had
struggled up the Nile and defeated the Mahdi’s forces in several battles
to little effect. These frustrations were felt most keenly by those left
on the frontier. By 24 January, when over 200 men were in hospital
with dysentery and typhoid fever, at least one officer, uncertain about
the future, complained:
Alas, alas, it looks like another summer in Halfa with its accompanying
plagues of dust, heat, flies, and smells. After near a year and a half one
gets very sick at the thought of a further prolonged residence . . . Oh, why
did we ever meddle in Arabi? Oh, that the bondholders had been left to
burn their fingers. As for danger to the Suez Canal there never was aught
to be apprehended.103
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Several African campaigns did not involve skirmishes, sieges, battles
or engagements of any significance. Whereas the British Army had to
mount offensives and seek rapid, decisive military outcomes to dis-
perse and demoralise its enemies (while minimising its own logistic
burdens and likely losses from sickness and disease),1 African adver-
saries responded to these offensives in different ways. If facing over-
whelming odds, they sometimes avoided engagement and opted for
manoeuvre (or even complete dispersal), luring the British and their
auxiliaries across an inhospitable landscape and leaving them tired,
thirsty and despondent. Inevitably these expeditions attracted less
attention at home, especially if they coincided with major campaigns
elsewhere – as happened to the Bechuanaland expedition (1884–85) and
the two Asante expeditions of 1896 and 1900 – and so few letters from
them survive. Nevertheless, the Bechuanaland campaign at least
demonstrated the degree of British adaptation since the Anglo-Boer
War of 1881.
The expedition was occasioned by Boer freebooters exploiting the
rivalry among Bantu clans along the border from Vryburg to Mafeking
and proclaiming the two semi-independent republics of Goshen and
Stellaland in Bantu territory. The Gladstone Government regarded
these incursions as breaches of the London Convention (1884), and
resolved to protect the Bantu chiefs and retain control of the trade route
from Cape Colony to Central Africa. It despatched Major-General Sir
Charles Warren (RE), as a special commissioner with some 4,000 men,
including 1/Royal Scots, the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, three batteries
of field artillery, a battery of Gardner machine-guns, three regiments of
mounted rifles (recruited partly in Britain and partly in the Cape), bal-
loon and field telegraph sections, a pioneer corps, and a corps of Bantu
guides. Warren was required to evict the Goshenites from Bechuanaland
(the Stellalanders had accepted British rule) and re-establish order.2
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The first units of regulars and volunteers reached Cape Town on 19
December 1884 and left by train the same day for the Orange River, dis-
embarking near Hope Town. They struggled over 12 roadless miles
through deep sand, and waded the Orange River, to reach a camp site
at Langford Rest. An old volunteer recalled that the dust and sand was
so thick that ‘we could not see five yards forward’, so arriving ‘with our
tongues sticking to the roofs of our mouths’.3 They found the camp
infested with snakes, scorpions, ants and beetles, and temperatures
that reached 112 degrees Fahrenheit in their tents. Life was made even
more miserable by the sandstorms which repeatedly swept the site, the
ban on ‘intoxicants’, and the cost of extras (including Bass pale ale,
which was presumably not regarded as an ‘intoxicant’, at 2s 6d, or
12.5p, a pint bottle). Yet one trooper was impressed by the ‘good many
troops here’, particularly the batteries of artillery and machine-guns
and the many mounted men (all distinct improvements on the prepa-
rations of 1881), while another correspondent regarded the men of
Colonel Paul S. (later Lieutenant-General Lord) Methuen’s Horse as
‘admirable, both physically and in morale’.4 Almost as impressive was
the health of the incoming men: by 4 January 1885 when half the force
had arrived, there were under a dozen men in hospital and, after eleven
days, only one of the Royal Scots, 740-strong, had fallen sick. Of more
immediate concern was the ‘want of water, transport and supplies’,
especially the lack of native labour, so the burden of ‘constructing
kraals, loading and unloading waggons, etc., falls on the soldier’.5 How-
ever, by 13 January, Warren had sufficient mule-carts, wagons and dri-
vers to march towards the Vaal River, where a forward base was
established at Barkly West.
Although sunstroke took an increasing toll on the line of march, and
many of the gentlemen troopers suffered ‘severely from the heavy
marching’ (as their horses had yet to arrive from Natal), soldiers rapidly
recovered at the camp site which had ample water, trees, shrubs and
plenty of fresh meat from nearby sheep, goats and cattle.6 Visitors were
surprised to see British soldiers (apart from the Royal Scots) wearing
‘rough corduroy’ suits with their formerly white helmets ‘travel-
stained to a dirty brown’.7 Julius M. Price, a volunteer of Methuen’s
Horse, confirmed this image of soldiers wearing inconspicuous kit and
adapting to local conditions by sketching, for the Illustrated London
News, officers in slouch hats and living in makeshift accommodation.8
Engineers, including the telegraph-laying section, and mounted
rifles led the way into the disputed territory, with men aware that they
had ‘to march up the country to show the natives and Boers our
strength’.9 Writing on 4 February, some 80 miles north of Barkly, a
trooper acknowledged the sensitivity of the mission: ‘It is a most diffi-
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cult thing to find out anything about the Boers. We absolutely don’t
know if we are going to fight or not . . . Stellaland seems to be quiet;
and if we can manage to capture or kill the Freebooters we shall have
easy work. But if, on the other hand, we kill a Transvaal Dutchman,
there will be a general rising.’10
As the field force pressed on to the village of Taungs, it established
an extensive line of communications, with telegraphic connections,
wells dug at 12-mile intervals, and detachments posted along the
route. The Royal Scots based its headquarters and four companies at
Taungs, with detachments at Bank’s Drift, Barkly and Langford ‘hold-
ing wells and fords’.11 After two months of trekking northwards, a Port
Elizabeth volunteer affirmed that ‘we are in excellent health. We have
very fine horses. I do not think that the enemy can fly from their pur-
suers. The men here who are making money are the parties following
the corps selling everything except liquors . . . Our haults [sic] have all
been made on the open veldt so as to avoid inebriation’.12 As patrols and
outposts failed to find any freebooters in Stellaland, speculation
mounted: what had become of them, wrote a colonial volunteer,
‘goodness only knows, though we hear they talked big up to a fortnight
of our arrival. They have entirely disappeared. They and their friends
confess to being quite funked by the force – so I hear.’13
Warren, accompanied by 600 dragoons and mounted riflemen, rode
north to Vryburg and thence over rolling grassland and through woods
of acacia trees to Mafeking, where he sought to restore order in
Goshen. He arrived on 9 March and Carrington’s Horse moved up to
the frontier at Rooi Gronde on the following day. Only a few Boers
remained in the vicinity: as a trooper observed, ‘They generally refuse
to speak to an Englishman or at best answer in monosyllables; but the
natives seem genuinely pleased to have us among them.’14 As the expe-
ditionary force now languished, patrolling along the frontier until
October 1885, officers indulged their passion for shooting and some old
soldiers found solace in drink. Several troopers insisted: ‘We are all
tired of the bloodless campaign’, and claimed that ‘more than one
longed to return as speedily as possible’.15 Warren, though, had to estab-
lish a British protectorate over Bechuanaland, and in doing so demon-
strated another means of surveillance and control by deploying a
balloon on the veld. Major Henry Elsdale, RE, was delighted that his
team was able to spend a week in April, often ‘in very unfavourable
gusty weather’, conducting reconnaissance operations. ‘We pulled it
off by a very narrow margin’, he wrote, ‘for our balloons were designed
for Egypt at a low elevation above sea level, and the great elevation
here (about 5,000 feet above sea level) is so much against them . . .’.16
The whole exercise was given maximum publicity as colonial
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reporters described the size and scope of the balloon (20 feet in diame-
ter, containing 10,000 cubic feet of hydrogen gas, and able to float
steadily at 1,000 feet), and noted that Elsdale could scan a horizon of
over 30 miles’ radius while communicating with the ground by tele-
phone. At least one correspondent concluded that ‘henceforth no army
in the field will be complete without its ballooning detachment’.17
If the campaign had demonstrated that some lessons had been
learned about campaigning in South African conditions, particularly in
respect of dress, fire-power and mobility,18 the outcome was scant con-
solation for the soldiers involved. If they were well fed (graphically
depicted by Price in his sketch of a sentinel standing on 2,000 cases of
corned beef), generally healthy, and able to enjoy shooting game in the
environs of Taungs,19 they had little to show for the expedition itself.
Bored and isolated (hence the anxiety about the receipt of post and
newspapers from Britain),20 they endured the heat, thunderstorms, and
the ordeal of African campaigning without the excitement of engaging
an enemy and the accompanying opportunities to earn medals and pro-
motions in the field. In writing to his wife, Methuen, a veteran of the
Asante and Egyptian campaigns, deeply resented his exclusion from
the Nile expedition. ‘It is hard to see the chance gone’, he had written
in September 1884;21 six months later he still thought ‘of the chance I
lost’, adding:
It is a very bitter disappointment having toiled here for nothing particu-
larly for the others, who have never seen service: had a shot been fired,
my feeling is that there could have been heavy losses, as the Boers shoot
so well, and the hatred here is intense. We all long to wipe out the shame
inflicted on us, though at a heavy sacrifice.22
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After the costly failure of the Gordon relief expedition, successive
British governments retained only a small army of occupation in Egypt
and withdrew forces from the southern frontier, the defence of which
was left increasingly to the Egyptian Army. The latter was reformed
and trained by a cadre of British officers and NCOs and was periodi-
cally supported by British units, notably a squadron of the 20th Hus-
sars at the battle of Toski (13 August 1889) and in engagements with
Osman Digna’s forces near Suakin. British units were even more
prominent in the Sudanese campaigns of the late 1890s; the 1/North
Staffordshires served in the Dongola campaign of 1896 and another
eight battalions, supported by the 21st Lancers, two batteries of
artillery, a machine-gun battery and a flotilla of gunboats served in the
Anglo-Egyptian army at Omdurman (2 September 1898). As all these
campaigns involved protracted journeys and tedious days spent in bar-
racks or under canvas, soldiers kept diaries, drew sketches, and took
numerous photographs.1 They were also prolific correspondents, and,
in some cases, wrote campaign histories based partially on their first-
hand experience.2 They explained how the logistic problems of operat-
ing in the Sudan were overcome and how an Anglo-Egyptian army
defeated the forces of the Khalifa. Some of these letters have been
reproduced,3 others have embellished well-known accounts of the
campaign, particularly those commemorating the centenary of the
battle of Omdurman;4 but the surviving correspondence is even more
voluminous than these sources suggest. Although most material
derives from the 1898 campaign, the earlier letters and diaries provide
a comparative context, indicating how the experience of soldiering in
the Sudan evolved over a decade.
As most of the Gordon relief expedition began to depart, Private
Francis Ferguson (20th Hussars) reconciled himself to a long tour of
duty in Egypt. He anticipated another twelve months but would ulti-
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mately spend the remainder of his five years with the colours in Egypt,
where he liked ‘the fighting if it were not for the cursed climate . . .’.
He had already succumbed to dysentery and knew that his regiment,
despite receiving regular drafts of men from England, had ‘been weak-
ened by a lot of men being invalided home with Dysentry & Enterick
fever’.5 Within two months of the battle of Ginnis he was again
invalided down to Assouan from Wadi Halfa, which he regarded as ‘the
most unhealthy station’ in Egypt with ‘3 or 4 funerals every day some-
times as many as 9’.6 After returning to Wadi Halfa, where he remained
until May 1886, Ferguson feared the risks of illness above anything else
whenever the prospect of frontier service recurred. In April 1887 he
noted reports of ‘a good many of our men dying’ at Assouan, and, after
the battle of Toski, berated the medical authorities for failing to pro-
vide any water purification: ‘the Nile is rising & we have to drink the
water like mud as we have no means to clear it’. By now well
acquainted with Sudanese conditions, he regarded the medical depart-
ment as ‘[v]ery thoughtless . . . as they ought to know the state of the
Nile at this time of the Year & I think that is the cause of all the sick-
ness here at present’.7
Egyptian service had its attractions, nonetheless. Ferguson liked the
barracks at Abbassiyeh, some 3 miles from Cairo, describing the rooms
as ‘large & lofty, each capable of holding over fifty bed cots and are very
cool considering the climate’. He regarded the stables, about a mile
from the barracks, as ‘much better than English stables’, with plenty of
water and troughs ‘about fifty feet long & six feet wide’. The troops
enjoyed beer at 7d (3p) a quart in a ‘very decent canteen with a stage’
and could supplement their rations with plentiful supplies of cheap
local produce. While the charms of Cairo were only a donkey ride
away, a local bazaar had formed near Abbassiyeh ‘kept by French
people & girls & some Greek but no English’.8 Periodically the temp-
tations of the canteen proved too much, and there was a drunken
Christmas brawl between the Shropshire Light Infantry and the 20th
Hussars: ‘Iron bed legs were flying about in all directions & one of our
men is a lunatic in the hospital caused by a bayonet going through his
head. Several more got bayonet wounds & 18 of the infantry are in with
sword wounds but all is quiet now.’9
Ferguson, like many of his comrades, never formed a high opinion of
the Egyptian soldiery (other than the black Sudanese). When the garri-
son at Wadi Halfa was handed over to the Egyptians, he remarked: ‘It is
nearly time they were able to shift for themselves’ and, in departing for
Suakin in December 1888, he recalled the debacle of Hicks Pasha’s
army, claiming that ‘The Egyptians cannot be trusted as they run away
if a few men chase them’.10 In fact, the Egyptian Army had been
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reformed and would fight effectively in the Sudan: at Gemaizah (20
December 1888) the Sudanese cleared the Mahdist trenches before the
cavalry charge. Both Corporal Wakefield and Ferguson described the
‘awful’ crash of the two mounted forces as they charged each other over
‘terribly rough ground’. Whereas Ferguson thought that we ‘emptied
about 30 saddles’, Wakefield reckoned that most of the enemy dis-
mounted to fight alongside ‘hundreds of rebels on foot’. The 20th Hus-
sars, he claimed, were handicapped by the quality of their sabres: in the
first clash of arms, he saw one trooper killed and another slashed from
shoulder to nearly his waist while at least three British sabres ‘broke
over the Arabs’ spears’. He himself ‘cut one man full on the head, but
it had no effect on him’. After a couple of charges the troopers retired,
dismounted ‘and commenced firing, which ultimately made the
enemy retire’.11
During the cavalry charge three troopers and trumpeter Newton
were killed and mutilated, prompting not merely feelings of rage and
vengeance but the reflections of Trooper E. P. Wedlake:
It was, indeed, a glorious charge, though marred with grief and pain,
For Newton, Thomas, Jordan, Howes, were numbered with the slain.
We bore them from the field of strife with tenderness and love,
And trusted that their souls had found a resting-place above.
Then our thoughts returned to Cairo’s camp, with its mottoes and its
flowers,
With saddened recollections of its gay and festive bowers.
We wept for our gallant comrades, as still in death they lay,
And in the camp of our beaten foes we spent our Christmas Day.12
Ferguson’s letter largely chronicled his own exploits, particularly in
protecting Private Knowles from an Arab wielding a double-edged
sword. When copies of the Evening News containing this letter and an
advertising placard were sent to him, soldiers posted the material on
the stable door and ribbed him about his tale. Ferguson defended ‘every
word’ by referring to various witnesses, including Private Knowles,
memories of his blood-stained horse and the deep cut in his sword hilt,
‘So they said no more to me about it’. He also explained to his parents
that the hussars had spent the month after the battle constantly on
parade and vedette duty, capturing the odd rebel and scouring hills near
Tamai for the enemy. Ferguson was particularly impressed with
Colonel H. Herbert Kitchener, whose linguistic gifts had enabled him
to operate as a spy in Metemmeh during the Nile campaign: ‘he is a
very brave man & well liked by all Troops’.13
Finally, Ferguson left his impressions of the battlefield at Toski
where the 20th Hussars was the only British unit present and assisted
in the final rout of Wad Nejumi’s invading army. After all his previous
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engagements, Ferguson was gratified that ‘hardly any fighting men of
the Rebels escaped’, and that all the leaders, save one, were killed. In
killing Nejumi, who he thought, erroneously, had killed Gordon and
defeated King John of Abyssinia, they had disposed of ‘the ablest & best
leader & bravest of the Mahdi’s Generals’. He had never seen ‘so many
Dead after a Battle, and so close together . . . They were in heaps as
they were shot down’, with more women, children and animals slain
in the two camps, including a women killed in the act of childbirth, ‘a
horrible sight’.14 The last Mahdist invasion of Egypt had been repulsed.
Although Ferguson made scant reference to the role of the Egyptian
Army at Toski, it had proved its worth in repelling a Mahdist assault
and then in advancing to seize the enemy’s camp. Some eighteen
months later, in February 1891, Egyptian and Sudanese forces reoccu-
pied Tokar without the assistance of any British troops (other than
their British officers and NCOs). Nevertheless, in March 1896, the
1/North Staffordshires were sent forward in support of the Egyptian
Army when the cabinet approved a limited incursion into the northern
province of Dongola. This decision was a response to Italian pleas for a
military diversion to ease the pressure on their garrison at Kassala
(after the catastrophic defeat of the Italian forces at Adowa on 1
March). Cromer advised Lord Salisbury, then prime minister and for-
eign secretary, that it would ‘be a serious business, from a military
point of view, to get to Dongola’. He doubted ‘whether it can be
achieved without employing English troops’.15
At Abbassiyeh barracks the North Staffordshires greeted news of
their impending action with ‘wild excitement’: ‘officers and men’,
recalled Lieutenant (later Major) J. J. B. Farley, dashed ‘about, throwing
helmets in the air and shouting “Wady Halfa in a week”’.16 After rigor-
ous medical examinations in which 10 per cent of the strength were
turned down, the battalion left Cairo by train on 22 March to a
tremendous ovation from friends and well-wishers. On the next day
the 912 men were crammed on to two steamers and completed a jour-
ney of 800 miles to Wadi Halfa in ten days. Thereafter they languished
in barracks for several months as Kitchener concentrated on extending
the railway and the telegraph south of Sarras while moving stores and
supplies forward to the base at Akasheh.17 Colonel Archibald Hunter
(Egyptian Army) later explained that: ‘More than two-thirds of the
work is calculating the quantity of supplies required and where to have
them and by what time. In fact, war is not fighting and patrolling and
bullets and knocks; it is one constant worry about transport and forage
and ammunition and seeing that no one is short of stuff.’18
Although the North Staffordshires had come to Egypt from Malta in
the previous October, they were not prepared for the heat, flies and
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general discomfort of serving on the Sudanese frontier. ‘We are grow-
ing weary’, wrote Captain Somerset Astell, ‘horrible rumours come in
that the Dervishes are starving, their allies deserting, so they may cave
in & then we shall have borne the burden & heat of the day for
nought.’19 They endured a daily routine of early morning drill, includ-
ing attack and square formations, and musketry practice before spend-
ing most of the day in barracks. In the extreme heat water fatigues were
particularly arduous, and the medical staff tried to prevent their ther-
mometers from bursting. Officers sought to occupy bored men, some-
times by reading aloud to their companies. As Astell recalled: ‘Slatin’s
Fire & Sword in the Soudan held the Palm & was a veritable gold mine
to us, both as instruction and interest to men & officers.’20 In the late
afternoon soldiers played football or, like the officers, bathed in the
Nile and attended concerts or smoking concerts at night. Officers, find-
ing little scope for riding or shooting, experimented at fishing, while
some sailed on the river, and most enjoyed the company of the hard-
drinking and garrulous war correspondents. Everyone appreciated the
receipt of mail from home.21
None of the regiment apart from Captain Goldfinch’s Maxim bat-
tery took part in the major battle of the campaign at Firket (7 June
1896). They learned at second hand of the night march by the three
brigades of the Egyptian Army, the co-ordinated strike on the village,
and the house-to-house fighting before the Mahdists retired. ‘The
plan’, reckoned Astell, was ‘as ably thought out, as it was brilliantly
executed.’22 Farley agreed: ‘The whole operation was a perfect example
of careful planning on the part of the Sirdar and Colonels Rundle and
Hunter and it was brilliantly carried out by the troops.’23 Hunter, who
commanded one of the Egyptian brigades, attributed the success to the
element of surprise after the ‘silence’ of the night march. He doubted
that they could achieve another surprise and expected ‘a great fight at
Dongola’. Despite being critical of his soldiers for their ‘wild, badly
aimed’ shooting, he was glad they had seized this ‘chance to belie the
croakings of their detractors’.24
Of more immediate concern was the typhoid fever and cholera that
began to sweep through English and Egyptian ranks from mid-June
onwards. Lieutenant-Colonel Beale, Lieutenant Hutchinson and sev-
eral North Staffordshires were invalided to Cairo, and, on 1 July, the
battalion moved camp to Gemai. Within a day of their arrival another
man was struck down and over the next six weeks cholera took a heavy
toll of officers and other ranks. Astell grimly noted: ‘Funerals, for obvi-
ous reasons took place as quietly as possible, generally at night.’25
While officers praised the efforts of the medical staff, Farley noted how
the latter had struggled without water filters and wood for boiling
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water.26 The battalion was now dispersed into three locations, with the
sick being treated in a separate hospital from Gemai and an increasing
number being invalided to Cairo. The two local Methodist preachers,
Conductor Linnington (Ordnance Service Corps) and Sergeant Forde
(North Staffordshires) conceded that they could no longer hold reli-
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gious gatherings; but Forde consoled himself: ‘Not a single abstainer
has been attacked, and there is not a single abstainer in hospital up
here. This speaks for itself.’27
Fortunately the cholera abated by mid-August but a massive storm
and flooding ruined a section of the railway on 25 August, so many of
the available soldiers were sent to Sarras to repair the track. Although
the railway work ‘was very hard’, Astell claimed that the men
‘rejoiced’ at anything that gave them some relief from ‘the utter stag-
nation’ they had endured for ‘so long’. He observed, too, that ‘the
Soudanese & our men were always great friends’ but ‘one never saw
any mingling of the white & Egyptian troops’.28 Officers and other
ranks were even more pleased when the orders came to move forward
by train to Kosheh. The North Staffordshires were now somewhat
depleted as 44 had died, 120 had been invalided to Cairo, and, at
Kosheh, another 150 had to be left behind as the steamer Zafir burst its
cylinder.
At Hafir (19 September) they were largely spectators as the gunboats
and a brigade of artillery under Colonel C. Parsons bombarded the
enemy’s defences. ‘The Dervishes’, wrote Farley, ‘certainly deserved
and obtained our highest admiration for the way they stuck to their
position.’29 When the Mahdists eventually withdrew, the North
Staffordshires marched on without any food, rations or water, covering
the next 23 miles ‘on empty stomachs’ and losing only one man on the
line of march. On 23 September the battalion marched on Dongola in
the centre of the front line of the 15,000-man army, with gunboats pro-
viding fire support. Once again the bulk of the Mahdist forces with-
drew, although Baggara horsemen and a few individuals proffered
token resistance. By 11.30 a.m. the town had fallen without any casu-
alties among the English soldiers.30 While soldiers appreciated Kitch-
ener’s words of praise on the following day, and the opportunity to
acquire ‘dervish loot’, this was scant comfort for their state of health:
when the North Staffordshires returned to Cairo on 9 October, another
seventy-six men entered hospital, of whom twenty, including Captain
J. Rose, died.31
In a subsequent interview Kitchener admitted his ‘great surprise’
that the enemy had bolted from Dongola ‘in utter rout’. He attributed
this collapse of morale to the stories from Firket, the presence of gun-
boats and the overwhelming numbers of the Anglo-Egyptian army, but
warned against underestimating the power of the Khalifa.32 Hunter
agreed, claiming that the Egyptian Army had only overwhelmed the
enemy’s positions at Toski, Tokar and Firket because it had English
officers and ‘we were always in superior numbers. We have never asked
him to do anything that was not within the easy compass of attain-
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ment’.33 Such reasoning would ensure that once the Sudan Military
Railway (SMR) was built from Wadi Halfa across the Nubian desert,
British forces would again be required for the advance on Omdurman.
Despite appalling climatic conditions, construction of the railway
began on 1 January 1897, involving gangs of native labourers under the
energetic direction of Lieutenant E. P. C. Girouard, RE, and his staff.
On 7 August 1897, Hunter in command of a flying column secured the
terminus for the 230-mile railway at Abu Hamed,34 and then pressed on
to establish a forward base at Berber. The railway, completed on 4
November 1897, was rightly regarded by Hunter as ‘the all important
factor of this expedition’. It shortened the journey to Abu Hamed from
eighteen days by camel and steamer to twenty-four hours (depending
on the serviceability of the engines) and enabled Kitchener to move his
forces and gunboats into the heart of the Sudan independently of
season or the height of the Nile. As Hunter added: ‘That Railway from
Halfa to Abu Hamed is a monument of the skill & resources of the
Sirdar. It is his idea & his only.’35
Railway construction continued during 1898. By February, when the
railway from Cairo reached Assouan, Colonel A. O. Green (RE) reck-
oned that even with a delay the boat and rail journey to Wadi Halfa
took only six days; by August, when the SMR reached Atbara – 385
miles from Wadi Halfa – Sergeant-Major Clement Riding (Royal Army
Medical Corps – RAMC), claimed that it took only seven days to reach
Atbara from Cairo.36 Soldiers sometimes erred in recalling the length
and duration of journeys – Corporal George Skinner (RAMC) added 120
miles to the rail journey from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamed 37 – and the
travelling experiences often varied from unit to unit. Of the four bat-
talions of the First British Brigade (the 1st Battalions of the Lincolns,
Royal Warwicks, Cameron Highlanders and Seaforth Highlanders)
only the late-arriving Seaforths and some drafts for the other units,
including Private H. Matthews (Lincolns), experienced the delights of
riding through the night on camels to their camp site. ‘After this camel
ride’, grumbled Matthews, ‘we could hardly walk’, and the experience
was even less agreeable in a kilt: as Sergeant Roderick Morrison com-
plained, ‘It was by far the worst journey I ever undertook.’38
Travel was only one of several new experiences for the short-service
soldiers, many of whom had never served in Egypt and the Sudan
before.39 Coming from Malta, Lance-Sergeant Colin Grieve (Seaforths)
was franker than most in his description of Cairo as ‘one of the finest
cities in the world to look at, but the wickedest place on God’s earth
. . . As far as I can see the majority of the people in these Eastern Coun-
tries live on Villany [sic] & their wits, and immorality is looked on as
quite a respectable trade.’40 Many recalled the enthusiastic crowds that
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had greeted their departures and the cheering from passing steamers,
the experience of being ‘packed like herrings in a box’ on Nile vessels,
the spectacle of the ancient ruins at Luxor, and the first sight of the
Sudan Military Railway as its ‘shimmering rails disappeared into the
mirage’.41 Yet battalions were shocked as the strain of the logistic
arrangements took its toll, with two elderly quartermasters commit-
ting suicide: a Cameron Highlander ‘blew out his brains’, reportedly
‘through a choking off that the Colonel gave him’;42 and Quartermaster
Sergeant Haines of the Lincolns cut his own throat. Another Lin-
colnshire sergeant explained: ‘He had had a lot of work to do of late,
and was not in good health, nor had he been used to a life such as this’.43
Any gloom over these suicides soon dissipated once soldiers com-
pleted their journeys, pitched camp near the railhead 22 miles south of
Abu Hamed, and began a hectic round of daily fatigues and training.
The arrival of their commanding officer, Major-General William F.
Gatacre, a 55-year old martinet from India, ensured that they would
not languish in camp as the North Staffordshires had done.44 A Lin-
colnshire sergeant wrote:
Our daily routine [is] as follows: Running drill to the Nile and back,
bathing parade, battalion drill in fighting formation, attack and defence,
outpost duty by night and day, camp fatigues, wood and water fatigues,
unloading railway trucks of stores, and pitching and striking camp; also
marching drill during the warm part of the day.45
Gatacre added to these labours by insisting that everyone wore their
full kit, boots and ammunition, by night and day: ‘what little sleep we
got for fully a month’, wrote Private Matthews, ‘was with our boots
and clothes on’.46 If officers were more sceptical of Gatacre’s excessive
precautions, hectoring speeches and constant interference – ‘He is one
of the fussiest men going’, claimed Lieutenant William Stewart
(Camerons)47 – the men appeared more tolerant of ‘Old Back-acher’, as
they described him, other than his proscription of beer. Occasional tots
of rum were scant comfort: ‘the men began to moan’, noted Skinner,
‘especially when it was known that the officers were getting as much
as they wanted’.48 ‘As regards rations’, Matthews admitted, ‘we cannot
grumble. We each get 2lbs. of bread each day, and if we do not get bread
we get a pound of biscuits and a pound of meat. We also have to drink
tea four times a day.’49 Soldiers appreciated, too, that some of Gatacre’s
additional fatigues would enhance their prospects in battle, particu-
larly filing the tips off their bullets to make them similar to Dum Dum
ammunition: by 19 February, a Cameron Highlander could report: ‘we
have just finished the last box to-day; so that is 300 boxes of Dum
Dums for Fuzzy Wuzzy to stomach’. 50
R E C O N Q U E R I N G  T H E  S U D A N
[ 145 ]
chap 8  9/7/04  9:10 am  Page 145
Officers and men were less impressed when Gatacre ordered them
to undertake a forced march to Berber and thence to Darmali, some 122
miles in 5 days with a day’s rest (25 February–2 March), reputedly to
save the advance units of the Egyptian Army from Mahdist attack.
Whether marching at night or early morning, the soldiers struggled
through deep sand and then over hard rocky desert. The latter, wrote
Sergeant Murphy (Lincolns), ‘was very trying. It hurt the men’s feet
badly, the stones were so sharp. We marched 32 miles on this day with
only the water in our bottle . . . I never saw one tree on this march;
nothing met the eye except now and again the bleached bones of a
camel. After this long march we received a ration of rum.’51 ‘What
made the marching worse’, added Private D. MacDonald (Camerons),
‘was that most of it was done on our bare feet, as we had no shoes or
sox [sic] on.’52 Lieutenant Ronald F. Meiklejohn (Warwicks) agreed that
‘some had no soles on their boots: many had the skin off their feet: &
others were worn out. We left about 150 men & two officers (Caldecott
& Christie): the Lincolns left 180: the Camerons 200: and these waited
for two gunboats to arrive & bring them on.’ He was even more
incensed when the battalions reached Berber to an enthusiastic recep-
tion and the realisation that they had not been expected for a week at
least. ‘Our confidence [in Gatacre]’, wrote Meiklejohn, ‘is shaken. He
has the reputation of wearing out his troops unnecessarily.’53
Nevertheless, soldiers were pleased with the issue of fresh boots
from the Egyptian Army and a more varied diet from Berber (including
bacon, rice and other vegetables). While the Seaforths joined the
Camerons at Kunour on 16 March, the Lincolns and Warwicks
encamped in the village of Darmali, some 15 miles south of Berber.
Cordial relations were again forged between the British and Sudanese
soldiers, with the 10th Sudanese greeting the Lincolns with cheers and
cups of tea, its band playing a rendition of the ‘Lincolnshire Poacher’,
and soldiers shouting in broken English: ‘You, 10th Inglesey, we 10th
Soudanese.’54 The Sudanese even found a mess table for the Warwick-
shire officers, whereupon the latter were able to host a dinner for Gat-
acre, involving ‘soup, stewed beef, rice and green peas, asparagus, rice
pudding, and damsons, coffee, champagne and port’, all the produce
being acquired in Berber.55
More importantly British, Egyptian and Sudanese battalions were
now able to practise combined movements, forming squares and com-
pleting other manoeuvres under Kitchener’s observation. When news
arrived that Emir Mahmud was leading an ansar of 16,000 men
towards the River Atbara, Kitchener ordered his entire army to
advance on the Atbara (20 March). Within two days the army reached
Ras-el-Hudi, where Sergeant Murphy described the scene: ‘We are lying
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close on the Atbara river which is teeming with fish, gazelle are plen-
tiful in the woods, while quail, geese, wild ducks, and pigeons, hares,
rabbits, etc., are in abundance . . . Palm and mimosa trees are thick
here, and milk trees are in abundance.’56
Having waited in vain for a Mahdist attack, Kitchener eventually
resolved to advance on Mahmud’s zareba. After a series of cautious
marches his army deployed some 600 yards from Mahmud’s stronghold
(6 a.m. on 8 April), whereupon the Egyptian artillery began pounding the
enemy’s position for three-quarters of an hour. Thereafter three brigades
walked towards the zareba, with the Camerons deployed in line at the
front of the British Brigade, followed by the Seaforths, Warwicks and 
Lincolns in column. As the units advanced firing volleys, many remem-
bered the Sirdar’s final exhortation: ‘Remember Gordon.’57 Private H.
Pexton (Lincolns) recalled: ‘The bullets from the Dervishes were like
hailstones flying about’, while Private J. Turnbull (Camerons) admitted:
‘It felt a bit funny at first hearing the bullets whistling round a fellow’s
ears, and seeing a chum drop beside a fellow, and never having time to
think when your own time was coming’. A comrade added that once the
Camerons ripped open gaps in the zareba, they never waited for ‘orders
to charge, but went for them for all we were worth like devils’.58
Sergeant Morrison was ‘astonished’ by ‘the heavy and continuous
fire kept up by the enemy, but it all went high, and a good job too’.59
They found the Mahdists fighting from a maze of deep trenches and a
central stockade, with many slaves, as observed by Private Arthur
Hipkin (Lincolns), ‘unable to retreat because they were chained by the
ankles’.60 ‘They are a very tough lot of men’, claimed Sergeant Murphy,
not least those who survived multiple wounds from Gatacre’s bullets
before succumbing to the bayonet. However, their shamming of death
or injury before shooting or stabbing passing soldiers provoked fierce
retribution: ‘After that’, wrote Drum-Major David Nelson (Seaforths),
‘they got no mercy. They got bayonetted every time.’61
British soldiers praised the Sudanese for their zeal in close-quarter
fighting, if not always the accuracy of their shooting, and for capturing
Mahmud: Private George Young (Lincolns) even ‘pitied the Dervishes
that showed any signs of life, as the Soudanese soon put an end to their
misery’.62 Another Lincoln, Corporal D. W. Anderson, deplored the
‘slaughter’ of the battle: 
[I]t was a horrible sight to see those trenches full of dead and dying
Dervishes, and as we drove them to the river they were properly
butchered, and hundreds of them were fairly blown to pieces . . . The
smell was awful, for the huts, which were made of large palm leaves,
were burning (from the shells and rockets) and it was horrible to see lots
of Dervishes burning in these fires.63
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Compounding the stench of battle were the odours of a camp bereft of
sanitary arrangements: ‘The Dervishers [sic]’, asserted Hipkin, ‘are a
dirty tribe’,64 but the dangers of the battlefield, especially from ‘ammu-
nition constantly exploding’ in the fires, prompted a withdrawal of the
victorious units and their wounded. They had to bivouac in the desert
with ‘absolutely no shade’, burying their dead and remaining until 5
p.m. whereupon they could march back to camp. ‘If it was bad for us’,
wrote one Seaforth officer, ‘it was a thousand times worse for the
wounded, who suffered much.’65
The sufferings of the wounded, many of whom had injuries from
explosive bullets, were a source of continuing anxiety. Corporal Skin-
ner explained that the under-staffed and ill-equipped medical team
‘had plenty of work’ with ninety-four patients (there were a few less
seriously injured). They lost 5 of their patients after the battle (adding
to the 19 killed outright) and another 3 in the coming weeks. Even
transporting the wounded on litters and stretchers by night, with the
less serious cases on camels, was a ‘very trying’ experience – ‘the worst
march of the whole lot’, in Skinner’s opinion.66 Lincolns praised their
‘brave old colonel’, T. E. Verner, who was shot through the jaw ‘but led
us on to the finish’,67 while several Seaforths lauded officers either
killed or mortally wounded when leading from the front. Bandsman P.
Learmonth grieved for ‘one poor young officer, Lieutenant Gore’, who
died with ‘a smile on his face’, and Private Thomas R. Clarke com-
posed a poem about ‘our brave young captain’, Alan Baillie, who died
after an amputation. The poem testified to the strength of officer–man
relations, ending
We’ll march no more together,
We’ll miss his kindly care,
Until we meet our captain
In yonder land so fair.68
If good officer–man relations underpinned regimental esprit de
corps, rivalry between the battalions added a competitive dimension.
As the Scots incurred most of the casualties, with Camerons suffering
the bulk of the fatalities and nearly half of the wounded, they joined
war correspondents in extolling their own achievements. Even Lance-
Sergeant Grieve, who was not present at the battle, concluded that ‘the
Lincolns & Warwicks had scarcely any wounded as the Jocks were in
the trenches first’.69 A Warwickshire soldier was not alone in com-
plaining that ‘according to one paper, anyone would think the War-
wicks and Lincolns had not taken part in the affair – but we have, and
we did our duty’.70
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The veterans of Atbara returned to their respective camps – the
Camerons and Seaforths to Darmali, the Lincolns and Warwicks to Es
Sillem – gratified by the Khedive’s promise of a medal and clasp, and
pleased by the improvements in food and accommodation, and by the
delivery of mail.71 For four months the brigade languished in its
‘summer quarters’, with officers and men trying to occupy themselves
with hunting, fishing, smoking concerts and sports, including an
Atbara ‘Derby’ in June. Marches and drills were largely confined to the
early morning as daytime temperatures soared above 100 degrees
Fahrenheit. Dysentery became prevalent from late April onwards and
later typhoid fever took an increasing toll (leaving fifty dead at Darmali
and probably more among those who had to be evacuated). Lance-
Sergeant W. Briggs (Seaforths) was almost certainly trying to reassure
relatives when he claimed: ‘All the troops at Darmali are in good
heath’; others were more candid about the state of the camps.72
By early August reinforcements began to arrive, notably the 2nd
British Brigade (1/Grenadier Guards, 1/Northumberland Fusiliers,
2/Rifle Brigade and 2/Lancashire Fusiliers), the 32nd and 37th field bat-
teries RA, a battery of Maxim machine-guns manned by Royal Irish
Fusiliers, 16th company Royal Garrison Artillery, and ultimately the
21st Lancers who joined the army on 23 August. Given the rapidity of
their travel from Cairo, the forces struggled to acclimatise and to prac-
tise their drills and fighting formations: as Private Walter Pickup
observed, ‘the sweat rolls out of you if you walk only about half a dozen
yards out of your tent’, but fellow Grenadier Lance-Sergeant George
Shirley insisted that spirits were high and that all were ‘very anxious
to get a fight’.73 Kitchener was keen to oblige and had sent the Sudanese
ahead, followed by the 1st British Brigade to establish a vast camp at
Wad Hamed, just above the sixth cataract. When the Warwicks arrived
on 16 August after a three-day journey, one of their officers remarked:
‘From this date campaigning started again in real earnest, sleeping in
our boots, and patrols going all night.’74 On this part of the advance the
Lancers, following the caravan trail south from Fort Atbara in a suc-
cession of early morning rides, had several cases of sunstroke and
exhaustion, including two fatalities and the loss of 18 horses.75 They
arrived after Kitchener’s review of 23,000 soldiers at Wad Hamed but
in time to screen the ensuing march over the remaining 60 miles to
Omdurman.
Even seasoned soldiers from the Egyptian Army and the 1st Brigade
struggled in the daily marches which, though short, were extremely
slow on account of the number of soldiers involved. Conducted over
undulating terrain and through patches of deep sand and scrub, the
marches were, according to Lance-Corporal Whiting (Lincolns),‘worse’
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than the pre-Atbara march, ‘for instead of sandstorms we had a thun-
derstorm about every other night’.76 If a ‘great many men fell out’, as
Lance-Corporal A. Unsworth (Seaforths) recalled, most fell out from
the 2nd Brigade, where grumbling persisted about the lack of food and
water. Unsworth reckoned that most bore their discomforts ‘cheer-
fully, and with resignation . . . resolved to make the Khalifa pay dearly’
for them; others testified to the inspirational support of the regimental
bands and Reverend Watson’s sermon on the Sunday before Omdur-
man, in which he likened their mission to a crusade to avenge the
death of Gordon.77 Sergeant W. G. Moody (Lincolns) expressed confi-
dence in Kitchener and fatalism about the battle to come: ‘There was
nothing left to chance by the Sirdar, and he will carry this through all
right. Of course, we shall probably leave a good few behind us, but that
can’t be helped, and everyone stands the same chance of getting
through all right.’78
On reaching the village of Egeiga (1 September), soldiers were
impressed by the Sirdar’s preparations for battle. While gunboats and
howitzers travelled upriver to pound the defences of Omdurman and
the Mahdi’s tomb, Lancers posted signallers on Jebel Surgham, a hill
about two miles away, to report on the movements of the Khalifa’s
army. The remainder of the Anglo-Egyptian army formed a horseshoe-
like formation with its back to the Nile, and, as a Warwickshire officer
explained, this semi-circle stretched for 4,000 yards and each front-line
battalion deployed six companies in the firing line, with two in reserve.
The British constructed a zareba (unlike the shallow shelter trench and
parapet built by the Egyptian troops), placed range-markers out to
2,000 yards, and, after the cavalry withdrew, sent out spies to check on
the Khalifa’s movements.79 After an anxious night in which an alert
sounded, and the men stood to arms from 3.30 a.m. onwards, Lance-
Corporal J. Gibson (Lancashire Fusiliers) claimed: ‘I was glad when
morning came, as I wanted to have a rub at the dervishes.’80
Once the dawn patrols of cavalry and horse artillery returned to the
zareba, they heard the ‘awful noise’ of the advancing army 81 and then
saw, as Grenadier Drill-Sergeant Morgan described,
the sight of countless black men clad in white – an enormous host with
spears and swords that glittered in the early sun, and hundreds of
coloured banners. The big drums boomed – the small ones gave a pecu-
liar liquid tone. The sight and sounds seemed to create a queer feeling
among the younger chaps, but they immediately stiffened up and
remembered they were Britons.
This was an organised foe, he recalled, ‘in five lines, in good formation,
and they were led by chiefs mounted on splendid horses’.82 As they
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charged across open ground, Guardsman Percy Thompson recalled how
‘a murmur of admiration ran through British ranks’.83 ‘We waited with
breathless intensity’, wrote Corporal Fred Monks (Rifle Brigade), ‘for
the first shot, which we knew would be delivered by the artillery.’ First
the gunners ‘with their coats off for some hot work’,84 then some
infantry firing long-range volleys at 2,000 yards, the Maxims and the
remaining infantry at about 1,500 yards, sustained a fusillade of gun
and rifle fire all along the line for at least an hour-and-a-half. ‘We knew’,
claimed Private Lison (Camerons), ‘that we were all right so long as we
kept them at a distance’, and none of the enemy reached the zareba.85
Most praised the bravery and tenacity of the Mahdists, particularly
the leader of the Baggara horsemen, whom Unsworth thought bore a
‘charmed life’ as he charged on alone after all his comrades had fallen
before being killed.86 ‘It was a fearful slaughter’, wrote Drum-Major
Cordial (Northumberland Fusiliers), ‘more like a butcher’s killing
house than anything else. Although the Dervishes are very brave men,
our magazine fire was too much for them, and the Maxims and big
guns actually mowed them down.’87 Morgan agreed: ‘The slaughter was
dreadful. I thought it was like murder. Men fell in heaps, and corpses
were piled up.’88
Soldiers were delighted when the first phase of the battle was over.
‘My arms were aching’, recalled Lison, and the barrel was ‘too hot . . .
to hold’; he welcomed the rest, a biscuit and water as ammunition
pouches were refilled (the Seaforths had fired 56 volleys, the Warwicks
between 60 and 70 rounds per man).89 When the British moved forward
at about 9 a.m., they ‘got orders’, as Colour-Sergeant Eastwood (Rifle
Brigade) observed, ‘to bayonet and shoot everyone we saw’: this was
‘horrible’ if ‘absolutely necessary’ work in the opinion of some – a fore-
taste of the controversy that would later rage in the press – but it was
a task relished by others, like Gibson, who killed ‘about twenty-five, I
think, and every shot I fired I said “Another one for Gordon”’.90
Thompson found it ‘a peculiar sensation bayonetting a man. I shut my
eyes the first one I struck, but I got used to it by the time I reached the
next one.’91
The 21st Lancers advanced under orders to harass the enemy on
their flank and head them off from Omdurman. The regiment, as Cap-
tain F. H. Eadon admitted, was ‘keen to make some mark in history in
this our first campaign’,92 and after encountering some 150 riflemen
guarding the Khalifa’s line of retreat and coming under fire, Colonel
Roland Martin wheeled his four squadrons into line and ordered a
charge. He subsequently claimed that patrols had given ‘correct infor-
mation’ about the enemy’s numbers, that the khor over which they
jumped was not as deep as ‘represented in some quarters’, and that ‘We
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charged because it was our duty to do so’.93 Trooper Fred Swarbrick,
however, whose patrol had initially sighted the enemy, confirmed that
the reconnaissance had been minimal: ‘I pointed with my lance
towards them, and immediately afterwards they opened fire. The regi-
ment wheeled into line.’94
As they galloped forward, Lieutenant Frederick Wormald realised
that they had been lured into a trap (prepared by Osman Digna), and
‘that instead of a mere handful of men there were about 1,500, armed
with rifles and swords’.95 Trooper Thomas Abbot described the ensuing
clash:
Wild with excitement, we galloped for all we were worth, lances down at
the ‘Engage’. Shots were flying in all directions and you could see noth-
ing else but a mass of black heads appearing from the ground. We charged
with all our might right to the hilt of our steel. After we had finished our
first man the lance was only in the way, and we had to draw our swords,
and then I completely lost my senses in the midst of them. It was a dread-
ful fight for about ten minutes – a fair hand to hand.96
The ‘horrors of those moments’, as Trooper Clifford Thompson recol-
lected, varied in intensity and duration from troop to troop, with the
bulk of the fighting falling upon the central B and D squadrons: Eadon’s
squadron had ‘eleven killed and thirteen wounded’ out of total casual-
ties of 21 killed and 50 wounded.97 Lancers reflected upon their own
luck, deeds of great gallantry (three VCs were won), the misfortunes of
wounded comrades (Sergeant Freeman was unrecognisable with his
nose cut off and face covered in blood), and the mutilation of fallen
comrades. When they dismounted and opened fire with carbines, ‘we
had the pleasure’, as Trooper M. Bryne observed, ‘of seeing the enemy
flying out of the trench’, but afterwards it was a ‘ghastly sight’ gather-
ing up the dead.98 Few dwelt on the futility of a charge that left the reg-
iment with 119 horses killed or wounded and thereby incapable of
harassing the enemy.
On the main battlefield Hector Macdonald’s brigade of Sudanese and
Egyptian soldiers (and the Camel Corps) fought off the final attacks
from the Khalifa’s reserve forces. Compelled to change front in dealing
with the separate attacks, ‘our men behaved splendidly’, wrote Major
Nason; they moved ‘quickly . . . and without the slightest confusion’,
virtually completing the fighting by the time the 1st British Brigade
arrived: ‘Our Brigadier has been given, I am glad to say, great credit for
it.’99 With the enemy scattered, the Anglo-Egyptian army pressed on to
Omdurman, a city whose size impressed the victors but not the rows
of mud huts nor the stench from a multitude of dead and decomposing
bodies, both animal and human. ‘What a sickening march’, recalled
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Guardsman Thompson, ‘through five miles of dirty, foul, smelling
streets, and us dead beat, too’, but there was a welcome, especially
from the women who ‘ran out and kissed the officers’ hands and sword
scabbards’.100
After a night bivouacked outside or near the edge of the city, British
units moved to more sanitary camp sites and buried their dead. On the
following day, soldiers from each unit attended ‘an imposing little cer-
emony’ in Khartoum where flags were raised, and Kitchener wept as
laments were played, a service conducted and guns fired in memory of
Gordon.101 Meanwhile, each battalion sent an officer and sixteen men
to count the dervish dead: as a Warwickshire officer remarked, this was
‘not a pleasant occupation’, especially as they counted 10,800 corpses.
They also carried biscuits and water for the enemy wounded and mar-
velled at their resilience despite some horrendous wounds: ‘it is won-
derful the way they hang on’.102
For the vast majority of the British soldiers the campaign was now
over, but ‘E’ Company of the Cameron Highlanders was chosen with
the 11th and 13th Sudanese battalions to accompany Kitchener in
three gunboats up the White Nile to confront Major Marchand’s force
at Fashoda. Although they were all sworn to secrecy, several officers,
kept diaries and the account of Captain the Hon. Andrew Murray was
used by Bennett Burleigh in his famous ‘scoop’ on the expedition. As
Murray recorded, they had ‘a very miserable journey’ south, for it
rained heavily every night as they travelled through tropical country,
with heavily forested river banks. They used all their Maxims and guns
to disperse a Mahdist camp at Renk and disable an enemy vessel before
the fateful meeting between Marchand and Kitchener on board the
Dal. The Camerons then had the honour of providing an escort ashore,
whereupon the Khedive’s flag was raised and his anthem played before
they marched back to the tune of the ‘Cameron Men’. Sudanese troops
were left to provide garrisons at Fashoda and Sobat, but Murray
doubted they ‘cared much to be back in their native country’. The
Camerons returned directly to Omdurman and thence to Cairo.103
After the declaration of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, Sir F.
Reginald Wingate was left with the task of pacifying the country and
suppressing the last embers of Mahdism. This would involve several
fruitless expeditions in attempts to apprehend the Khalifa before
encountering his remaining forces at Um Dibaykarat (24 November
1899). Egyptian fire-power duly overwhelmed the enemy, leaving the
Khalifa dead with his emirs alongside him. One of Wingate’s staff
regarded it as ‘a truly touching sight, and one could not but feel that,
however great a beast he and they had been in their lifetime, their end
was truly grand’.104
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The South African War (1899–1902) posed an unprecedented challenge
for the Victorian army and eventually involved the services of 448,435
British and colonial troops in a series of major battlefield engagements,
sieges, relief operations and protracted counter-guerrilla campaigns.
The volume of correspondence from British soldiers was prodigious,
and some of these letters have been used in campaign accounts, regi-
mental histories, local studies and an analysis of the Scottish military
experience.1 If many of the letters were largely descriptive, they also
testified to the immense difficulties presented by a well-armed and
highly mobile adversary, operating over vast terrain and capable of
mounting strategic offensives, conducting sieges, fighting from formi-
dable defensive positions and engaging in guerrilla warfare. Although a
single chapter, utilising largely unused correspondence, cannot review
the entire war, it can shed light on how British soldiers responded and
reacted to the unique demands of this conflict. It does so by comparing
the experiences of a sample of soldiers, specifically those from Scotland
and the west country (Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, Dorset and
Gloucestershire). Soldiers were chosen from these parts of the United
Kingdom as they served in distinguished local regiments and other
arms, and came from localities with strong military connections,2
ensuring coverage of their exploits in the provincial press. Some had
served previously in Africa or on the North-West Frontier, so facilitat-
ing comparisons with previous wars; they also fought in many of the
major battles of the war, thereby attracting the attention of metropol-
itan as well as local newspapers. Sometimes Scots and west country-
men fought together, as at Elandslaagte, Colenso, Paardeberg and the
siege of Ladysmith, and, like others, they endured the demands of the
counter-guerrilla campaign.
When war began on 11 October 1899, the Boers launched their 
invasions of Natal and Cape Colony and began the investment of the
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strategic border towns of Mafeking and Kimberley (14 October). The
2/Gordons, 1/Gloucesters and 1/Devonshires were among the rein-
forcements sent from India and already deployed in Natal; further Scots
and west country units would serve in the 47,000-man army corps sent
from Britain under the command of Sir Redvers Buller. As Buller arrived
in Cape Town on the day after ‘Mournful Monday’ (30 October, when
Sir George White’s forces in Natal suffered defeats at Lombard’s Kop and
Nicholson’s Nek, and fell back on Ladysmith), he decided to split his
army corps. He led a relief force into Natal, sent a division under Lord
Methuen along the western railway to relieve Kimberley, and another
division under Gatacre with Major-General J. D. P. French’s cavalry
division to repulse the invasion of Cape Colony. Although Scots and
west countrymen served with all these forces, they were most promi-
nent in Methuen’s command and in Buller’s relief force.
Even before they faced the new realities of warfare, especially fire-
zones swept by smokeless fire from magazine rifles, British soldiers
had to adapt to the rigours of campaigning in South African conditions.
Apart from the small garrisons in Cape Colony and Natal, and the sea-
soned soldiers sent from India and the Mediterranean garrisons, many
short-service soldiers and reservists from Britain were new to the
demands of colonial service. They appreciated the welcome from the
English-speaking community, particularly in Natal where ‘the people’,
claimed Lieutenant George Smyth Osbourne (2/Devons), ‘are very
loyal, much more so than at Cape Colony’,3 and, in Durban, added Pri-
vate L. Graham (2/ Somerset Light Infantry), they gave ‘us fruit, fags,
tobacco, and made a great fuss of us’.4 Yet soldiers had to acclimatise,
and they struggled when required to march, often on short rations of
bully beef and biscuit, in the heat (and flies) of the day before enduring
cold nights and periodically heavy fogs or severe storms.5 Corporal
Devas (2/Somersets), posted with his heliograph on top of Mount
Umkolomba, Natal, described how he had never ‘been in such a funk
before; a thunderstorm is no joke on top of these mountains’.6
The 1/Devons and five companies of 2/Gordons (formerly the 92nd
Highlanders who fought at Majuba) were soon in action at Elandslaagte
(21 October 1899), serving with half a battalion of the Manchesters and
the Imperial Light Horse. Many of the Devons had recently fought on
the North-West Frontier, and so appreciated the extended formation
adopted by another Tirah veteran, Colonel Ian Hamilton. ‘We were
advancing in single rank’, wrote Private J. Isaac (Devons), ‘about 15
paces interval from one another, so we could not form a big target for
them.’7 While the Devons with close artillery support launched a
frontal attack across the veld, some 2 miles distant the Gordons and
Manchesters advanced, again with artillery support, in ‘open column’
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with intervals of ‘about 100 yards’ between companies round the
horseshoe ridge towards the enemy’s left flank. Private S. Anstey
(Devons) described how bullets rained ‘down on us like large hail-
stones’, but when they ‘were within 200 yards of their position . . . the
order to charge was given, and every man rushed as for revenge into the
enemy, who did not face the bayonet’.8 Devons and Gordons then
recalled bitterly how the Boers waved the white flag, prompting a
British cease-fire, before launching another charge ‘with an awful fire,
killing a lot of our chaps’.9 Having rallied his men to repulse these
‘treacherous marksmen’, Captain (then Lieutenant) Matthew F. M.
Meiklejohn (Gordons), who lost an arm in the action and earned the
VC, observed that two squadrons of cavalry (5th Dragoon Guards and
5th Lancers) completed the rout.10
Like others, Meiklejohn reflected on the difficulty of seeing any
Boers during the advance and the futility of volley-firing: ‘Men fired as
they saw something to fire at.’11 Equally significant were the differen-
tial casualty rates, with far fewer injured (about thirty-four) and none
killed in the Devons compared with five officers and three rankers
killed in the Gordons, eight officers and ninety-eight other ranks
wounded. A Teignmothian suspected that the Gordons must have got
‘too close together’, and Meiklejohn confirmed that it had proved dif-
ficult to restrain the supporting soldiers, eager to avenge Majuba, from
running into the firing line. The officers of the Gordons, wielding clay-
mores and wearing distinctive uniforms, had also proved far too con-
spicuous.12 In the aftermath of battle a Devonian colour-sergeant
reckoned: ‘The sight would turn you cold – headless bodies, limbs
lying around everywhere . . . I found one young fellow badly wounded,
talking about his mother and his home, and it touched me, for the
enemy are white people like ourselves.’13 Nevertheless, Devonians
were proud of their regiment’s achievement at Elandslaagte; some
insisted that they had gained ‘a very good name, better than the Gor-
dons did at Dargai’.14
Conversely, there was deep despair after the six-hour battle at
Nicholson’s Nek when 850 soldiers surrendered from five-and-a-half
companies of 1/Gloucesters and six companies of Royal Irish Fusiliers
(another 33 ‘Glosters’ were killed and some 80 officers and men were
wounded). Surviving ‘Glosters’ said little about the feasibility of their
mission (a night march into the rear of Boer forces who were beginning
to invest Ladysmith) or their maldeployment when they occupied
Tchrengula Hill overnight or the folly of constructing sangars (stone
breastworks) that served as targets for covering fire while other Boers
scaled the hillside.15 Rather they dwelt on several misfortunes, includ-
ing the stampede of their mules on the previous evening removing
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much of their ammunition and rendering the mountain guns useless,16
and how the surrender of an isolated and heavily wounded advance
party triggered the wholesale surrender of the entire force.17 Inevitably
some exaggerated the numbers of casualties and of the Boers who
attacked from three sides: a soldier asserted, ‘if we had not given in then
we would all have been slaughtered’.18 As inquiries were made into the
raising of the white flag, and recriminations persisted between the
Fusiliers and the ‘Glosters’,19 Captain Stephen Willcock (1/Gloucesters)
praised the Boers for their ‘devilish’ fire, ‘wonderful’ use of the ground
and generous treatment of the prisoners.20
Unable to break the Boer lines, some 12,000 soldiers withdrew into
Ladysmith which, along with Kimberley and Mafeking, would endure
protracted investment. When the soldiers retreated into Ladysmith, Dr
Harry H. Balfour saw ‘men wandering in, so tired that they could
hardly crawl and had to fall out to have a rest, sitting or lying on
doorsteps . . .’.21 Soldiers could not dwell on their misfortunes as they
had to fortify outposts along an 11-mile perimeter. A sergeant of the
Gordons described this work as harder ‘than would have been neces-
sary under normal circumstances’, labouring ‘for several days from
four to six hours a day, and then most part of the night amongst rocks
and cactus trees of a horrible kind tearing your hands and legs, break-
ing off nails, etc.’. Many of these untreated sores tended to swell and
fester amid the heat, sweat and flies, so making life ‘miserable’:
‘Scarcely a man escaped suffering from diarrhoea and dysentery, and
some pitiable sights were to be seen.’22 Under regular shelling from the
Boers (other than on Sundays), men kept in their trenches by day and
worked building or repairing the fortifications by night.23
The besieged took comfort from information gleaned by their bal-
loon and signallers (other than in periods of torrential rain), from the
odd sortie against the Boer positions, and retaliatory fire from their
own artillery, especially the naval 4.7-inch guns, but morale soon
flagged. By 16 November, Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil W. Park (Devons)
confirmed that ‘everyone is most deadly sick of the monotony of the
siege’, and later that his men had hardly been encouraged by news of
Buller’s defeat at Colenso.24 Yet the defenders fought off the enemy, par-
ticularly during the seventeen-hour attack on Wagon Hill and Caesar’s
Camp (6 January 1900). Once again the 1/Devons had the dramatic, if
costly, privilege of launching the final bayonet attack to clear the Free
Staters from Wagon Hill. ‘The gallant Devons’, wrote Private Lyons,
‘showed how we could fight with fixed bayonets’, an achievement rel-
ished by Private W. Parminter because ‘before our regiment charged,
the Gordons and the Rifles had a go at it, but failed in the attempt,
losing many killed and wounded’.25 The defenders suffered heavy 
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losses in this close-quarter fight (17 officers and 158 men dead, 28 offi-
cers and 221 men wounded), but in the hospital throughout the siege
only 59 of the wounded died compared with 510 deaths from typhoid
and dysentery.26
Men clearly weakened as the siege dragged on and provisions
became increasingly scarce. By February 1900 Devonshire soldiers
recorded both the escalating prices at auction – £25 for a bottle of
whisky, 10s (50p) to £10 for tins of condensed milk, 22s 6d (£1 12.5p)
for a dozen potatoes – and the cuts in their own rations: sometimes
bread and horse meat per day, or biscuit and bully beef, ‘very old and
nasty’ porridge, and ultimately a daily allowance of some 3oz of mealie
bread and over 1lb of horse meat.27 The horse flesh, added a Gordon,
was ‘very often putrid . . . crawling with maggots and stinking, of
course’.28 With the siege lifted on 28 February 1900, the relief column
subsequently marched through the town and the beleaguered garrison
provided a guard of honour: ‘The poor fellows’, wrote Gunner H. Lam-
bert, ‘were too weak to stand up and so they sat down, looking thin and
haggard, not a smile to be seen except when they happened to see a face
they knew.’29
If protracted sieges were a rarity in the African experience of the Vic-
torian army (other than in conflicts with the Boers), so were the three
major defeats in the ‘Black Week’ of 10–15 December 1899. Scots and
west countrymen were involved in two of these defeats. At Magers-
fontein (11 December) the Highland Brigade incurred the vast majority
of some 948 killed, wounded and missing, and many survivors vented
their spleen on the generalship of Lord Methuen. Anonymous claims
of a mutinous spirit within the brigade may have been far-fetched,30 but
soldiers, aggrieved at the death of their own commander Major-Gen-
eral Andrew Wauchope, denounced Methuen’s ‘blundering’, ‘bad gen-
eralship’ and ‘almost criminal negligence’.31 Corporal W. G. Bevan
(1/Argylls), a veteran of an earlier, costly ordeal at Modder River (28
November), and Private Walter Douglas (2/Black Watch) were more
specific: they berated the lack of reconnaissance, a laborious night
advance in quarter-column formation (which made an ideal target for
the Boers before it could deploy in intervals of five paces), and an
inability to cross an open field of fire against an unseen, entrenched
and well-armed enemy: ‘It was not fighting’, wrote Bevan, ‘it was
simply suicide.’32 Some conceded that the brigade, after several
thwarted attacks and ten hours pinned to the ground under a fierce sun,
compounded its predicament by retiring in daylight. An HLI soldier
admitted that after the shout ‘Retire!’ a ‘stampede’ ensued – ‘4,000 men
like a flock of sheep running for dear life’ – and many soldiers were shot
in the retreat.33 Methuen, though revered by many of his Guardsmen,34
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deeply alienated the Highlanders by sympathising with ‘their terrible
loss’ in his post-battle speech, and Lord Roberts, the new commander-
in-chief, quickly removed the brigade from his command.35
Buller had never encountered such difficulties in Natal, despite his
relief force suffering an even heavier defeat at Colenso, a disaster at
Spion Kop (24 January 1900) and another reverse at Vaal Krantz (5–7
February 2000) before eventually breaking through the Tugela
defences. Scholars have speculated on how he retained the enduring
affection of his troops, whether it was respect for his personal bravery
and endurance; or his attention to the comforts of the men, including
their food, supplies and mail from home; or his readiness to withdraw
rather than push on recklessly; or recognition that the campaign in
Natal was extremely daunting.36 Soldiers’ letters support all these
claims, but those written immediately after Colenso – a failed frontal
attack across open ground against an unseen enemy – reflected the
shock of young soldiery, many of them in their first battle. Soldiers of
the 2/Devons described how they survived a ‘hailstorm’ of bullets,
lying behind anthills for eight hours under a blazing sun before with-
drawing in daylight ‘under a murderous fire’ or managing to evade cap-
ture.37 If some grossly exaggerated the enemy’s numbers (‘22,000’
rather than 3,000) and their casualties (‘2,000’ killed rather than 38),
and described their positions as ‘impregnable’,38 others were more per-
ceptive. Scots Fusiliers, who escorted the guns forward, testified to the
lack of reconnaissance: ‘we got a surprise, as they hid in their trenches
until we came near them’, and the ‘mistake’ of taking the ‘artillery so
near the enemy’s position’.39 A Cameronian, who observed the battle-
field from high ground in the rear, where he escorted the naval guns,
saw the target presented by Hart’s brigade as it advanced in a ‘close
mass of columns’, the heavy casualties caused by withdrawing in day-
light, and the vulnerability of Barton’s more extended brigade when it
advanced without artillery support.40 Soldiers tended to blame Colonel
C. J. Long for losing the ten guns and Major-General Fitzroy Hart for
his choice of formation rather than Buller, who was lauded for remain-
ing in the firing line.41
Similarly Buller evaded much of the blame for Spion Kop but earned
plaudits for breaking off the attack, a decision repeated at Vaal Krantz.
Sergeant A. Kean (2/Somerset Light Infantry) affirmed:
There is no doubt General Buller deserves the greatest praise for the way
in which he has manoeuvred the troops about from one place to the other
. . . I think it is General Buller’s great motto to manoeuvre and take the
positions with as few casualties as possible and not to rush a position
which means sure death, especially against such positions and fortifica-
tions as our enemy possessed.42
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Inevitably there was grumbling about the withdrawals and sarcasm
about Buller’s claim to have found the ‘key’ to the road to Ladysmith,43
but many soldiers resented the domestic criticism of Buller, arguing
that their commander had the toughest task in breaking through the
Tugela line, showed ‘bull-dog tenacity’ in that, ‘checked three times,
he yet went for them a fourth’, and deserved every credit for the relief
of Ladysmith.44 Devonians, identifying with one of their own, were
probably more supportive than most, but Sergeant-Major William
Young (2/Dorsets) was delighted by Buller’s praise of the Dorsets after
Spion Kop as ‘our Regt was the only one that did not run away’.45 Sol-
diers appreciated, as Private H. Easterbrook (2/Devons) argued, that
Buller had shared their hardships: ‘where the fighting was the fiercest
there he was to be found’ and ensured that they lived ‘very well; even
better than I ever lived in barracks. Plenty of biscuits, tinned meat,
cheese, jam, fruit and bread, and fresh meat whenever it is possible to
get it.’46 Some lauded his tactics in the final push on Ladysmith with a
sustained onslaught, and heavy use of artillery and Maxims, over
eleven days (16–27 February); many remained fiercely loyal to him
thereafter.47
Veterans of previous wars were equally forthright: ‘My Soudan expe-
riences’, wrote Father Matthews, ‘were mere child’s play in compari-
son’; any action in the Tirah, argued Private H. Worth (2/Devons), was
eclipsed by Colenso; and ‘Omdurman was a picnic’, claimed Private
Louis Wilshaw (2/Lancashire Fusiliers), by comparison with Spion
Kop.48 Egyptian veterans told Private F. Hughes (2/Black Watch) that
this campaign was far more stressful as they were always on the march
or look-out, while Tirah veterans praised the supply services in South
Africa inasmuch as rations (and presents from home) were far more
plentiful than in India. They observed, too, that their khaki kit served
as excellent camouflage in South African conditions, and that the
wounded could be left on the battlefield, as they were at Magers-
fontein, ‘in the knowledge that they will receive the best treatment at
the hands of their enemies and not the “coup de grace” from the
Afridis’.49 Yet soldiers recognised that they were being tested as never
before: after Magersfontein Private Bain (1/Argylls) admitted that ‘a lot
more troops from home’ were ‘badly’ needed; many gunners, drivers
and troopers complained that ‘our horses are badly in want of rest’ or
‘are dropping down like dead sheep every day as they can’t stand the
heat’; and some protested that the army needed ‘more modern and
quick-firing guns’ as well as a rifle to match the Mauser.50 Soldiers
acknowledged, nonetheless, that the army was adapting to the con-
straints of modern war. Modifications of kit aroused intense debate as
Highlanders placed aprons over their kilts, while officers, as Smyth
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Osbourne described, discarded their swords and dressed ‘as much like
the men as possible’ to make themselves less conspicuous.51 Another
officer in Natal indicated that the soldiers were developing new skills
in field-craft to beat the Boer at ‘his own game’, adding: ‘What a lot
they are teaching us, these farmers! When we have settled them we
shall be the most magnificent army in the world.’52 
Meanwhile Scots and west countrymen would be involved in the
worst day’s fighting of the war, the assaults launched by Kitchener on
Cronjé’s beleaguered forces at Paardeberg (18 February 1900). Soldiers
recalled the gruelling marches over several days that preceded those
attacks. ‘Some days’, wrote Bandsman P. Kelly (Argylls), ‘we did 18
miles, and went off at night, marching by moonlight, and for about four
days we never had four consecutive hours’ sleep’; Colour-Sergeant G.
Fry (2/Gloucesters) recollected ‘marching day and night, on half rations
. . . Of course we had no tents; we simply lay on the ground, just where
we halted . . .’.53 Barely recovered from such exertions, the Highlanders
were thrown into an early morning attack on the Boer trenches. While
other assaults were launched from upstream and against the front of
the Boer positions, with gunners pounding the Boer positions from 5
a.m. to 7 p.m., the Highlanders and later the ‘Dukes’ attacked from the
south-east. The Highlanders were soon halted by Boer fire-power
across open ground, whereupon a company of Seaforths accompanied
by two companies of the Black Watch forded the river and charged to
within 300 yards of the Boer trenches. ‘When I got across’, recalled
Lance-Corporal Wallace Maxwell (2/Seaforths), ‘I had to advance,
soaked through as I was, and with 150 rounds of ammunition in my
pouches, I was not very comfortable.’ Unlike 155 Seaforths (the largest
number of casualties suffered by any battalion on that day) Maxwell
avoided injury, but ruefully observed: ‘Our regiment is once more
reduced to very small numbers, so there will be some more gruesome
reading at home’.54 On the other bank of the river, Major-General
Hector Macdonald ordered the Argylls, who had been guarding the
guns, to join the firing line and ‘give a good account’ of themselves: as
Bandsman Kelly recalled, once bullets began whistling ‘round our
ears’, the infantry were soon pinned to the ground; and another Argyll,
Private William Johnston, admitted: ‘It is cruel work lying in the sun
all day.’55 At least they did not panic and remained prone, desperate for
water and tantalisingly close to the Modder River until dusk.
The ‘Dukes’ only arrived at the battlefield in early morning and had
one company posted on outpost duty and the other six guarding the
baggage. At 10.30 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel William Aldworth was
required to send the right half of the battalion to support the Highland
Brigade on the southern bank of the river, and, three hours later, to
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launch the other three companies in a direct attack from the northern
bank. The colonel, as Lieutenant Hugh Fife recalled, gave an inspira-
tional speech to the officers and men, assuring them that their first
action would take the form of a ‘Cornish charge’: it would earn them
lasting fame, and he would give £5 to the first man who bayoneted a
Boer.56 Officers and men were allowed some food, and then forded the
river, using a rope, with water ‘up to our waists’.57 By about 4.45 p.m.,
they formed three extended lines with intervals of 150 yards between
each company and then charged with fixed bayonets across open
ground into a ‘most terrific hail of bullets, pom pom fire and shrap-
nel’.58 Forced to take cover behind ‘a goodly sprinkling of ant-hills’,
some claimed that the ‘Dukes’ made a second charge (covering about
300 yards in all, or barely half the requisite distance); but few disputed
that once their colonel fell mortally wounded, ‘the men’, as one private
asserted,‘acted more for themselves, rushing to the front one at a time
for about 50 yards or so and getting under cover’.59 The fighting ceased
about 7.30 p.m., whereupon soldiers began ferrying the wounded
across the river: ‘their groans’, claimed Private D. James, ‘were sicken-
ing’; he would not have ‘cared so much’ had he been able ‘to see some
Boers to fire at’ and had the ‘Dukes’ received any support.60 In their first
action the two parts of the battalion had lost 3 officers and 24 men
killed and 74 wounded, a ‘very heavy loss’, in Fife’s opinion, for which
Kitchener was responsible. Their brigadier, Major-General H. L. Smith-
Dorrien, ‘knew nothing of it’, further testimony of the poor staff work
and lack of communications during the attack.61
Soldiers were certainly relieved when Lord Roberts resumed com-
mand on 19 February and replaced the costly attacks on Cronjé by siege
operations. Lieutenant Lachlan Gordon-Duff, whose 1/Gordon High-
landers had observed the battle on the previous day, regarded the mis-
sion set for the DCLI as an ‘impossible feat’, while Private H.
Haughton described the Canadian charge, over a distance similar to
that attempted by the ‘Dukes’, as ‘ridiculous’, since ‘after running 700
yards, a man would hardly push a bayonet through a sheet of paper’.62
During the ensuing siege Haughton, like his Cornish comrades, had
horrible memories of nights in the muddy trenches, with an all-per-
vading stench of dead men and animals, or on outpost duty often in tor-
rential downpours.63 Conditions were even worse in the Boer laager,
and when Cronjé surrendered on the anniversary of Majuba Day (27
February) soldiers were able to inspect the Boer defences. Lieutenant R.
M. S. Gardner (2/Gloucesters) found a ‘wonderful collection of rifles’ in
the laager, a less pleasant sight in soft-nosed (or explosive) ammunition
and ‘marvellous’ trenches, explaining how they held out so ‘well
behind them’.64
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After the loss of Cronjé’s wagon laager with over 4,000 men, women
and children, a joint council of the two republics resolved on 17 March
1900 to rely thenceforth on mounted commandos, a new method of
warfare in which the Boers exploited their increased mobility.
Although they abandoned both capitals without resistance (Bloem-
fontein on 13 March and Pretoria on 5 June), they engaged in fixed bat-
tles until the end of August 1900 before embarking on a protracted
guerrilla war. At first British soldiers seemed unaware that they would
have to adapt once again to altered conditions of warfare. When they
captured Bloemfontein, and received a hearty reception from the
British inhabitants, many were convinced that Lord Roberts had deci-
sively transformed their fortunes. They now had a chance to rest and
re-equip: ‘We are nothing but a bundle of rags now’, wrote Private Tom
Wood (2/DCLI), ‘our clothes are nearly dropping off us; we have not had
them off since January . . .’, while Private W. James (2/Gloucesters) was
even more relieved, thinking that the war was nearly all over, ‘for we
have been on the march this last five weeks, and we are all half-starved
and ragged – just like a lot of tramps’.65
The optimism proved short-lived: as Private Wood described,
typhoid soon swept the large encampment at Bloemfontein and British
forces, though re-equipped, were required to mount ‘long and tedious
marches into the surrounding country on look-out for the enemy’.66
The ‘hit-and-run’ tactics of the Boer commandos, led by Christiaan de
Wet, Louis Botha and Koos De la Rey, increased their frustration. Even
those soldiers, like Private Stinchcombe (2/DCLI), who had enrolled in
the growing ranks of the mounted infantry, complained that his com-
pany never got ‘much rest’, was ‘nearly roasted in the day’ and had ‘to
keep on all the time’.67 Others were exasperated by de Wet’s ability to
harass convoys, burn farms, attack trains and still elude his pursuers.
After de Wet captured a major convoy en route to Heilbron (4 June
1900), and then attacked the railway, destroying the mails at Roodewal
station (7 June), Sergeant William Hamilton (1/HLI) emphasised ‘how
disgusted and wild we we all felt on receiving this news’.68
Roberts resolved to assume the initiative when he left Bloem-
fontein on 3 May, advancing in concert with forces from Kimberley in
the west and Buller’s forces from Ladysmith in the east as they drove
towards Pretoria. A Tauntonian gunner, Harry Verrier (82nd Battery,
Royal Field Artillery) chronicled his exhausting itinerary:
action on 4th of May; captured Wynburg 10th May; Zand River in action
the whole of the day; 12th of May captured Kroonstad; 18th of May cap-
tured Lindley; 20th of May had a rearguard action with De Wet . . . 23rd
of May captured Heilbron; 26th of May crossed the Vaal River into the
Transvaal; 29th of May in action at the battle of Doornkop; 30th of May
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in the gold district of Florida; 31st of May captured Johannesburg; 5th of
June captured Pretoria after some fighting, had a grand march past for
Lord Roberts; 11th and 12th of June had a severe battle at Diamond Hill,
which I shall never forget: I worked like a slave that two days fixing and
setting fuses, but we kept them at bay.69
New units and tactics were employed to overwhelm Boer positions.
At Doornkop (29 May 1900) Hamilton launched his assault with the
City of London Imperial Volunteers (CIV) and the Gordons, supported
by the Cornwalls, up sloping ridges burnt black by the Boers to remove
any cover and render the khaki uniforms more easily targeted. The
Gordons included a Volunteer company in their second line, and
attacked in extended order, covered partially by artillery fire. Many of
the casualties occurred near or at the crest where there was a fierce fire-
fight among the rocks before the Boers withdrew. While the ‘Dukes’
suffered only two casualties, including Lieutenant Fife who was fatally
wounded, the Gordons incurred 97 (about 20 of whom would die from
wounds caused by explosive bullets). Even so, Lieutenant Gordon-Duff
thought: ‘Luckily they were not first class shots, otherwise not so
many of us would have come off, Scot free’.70 
On 11 June 1900, the 2/Dorsets undertook their first major action at
Alleman’s Nek, where they were required to seize two hills overlooking
the pass. After languishing in Natal where many had succumbed to
fever, the men were reportedly jubilant at the prospect of action. They
were deployed in the centre of the advance (flanked in a wedge-shaped
formation by Middlesex soldiers on the left and Dublin Fusiliers on the
right). Under Major-General J. Talbot Coke’s instructions, companies
had to advance across the open plain without firing in a succession of
lines, each occupying 120 yards in width and with 150 yards in depth
between each line. Supported by naval guns and artillery, the Dorsets,
led by Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil Law, stormed Conical Hill before pur-
suing the Boers onto Alleman’s Hill, and during this pursuit, as Corporal
A. E. Robinson observed, ‘we lost most of our men’.71 Given the lack of
cover and the height of the hills, the loss of 2 officers and 10 men killed
and 52 wounded (2 of whom would die of their wounds) testified to the
value of a rapid assault. A Boer prisoner described the Dorsets as not men
but ‘devils’ since they had moved so quickly past their range markers
and had not stopped to fire in the assault; even more gratifying, added
Corporal R. Abbott, was the fact that the enemy not only evacuated Alle-
man’s Nek but fled from their positions on Laing’s Nek and Majuba,
thereby enabling Buller to break through the rear of the Boer defences.72
Capturing Pretoria unopposed did not, as Lord Roberts hoped, bring
the war to a ‘rapid conclusion’.73 His extended lines of communication
and dependence on the railway left British forces vulnerable to attacks
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in the renamed Orange River Colony, the Transvaal and, later, Cape
Colony. Countering these attacks proved difficult, as Private George C.
Fraser (1/Royal Scots Mounted Infantry) conceded, because ‘the mar-
vellous energies and skilful tactics of Christian De Wet’ were ‘leading
our men a dance and no mistake . . .’. He believed, nonetheless, that
the mounted infantry were becoming more proficient as horsemen,
skirmishers and snipers, and claimed: ‘The Dutchmen have taught us
many useful military lessons since the commencement of the war.’74
Infantry and artillery were also involved in chasing the Boers, and, after
a fortnight’s action in July 1900, Robert McClelland (chaplain,
1/Cameron Highlanders) described how the Camerons, as part of the
21st Brigade, had become proficient in the use of cover, in extended
operations, and in fire and movement with artillery support. ‘The
Cameron Volunteers’, he noted, ‘particularly distinguished them-
selves, advancing at the double up the face of almost inaccessible
cliffs’.75 However, the futility of infantry chasing commandos soon
became apparent: ‘it is impossible’, wrote Private Ross (2/Seaforths),
‘for infantry to follow them up’, and packing soldiers into carts, as
described by Lieutenant John Bryan (2/Gloucesters), ‘had no luck, as
usual . . .’.76 Even mounted patrols floundered in pursuit of de Wet,
with a Truro soldier in Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. O. Plumer’s column
acknowledging: ‘It’s a marvel how he gets about so rapidly. We are all
mounted, and it takes us all our time to keep up with him’.77
Facing repeated attacks on detachments, patrols and convoys, the
British forces had to protect their lines of communication. Battal-
ions, already depleted by mounting tolls of sick, were often split up,
with companies assigned to garrison duty in towns, stations and
depots, while others manned armoured trains, guarded bridges and
escorted convoys. These duties varied considerably: in some gar-
risons and rear-area postings, officers and men enjoyed, as Captain F.
M. Peacock (Somersets) remarked, ‘fairly easy times’, with hospital-
ity from friendly civilians and opportunities for shooting; but, in
more isolated posts, men endured extremes of temperature, restricted
rations and often monotonous duty.78 Patrolling was often arduous,
and after four companies of the Somersets completed 240 miles of
marching from Vryburg ‘through blinding dust, scarcely any water,
and often only half rations’, Sergeant Edward E. Husband was pleased
that ‘the Somersets have pulled through, and had only three men fall
out the whole time’.79 The engineers, as a Devonian sapper, C.
Bowden, affirmed, were particularly busy: his company not only
engaged the enemy periodically but built redoubts and roads, cleared
dynamite from bridges, repaired railway tracks and marched on to
Komati Poort, covering 800 miles in 6 months. There they built huts
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and roads in temperatures of ‘110 degrees in the shade all through the
fever months’.80
Small detachments, too, were vulnerable to enemy attack. Three
companies of the unlucky ‘Glosters’ were among 480 soldiers mount-
ing a garrison at De Wetsdorp when de Wet’s forces surrounded them,
captured their two guns, and killed or wounded some 96 soldiers.
When the widely dispersed and poorly fortified garrison surrendered
(23 November 1900), Private Bray reflected: ‘We had been in the
trenches three days and two nights without rest, and thirty hours with-
out water, so you can guess what state we were in . . .’.81 By February
1901 Private E. Eyers was delighted to learn that another 30,000 sol-
diers were due to arrive in South Africa: ‘They are badly wanted, for
this is a great country, and it takes a lot of men to fight, while others
hold all the towns and look after the railway lines and escort convoys,
etc.’82 Despite the reinforcements, including imperial troops and auxil-
iary forces, regular units still struggled to operate effectively: by May
1901, Peacock admitted: ‘The companies are not strong now; in fact,
very weak, and as we had to find a detachment of twenty men, under
Harrison, to guard the railway bridge, we cannot muster much more
than eighty men for duty, and as thirty men is the minimum we can do
with for picquet and outpost duty, the nights in bed are few’.83
Soldiers also engaged in active counter-guerrilla operations: farm-
burning, the destruction of Boer livestock and the removal of Boer fam-
ilies into concentration camps – policies begun under Roberts and
continued under Kitchener.84 Soldiers had mixed feelings about these
tasks: some, like Captain Boyd A. Cunningham (4/Argyll and Suther-
land Highlanders Militia), regarded ‘orders to ravage some farms . . .
[as] great fun’;85 others regretted the destruction of livestock or empha-
sised that they only burnt farms from which they had been fired upon.
Whereas an Australian officer of Cornish stock found it ‘very disagree-
able work’, another officer justified farm-burning as necessary because
the Boers used ‘their women and children’ as cover and their farms as
arsenals.86 The implacable hostility of many Boer women only com-
pounded these difficulties: ‘The women’, wrote Peacock, ‘are at the
bottom of the war.’ ‘They loathe us’, added a Bristolian officer, ‘the first
thing they teach their children is to hate the British.’87
The bitterness of the guerrilla engagements, coupled with the seem-
ingly endless conflict, exacerbated feelings towards the enemy. Sol-
diers and chaplains retold accounts of the Boers using explosive
bullets, firing on ambulance wagons, destroying loyalist farms, killing
wounded men at Vlakfontein and shooting blacks.88 Some soldiers
attributed this resistance to the lenient policies adopted by Roberts
when he first entered the republics and allowed Boers who surren-
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dered, and took an oath of ‘neutrality’, to return to their homes (where-
upon some resumed combat). Reverend C. E. Greenfield (acting chap-
lain with the Scots Greys) maintained that the British should have
grasped the nettle ‘strongly’ from the outset: ‘our weak efforts have
only resulted in us being grievously stung’.89
Soldiers adapted to Kitchener’s more systematic methods of
counter-guerrilla warfare; they constructed, with native assistance, a
vast network of blockhouses and barbed wire entanglements within
which to mount drives against the Boers. Sergeant H. Hurley (2/DCLI)
was impressed with the ‘craze’ of ‘hemming ourselves in with barbed
wire and also building blockhouses, which are great things in guarding
the line . . .’.90 If blockhouse duty was less onerous than trekking, sol-
diers had to stay alert, particularly at night, despite a daily routine
which Lance Corporal G. Hill (Somersets) aptly described as ‘very quiet
and monotonous . . .’.91 The drives yielded variable returns: after a
seven-day trek in May 1901, F and H companies of the Argylls brought
in ‘24 prisoners of war, 8 surrenders, 3 undesirables, 36 rifles, 2,300
rounds of small ammunition, 37 women, 124 children, 80 wagons, 26
Cape Carts, 200 horses, 12 mules, 1,300 cattle, 5,500 sheep’.92
Despite the mounting number of surrenders and the assistance
afforded by blacks (both armed and unarmed) and Boers who joined the
British as scouts,93 soldiers despaired of an end to hostilities. ‘The
“war”’, argued Major Mackintosh (Seaforths), ‘may go on forever at
this rate’,94 a fear that partly explained the intense resentment of the
pro-Boers at home. As Lieutenant-Colonel Law (2/Dorsets) com-
mented: ‘I am sorry to say the war drags on, our greatest enemies being
the size of the country and the traitors at home who give the Boers
every encouragement to continue this struggle with a view to getting
their independence.’95 Many soldiers deplored the expression of pro-
Boer opinions in Britain. Private W. Willis (2/Devons) reckoned that
the pro-Boers knew ‘nothing’ about the war: ‘They want to come here
and see what is going on. It is perfectly disgraceful.’96 Corporal Chin
(2/DCLI) reported that his regimental chaplain, Reverend H. K. South-
well, vicar of Bodmin, was planning to send samples of explosive bul-
lets to Leonard H. Courtney, a local Member of Parliament and
prominent pro-Boer.97
Soldiers were even more incensed by criticisms of their counter-
guerrilla operations, especially of the concentration camps where,
according to a Gordon Highlander, ‘every facility’ was offered to the
Boers and they were ‘treated as well, if not better, than Tommy Atkins
himself’.98 This was a recurrent military refrain,99 and those more
directly acquainted with the camps ascribed much of the ‘distressing’
mortality rate to the insanitary habits of the Boers in confined quarters
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and their lack of co-operation with the medical authorities. Reverend
F. J. Williams insisted that there was ‘no cruelty, no neglect, no
unkindness’ in the management of the camps, while Dr H. A. Spencer
of the Middelburg camp praised his nursing sisters who were trying to
‘convert some scores of irresponsible and careless women into better
mothers’. Just as Spencer deplored the criticisms of Emily Hobhouse,100
Trooper Lambert argued:
It is very annoying for us poor fellows, who have been out here just two
years and have been in the stiffest of battles, to have to read in English
papers that so-called English gentlemen have the soft headedness to
stand up before the British public and say that it has been a most bar-
barous war, accusing British Generals and Tommy Atkins of the same.101
Whether these fulminations reflected more than momentary out-
bursts of anger, triggered by incidents in the field, articles in the press
or frustrations over the length of the war, is difficult to discern. At least
one officer admitted being ‘a bit rabid on this question’,102 but others
proffered more considered judgements: Lieutenant M. H. Grant
(2/Devons) would not overlook the ‘many white flag incidents’ but
insisted that the Boers were not cowards but ‘brave men’, capable of
acts of ‘collective heroism . . . astonishing in a soldiery brought up in a
school of pure individualism’.103 A Dorset Lancer conceded: ‘The Boers
are awfully clever, though . . . both deceitful and treacherous’, adept at
the use of cover; several engineers commended the trenches of the
Boers and their long-range shooting; and Corporal Philip Littler (2/Gor-
dons) insisted that ‘it is a mistake to look upon the Boers as poor igno-
rant farmers . . . They will take some beating’.104 A Devonian officer
agreed, describing fighting that began at 3,000 yards:
You never see your enemy, even at 900 or 500; and the Boer is a busy
fellow if he feels so inclined. He will stay and fire 300 shots at you before
you can clap your hands. If he wants to go to a better place he will go, but
you can’t see him move. Taking one consideration with another, the
Dutchman is a fine enemy, and if he did not misuse the white flag he
would be universally respected.105
Whatever their feelings towards the enemy,106 many tired of the war
and yearned to go home. Neither news of Boer surrenders nor reports
of convoys capturing large numbers of refugees, animals and wagons
deflected the desire of Corporal F. Hawkins (Somersets) and others to
leave ‘this miserable place’.107 Once the peace conference at Vereenig-
ing began, hopes of a complete Boer surrender rose and a sergeant in the
South Wales Borderers was delighted to see Kitchener ‘in particularly
good spirits. He actually smiles, and that is a thing he does not often
do.’108 Relief was certainly the overwhelming sentiment when the
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peace was signed on 31 May 1902, but soldiers had expressed hopes
that lessons would be learned from the new methods of warfare. As a
Gordon Highlander claimed after Paardeberg: ‘Our generals have learnt
their lesson in the harsh school of adversity. The dangers attending
misdirected strategy and antiquated tactics have been recognised.’109
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Letter-writing by the late Victorian soldiery was not merely more volu-
minous than previously recognised (though still an activity of a minor-
ity of the rank-and-file) but was a highly significant undertaking in its
own right. Like the less extensive efforts in sketching, diary-keeping
and poetry, this correspondence reflected a desire to record and inter-
pret major historical events. Active service in Africa involved travel to
exotic locations, campaigns over difficult terrain, often in extreme cli-
matic conditions, and the prospect of testing personal courage,
weaponry and disciplined skills against a diverse array of enemies. Sol-
diers knew that these enemies usually had advantages in numbers and
in their knowledge of their own terrain (only partially offset by the
willingness of local auxiliaries to assist in scouting, transport and
combat), and that all these enemies had specific military skills (even
the much-maligned Egyptians who had professional training and apti-
tudes in engineering and gunnery). While British soldiers relished the
prospect of prevailing over these foes, with the possibility of earning
promotions and medals, they realised, too, that African service was
fraught with risks, not least of losing far more of their number from
sickness and disease than from combat. In short, British soldiers appre-
ciated that any service in Africa represented a challenge to their com-
mand, organisation, discipline and fighting skills.
In assessing the value of letter-writing by regimental officers and
other ranks three caveats have to be acknowledged: first, the corre-
spondents often wrote from a limited body of knowledge and a very
narrow perspective; second, they sometimes erred in their recollec-
tions and in their estimates of enemy numbers, casualties incurred,
distances travelled and the duration of events; third, their letters nor-
mally reached Britain after the publication of official despatches and
the reports of war correspondents. None of these caveats was absolute,
and in the earlier campaigns from southern Africa, where war 
correspondents were hardly conspicuous, the surviving letters and
sketches of soldiers were even more valuable as first-hand evidence.
Nevertheless, soldiers frequently recognised that family and friends
probably knew as much about their particular campaign as they did
themselves. When serving in Suakin, Lieutenant Lloyd often began let-
ters to his wife with the disclaimer that she would already ‘have heard
all about to-day’s performance’.1 In a conflict spread out over a vast
theatre, as in the South African War, Private R. Bullen (2/Gloucesters)
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expected that his parents in Lifton, Devon, would ‘get more news than
we do’.2
Compounding this perception were the effects of isolation in remote
locations: Private James Glasson (2/DCLI), when protecting a bridge at
Bethulie in the Orange Free State, about 100 miles from the nearest
town, complained: ‘We don’t know any news here. Have not seen a
paper for three weeks, and then there is no news of the war but what is
sent out from London.’3 Private R. Munro (2/Black Watch), when based
at the desolate garrison of Winburg, yearned for mail and newspapers
from home as ‘it is weary waiting in such a dismal hole as this is’.4 Sol-
diers moving into action were not much better informed. On the eve of
Magersfontein, a Highland officer conceded: ‘We get very little news
here’; or, as Lance-Corporal A. Taylor (1/HLI) added, ‘no news . . . what-
ever about the war elsewhere, as there are a lot of spies about’.5
Another comrade in the Highland Brigade later acknowledged: ‘We
know nothing of the plans of operations, but quietly go where we are
ordered in profound ignorance . . .’.6 Even Captain John E. Pine-Coffin,
a Devonian who commanded the 2/Loyal North Lancashire Mounted
Infantry, repeatedly bemoaned the lack of news: as he noted in his
diary, ‘all ordinary traffic stopped by Lord Kitchener’.7
Admittedly the South African War was unique in its scale, dispersal
of units and protracted guerrilla warfare. In earlier campaigns, soldiers
found it easier to comment on the capture of Kumase or the burning of
Cetshwayo’s kraal or the relief of Gordon. Moreover, they often had
personal tales to recount, promotions and medals to celebrate,8 and
marches, garrisons, duties and battles to describe. If they wrote pri-
marily to reassure, impress or entertain friends and family, they pro-
vided a personal perspective on campaigning that the official
despatches and articles of war correspondents could never emulate. In
sending home letters, poetry, sketches and sometimes diaries (see chap-
ter 1), soldiers sought not only to describe their impressions of active
service in Africa but to interpret events which the press had already
reported. Lance-Corporal Rose (2/DCLI) feared that the ‘people at home
little know what we are going through’, and Lance-Corporal T. Rice,
RE, insisted that ‘the horrors of war can’t be imagined’ except by those
involved.9 Misunderstanding the enemy, argued Sergeant J. E. Hitch-
cock (2/Coldstream Guards), simply compounded this incomprehen-
sion: ‘the feeling in England is that they [the Boers] are a lot of harmless
farmers, but they are worse than savages, and armed as well as us’.10
Many soldiers took a keen interest in how their exploits were reported
in the newspapers but had ambivalent feelings about the war correspon-
dents. While regimental officers often enjoyed their company (see chap-
ter 8), bemoaned their absence (chapter 6) or grieved over the death of the
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more respected correspondents (notably the Hon. Hubert Howard, killed
by a British shell at Omdurman, and G. W. Steevens, whose death from
typhoid in Ladysmith was described by Colonel Park as ‘a terrible loss,
both to the Daily Mail and the public’11), others remained deeply scepti-
cal of the profession. In the Sudan Colonel Archibald Hunter objected to
the presence of war correspondents, ‘1stly on the score of their drinking,
2d they quarrel in their cups among themselves, 3d they pester one for
news & keep back one’s work’. Correspondents, he affirmed, ‘are never
really in the know & all they can claim to give the public is the common
talk & speculation of the camp’.12 Major John M. Vallentin (2/Somerset
Light Infantry) was equally unimpressed when he first encountered jour-
nalists in South Africa: ‘I have been amazed how little they attempt to
get hold of the truth. Numbers of them don’t venture under fire, and take
the account of the first man they meet as Gospel.’13 Otherssuspected that
correspondents would always be prevented by censorship from reporting
unwelcome news. In the wake of Colenso, Rifleman Martin doubted that
his father would ‘get the truth through the press, as it is under Govern-
ment censorship. But that frontal attack was human butchery.’14 A
Gordon Highlander also questioned whether ‘the highly-paid correspon-
dents’ would examine the more mundane aspects of the South African
campaign such as the ‘state of the transport’, particularly the lack of carts
and the inadequate victualling of the mules and horses. Lord Roberts’s
march to Bloemfontein, he noted, was ‘marked by carcasses of mules and
horses that have died through overwork and no food . . .’.15
In fact, the Remount Department incurred so much press criticism
that Major C. H. Tippet, the officer commanding remounts for the
Aliwal district, wrote a lengthy defence of his staff and explained how
they treated sore, debilitated, lame and maimed horses. By expressing
his concern about misrepresentation in the press,16 Tippet reflected
part of a double-edged fear of the military – supposedly unjustified crit-
icism of their own units (not least after the many abject surrenders in
South Africa17) and excessive praise heaped on others. The press cover-
age of the Gordon Highlanders, real or imagined, aroused intense
resentment. After the early engagements in Natal, a Devonian sergeant
maintained: ‘The Gordons are not in it now. It is all the Devons here,
but I suppose in England it is the “Gordons did this and the Gordons
did that” but don’t you believe it.’18 Many Highlanders took umbrage
after reading the reports of Magersfontein: Private J. Ruddick read ‘in
the papers that the Gordons were in the line of fire. Well that is non-
sense. We, the Black Watch, were in the line of fire’; a private of the
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders insisted: ‘We did our work, and
well, so why should the Gordons get all the praise’; and Private Alex
Williamson (2/Seaforths) simply reckoned that the Gordons did not
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deserve ‘as much’ praise ‘as they are getting’.19 The Gordons defended
themselves, professing surprise at the envy of their comrades and
insisting that they had ‘done their share of the work, and have done it
well’;20 they even earned some accolades from soldiers in other units,
especially after the charge at Doornkop.21 In short, soldiers wrote at
least in part to correct perceived misrepresentations, or oversights in
the press, setting the record straight from their point of view.
Soldiers were even more concerned when they read newspaper arti-
cles, speeches by politicians or critical letters from home that seemed
to them unfair, ill-informed, or unjust. Inevitably these comments
tended to occur during the more controversial campaigns, such as the
Anglo-Zulu War or the South African War (although there was uproar
over press reports criticising the treatment of the dervish wounded
after Omdurman).22 The commanding officers, particularly Chelms-
ford, Buller and Methuen, bore much of the condemnation, and,
despite similar misgivings by certain soldiers (notably the Highlanders
towards Methuen after Magersfontein), many soldiers resented retro-
spective criticisms, especially from civilians at home. Sergeant Evan
Jones (2/24th) deplored the condemnation of Chelmsford’s strategy by
‘Conservative as well as Liberal journals’ on the basis of little infor-
mation and without even hearing ‘what he had to say’. Jones main-
tained: ‘I shall always remain convinced that he did everything for the
best. We, the 24th, ought to know what he is made of. There is not a
man in the 24th that would not fight and most willingly die for him
. . .’.23 Buller evoked similar feelings, even when he was dismissed from
the army after an indiscreet speech in October 1901. Private Arthur
Bowden, a Devonian reservist, claimed:
Everyone in the Army sympathises with General Buller . . . his troops
had every confidence in him during his attempts to relieve Ladysmith,
and after a reverse he had only to make a speech to them, and they were
willing to do anything, for, I believe, the universal opinion among the
men was: If Buller can’t do it no one can. It is easy for people to point out
his mistakes now, but at the time they could not tell him what to do. He
is one of the best generals we ever had, and will always be remembered
by the rank and file of the Army.24
If these sentiments were possibly less representative than their authors
imagined, they reflected not only the enduring bonds of discipline, loy-
alty and respect – bonds that had to be preserved in wartime (hence the
prompt removal of the Highland Brigade from Methuen’s command) –
but an assumption that only those who had served under a commander
could assess his qualities. In an era of highly personalised commands
when even staff officers, quite apart from regimental officers or other
ranks, were not fully apprised of command decisions,25 this assumption
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was profoundly mistaken. It was widely held, nonetheless, and may
explain the deep resentment of external criticism.
Soldiers, though, had other objectives in letter-writing, not least
those letters that found their way into the public domain. Officers and
other ranks were hardly indifferent to the shortcomings of their kit and
equipment, particularly those deficiencies exposed in African cam-
paigns. Complaints about boots, swords, medical supplies, tardy
supply columns and jamming machine-guns were all too frequent,
compounded by criticisms of the transport in Egypt, whale-boats and
camels in the Nile expedition, and horses, rifles and guns in the South
African War. Although British expeditionary forces were generally well
organised, and none foundered on account of failures in transport and
supply, the complaints of soldiers, endorsed by many war correspon-
dents and sometimes investigated at parliamentary level, helped to
keep these issues under review. Even Wolseley, in trying to defend the
swords used in Suakin before a parliamentary committee, admitted
that ‘sensational writing’ had raised interest in the issue.26
A few soldiers also believed that their conduct on active service, if
fully reported, would elevate their status in civilian society. At a time
when army enlistment had little appeal and soldiers were being
shunned in public places,27 this was an understandable concern, partic-
ularly for the reservists who had left their families and civilian jobs to
return to active service. Private William Henwood (2/DCLI) was con-
vinced that his comrades, particularly ‘us Reserve men, with good
characters’ had earned ‘a great name’ for themselves in South Africa,
and that this should enhance their reputation at home: ‘I don’t think a
reserve man should be looked down upon as he used to be in days gone
by.’28 Private Willis (2/Devons) agreed; he testified to the strains of
reverting to military service and appreciated the commendations of
‘our General’ (presumably Buller) on ‘the way we went into battle. 
We reservists feel it more than the regulars.’29 Several chaplains 
testified to the ‘excellent voluntary services both on Sundays and
weekdays’ in South Africa, the resilience and camaraderie of the 
soldiers in adversity, the sufferings of the sick and wounded borne 
with humour and fortitude, and the ‘reverence and tenderness’ when
funerals occurred.30 However the indiscretions of British soldiers, not
least their looting, hardly enhanced their image: ‘You should see the
troops’, wrote Private W. Chonlarton (1/Argylls), ‘skirmish round 
looking for sheep, goats, or cows. We have them killed, cut up, stewed,
and almost eaten in an hour, just like cannibals. It is pure warfare we
are having now.’31 Even worse were the reports of boredom as the 
war dragged on and the less publicised accounts of drunkenness and
licentious behaviour.32
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Relations with native peoples were a feature of all campaigns as
expeditionary forces required assistance in labouring, transportation,
carrying messages through enemy lines, gathering intelligence and pro-
viding supplies (as soldiers were always ready to supplement their
rations by bartering for extra foodstuffs; see chapter 6). Natives some-
times fought alongside British forces, albeit with differing degrees of
enthusiasm, as the Fantes, Swazis and Sudanese battalions demon-
strated, and appreciation of their services varied accordingly. The
capacity of ordinary soldiers to forge good relations with friendly
natives en route or near camp sites, such as Korosko, was well docu-
mented, and their sexual liaisons, if rarely mentioned in print, found
confirmation in the numbers hospitalised with venereal disease in
Egypt and in Kitchener’s famous refusal to quarter the Seaforth High-
landers in Assouan ‘where there are 3,000 Sudanese ladies’.33 Relations
with native bearers, labourers and traders were often more brutal, espe-
cially if soldiers felt that they had been cheated. Physical intimidation
of ‘these black fellows’, including threats to punch them ‘on the nose’,
as described by Lance Corporal J. A. Cosser in Natal, could facilitate
transactions: ‘They run about here naked and look horrible, but they
are very frightened of the soldiers’, and punishments, if possibly less
systematic than those meted out by the Boers, certainly included the
flogging of ‘niggers’, as periodically mentioned in Pine-Coffin’s diary.34
When military correspondents disparaged natives, they both
reflected and reinforced popular stereotypes about blacks in Britain,
not least when they had the backing of Wolseley himself.35 This writ-
ing, though, has to be placed in context. Many of the complaints about
native auxiliaries occurred along the line of march when expeditionary
forces depended upon native support but found that progress across dif-
ficult terrain, and often in adverse climatic conditions, was slow, frus-
trating and beset with breakdowns. Further protests arose whenever
the natives deserted in the face of the enemy, not least the 300 of the
Natal Native Contingent who fled from Rorke’s Drift. Yet some sol-
diers remained philosophical: Acting Commissary W. A. Dunne and
Private Henry Hook, VC, praised the natives for their assistance in
building the defences at Rorke’s Drift, while Chard responded to their
flight by simply compressing the overextended perimeter. The limita-
tions of these ill-equipped auxiliaries, led by commanders who could
barely speak their language, were all too obvious: as Colonel Pearson
remarked, they had little to offer in the firing line and were best
employed in scouting and pursuit. As he made this assessment in com-
mending the gallantry of some native scouts who had died trying to
hold their ground against a Zulu impi, he was proffering a military
judgement and not a racial slur.36 By the late 1890s, when the British
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fought alongside a properly trained, equipped and led Egyptian Army,
many lauded the contribution of the Sudanese and Egyptian soldiers in
the battles of Atbara and Omdurman (see chapter 8).
Regular soldiers had mixed feelings, too, about other sources of aux-
iliary support. In the South African War where they desperately needed
reinforcements, they praised the specialist skills of the Lovat scouts,
the zeal of the CIV, and the improvement in Volunteer Service Com-
panies once they became acclimatised and were trained by regular offi-
cers and NCOs.37 Less appreciated were the rates of pay and preferential
terms of service enjoyed by the volunteers and the accolades accorded
them by the press: ‘The papers’, wrote Lieutenant John Bryan from
Gloucester, ‘are at present full of nothing but C.I.V. We are getting a bit
tired of it out here’.38 The Imperial Yeomanry aroused even more ire:
Pine-Coffin regarded them as a ‘useless lot’ and ‘too slow’ in their
patrolling and skirmishing with the enemy, while a Bristolian officer
maintained: ‘It is rather hard for men who have borne the heat and
burden of the day from October 1899 onwards to see raw boys, who can
neither shoot, ride, nor look after their horses, receive five shillings
[25p] a day, while they only get, say, 1s 2d (6p).’39 Several soldiers drew
attention to disasters involving the yeomanry, such as the seizure of
the camp at Tweefontein (25 December 1901) and Methuen’s defeat at
Tweebosch (7 March 1902), and a Seaforth observed: ‘We call the Yeo-
manry De Wet’s bodyguard or McConnachie’s [sic] Scouts as they think
of nothing else but their stomachs.’40
Soldiers were somewhat more appreciative of the services of colo-
nial auxiliaries, not only locally raised bodies such as the Imperial
Light Horse and Major M. F. Rimington’s Guides, but contingents from
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Apart from reservations about
the discipline of some colonial units, officers frequently lauded their
skills. As Corporal Jewell (New Zealand Mounted Rifles) informed his
sister in Cheltenham: ‘General French has complimented us on many
occasions on our coolness under fire and our horsemastership. He said
we could gallop across country where English cavalry could only walk;
we were the best scouts he had ever employed; and we always brought
in something – either prisoners, horses, sheep, cattle, or valuable infor-
mation’.41 Yet the political significance of their contribution, which
was evident even when the first Australians served in Suakin (see chap-
ter 6), far exceeded their skills and limited numbers. Private Tom Wood
(2/DCLI) admitted: ‘I had no idea of the greatness of the British Empire
until I came out here. It is surprising to see men here from all parts of
the world, always ready to uphold the Union Jack, and to support each
other in any danger.’42 Imperial ideology, if less conspicuous in corre-
spondence from Zululand,43 had become more apparent in letters from
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South Africa, where Staff-Sergeant Wallace H. Wood (Army Medical
Staff Corps) argued that ‘this is the beginning of an empire which will
be the means of preventing in the future such wars as this; as no coun-
try in the world, knowing the Empire is one in deed as well as in name,
will ever dare to throw down the gauntlet to us’.44
Most correspondents focused on more immediate matters, espe-
cially their travails in African conditions. Inevitably short-service 
soldiers on expeditionary forces described their experiences, especially
any ‘baptisms of fire’, somewhat differently from those who had
already seen action or spent several years in Indian, Mediterranean or
African garrisons. Doubts about the reliability of short-service soldiers
and reservists diminished after the Egyptian campaign, but debates
persisted about the influence of old soldiers, whom Methuen regarded
as ‘grumbling brutes’ and his ‘curse’ in Bechuanaland.45 If large num-
bers of seasoned soldiers had to be incorporated into under-strength
units earmarked for expeditionary service (and this was a recurrent
failing of the Cardwell system), tensions could occur. Lance-Sergeant
Grieve argued that the 1/Seaforths, when bound for the Sudan in 1898,
‘is not what it used to be – that lot that joined us in Malta have played
the mischief with it’.46 Once campaigns were underway, writers dwelt
upon other themes, notably the fate of comrades under fire, pride in 
the performance of their own units, praise or criticism of specific 
commanders, and adaptation to the varying demands of colonial 
warfare. 
As all these wars were wars against nature as much as, if not, at
times, more than, against their adversaries, soldiers commended both
their naval support, with generally excellent relations between the two
services at operational and tactical levels,47 and the endeavours of their
supporting units. The Royal Engineers were to the fore in most cam-
paigns, clearing paths and camp sites in the tropical rain forest, build-
ing forts and roads in Zululand, repairing boats on the Nile,
supervising railway construction and the erection of telegraph lines in
the Sudan, and undertaking a multitude of duties, often at great risk,
in South Africa. Sapper R. Gomer recalled how his company with its 6
horses, 20 mules and 406 oxen was one of the first into the Orange Free
State, building bridges, running ferry boats on steel cables and cutting
roads out of river banks, while 17th Company (RE) having erected the
pontoon bridges across the Tugela, was the first unit to scale Spion Kop
at night, in a vain attempt to construct defences on the top. ‘Out of my
Company’, wrote a survivor, ‘we lost the Major commanding and three
sappers, a lieutenant and four sappers wounded.’48 A Tauntonian baker,
Corporal Frank Williams (Army Service Corps) described the prodi-
gious task of baking for Methuen’s division, with 100 bakers producing
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30,000 loaves, sometimes 35,000 loaves, each day. These 1.5lb loaves
were baked in 55 ‘Aldershot’ ovens, each accommodating 108 loaves,
and the work was undertaken ‘all day in the burning sun, made worse
by the heat of the ovens’.49 Forces on the lines of communications
brought forward the food, ammunition and other supplies, guarded the
stores at fortified bases and supplied the troops at the front. Another
Somerset soldier, Private E. S. Stagg, writing from Estcourt in Natal,
wrote: ‘We are at it day and night. We never know what it is to sleep
with our boots off, and we always have our rifles by our sides . . . We
are very dissatisfied with our lot.’50 Private W. J. Brown (RAMC) soon
found himself in a similar predicament, working ‘day and night, and
the nursing sisters the same’, in a nearby hospital at Chieveley. It was
‘something awful to see the wounded coming in’ and ‘miserable’ to
work ‘under canvas’ in the heat and thunderstorms.51 If the medical
arrangements foundered when typhoid swept the camp at Bloem-
fontein, the army recovered and depended, as ever, upon its support
services to function effectively. 
Given the risks of men succumbing to disease and fever, especially
when confined in cramped conditions, British expeditionary forces
usually sought early and decisive battles. Soldiers rightly worried
about languishing in camps or the vulnerability of their slow-moving
convoys whether in southern Africa or the Sudan (see chapters 2 and
6), and so generally relished the prospect of engaging the enemy. They
described fighting in a various formations: the awkwardness of the
‘square’ when moving through thick bush or over broken ground, the
maximised fire-power of the ‘line’ at Omdurman, and the movement
towards more widely deployed formations, with close artillery sup-
port, in South Africa. If wedded to the strategic offensive, British forces
often fought most effectively on the defensive, exploiting their advan-
tages in fire-power (even if a few actually regretted the absence of hand-
to-hand combat at Omdurman).52 Soldiers praised the disciplined
mobility of the Zulu, the courage of the Mahdists, and the shooting and
field-craft of the Boers, with perceptive comparisons made by veterans
like Percy Scrope Marling, VC, who fought the Boers, the Egyptians
and the Mahdists all before his twenty-third birthday (and fought the
Boers again in the South African War), or Robert Charles Coveny who
fought in the Asante, Egyptian, Suakin and Nile campaigns before
being killed at the battle of Kirbekan. In rating the Hadendowa Arabs
as their most formidable foe (see chapter 5), they testified to the endur-
ing legacy of the heroic, warrior ethos. This ethos found reflection in
other campaigns when soldiers lauded the fighting qualities of the
Asante, the Zulu, the Pedi and the black Sudanese, but also in their
contempt for the Egyptians in 1882 and criticism of the Boers for their
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reluctance on many (though by no means all) occasions to engage in
hand-to-hand combat.53
Bitter experience, however, ensured that the more discerning
realised that these campaigns would not always be resolved by the
clash of arms. Political pressures had intruded in 1881 and 1885,
prompting the vows of vengeance for Gordon in 1898 and the exulta-
tion in the relief of Ladysmith on Majuba day. ‘We gave them Majuba
day!’ wrote Corporal A. Hawkins (2/Devons), so helping ‘to rub off the
disgrace of what Gladstone did when he held the place in 1881’. He
would continue fighting ‘to the last for the honour of my country’,54 a
refrain that recurred in the letter-writing from the various campaigns.
Private A. Spear (1/Devons) was equally blunt in berating his father,
who was a Liberal: ‘You can see now what your Grand Old Man has
done for England. We should not have been in this war if Gladstone had
not given in to the Boers at Majuba in such a disgraceful way.’55
Whether making a point, raising an issue or fulminating over griev-
ances, real or imagined, these correspondents were reflecting their feel-
ings as soldiers on active service and commenting on many aspects of
the campaigning experience. Whenever they did so in more than a per-
functory manner, they left an invaluable record of uncensored eye-wit-
ness accounts, even if it is a record that has to be placed in context and
interpreted with care.
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